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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent nationwide developments have highlighted the importance 
of examining potential coverage for first-party contamination claims 
under property insurance. The staggering cost of cleaning up pol-
lution has triggered a search for insurance funds to pay for this 
effort. The primary focus of disputes to recover insurance proceeds 
has been an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify an insured under 
a policy of Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) insurance. Prop-
erty insurance policies, however, are fast becoming a new target for 
claims to recover losses caused by contamination. 1 
Several factors have contributed to the growing trend toward 
seeking property insurance coverage. Governmental agencies at all 
levels have stepped up the pressure on property owners to correct 
1 See generally Business Insurance, Nov. 6, 1989, at 92, col. 4 (reporting on the increased 
incidence of claims under property insurance policies for coverage to pay the costs of cleaning 
up hazardous wastes pursuant to governmental order). See also Glad & Barnes, The Final 
Frontier: First-Party Environmental Claims, INS. LITIG. REP., Jan. 1990, at 3. Glad and 
Barnes predict that "much of the emphasis in the future coverage litigation for hazardous 
waste claims will be in the virgin field of first-party [property 1 coverage." I d. 
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the environmental hazards on their own property. The public is more 
aware of the heightened risk of damage to property and the enhanced 
threat to human health posed by asbestos, toxic waste, and other 
harmful pollutants. In light of the recently expanded pollution ex-
clusion in post-1986 CGL policies,2 CGL funds to pay for cleaning up 
contaminants will become less available. These factors, in conjunc-
tion with the near absolute unavailability of environmental impair-
ment liability coverage,3 have contributed to an increase in contam-
2 The 1986 revised pollution exclusion differs significantly from previous versions. There is 
no longer an exception for the "sudden and accidental" emission of pollutants. The deletion 
should avoid the problems of interpretation that resulted when many courts found these words 
to be ambiguous. Further, claims based on threatened and alleged emissions are excluded 
under the revision. The latter change should exclude coverage for actions seeking injunctive 
relief against the insured to prevent imminent future pollution. For a discussion of the 1986 
revision and its implications on comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance coverage for 
pollution claims, see Gordon & Westendorf, Liability Coverage for Toxic Tort, Hazardous 
Waste Disposal and Other Pollution Exposures, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 567, 603-607 (1988-89). 
3 Environmental Impairment Liability (ElL) insurance is not presently available for pur-
chase. ElL coverage was developed by the Insurance Services Office, a statistical and rating 
organization associated with the insurance industry, and was meant to comply with the financial 
responsibility requirements established under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605-9675 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). Coverage was provided under ElL 
policies for gradual-non-sudden-pollution damage liability due to property damage, bodily 
injury, and other losses arising both on and off the insured's premises. ElL policies not only 
covered the business or entity insured, but also provided coverage for directors, officers, and 
employees of the insured who were acting within the scope of their corporate duties. The 
policy was offered on a claims-made basis, that is, coverage was provided only for qualified 
liability claims that the insured became aware of and reported to the insurer during the policy 
period. 
The coverage proved to be unpopular with insureds because of the high premiums and the 
extremely limited coverage that insurers were willing to issue on a location-by-location basis. 
ElL insurance presented problems for the insurance industry because such coverage was very 
risky for insurers and posed the potential for heavy losses. Therefore, an insurer sought a 
great deal of information about its insured's operations in order to assess the risk prior to 
issuing coverage. As part of the application process to obtain ElL coverage, the insured was 
asked to provide a location description, to disclose all raw and process materials used, and to 
supply information regarding environmental and safety officials at the site, and effluent-
discharge and waste-disposal information. Also, the insured was asked to provide a statement 
regarding its pollution-enforcement history and known conditions at its premises that could 
give rise to environmental claims. Following receipt of such information, the insurer ordinarily 
conducted an on-site risk assessment through an engineering firm hired by the insurer. The 
engineer would report to the insurer with a recommendation that the risks were too high, 
that further inspection should be conducted, or that the insurance should be written. Another 
reason for the unpopUlarity of ElL coverage with insureds is that the statements made in the 
policy application and during the risk assessment conducted by the insurer were thought to 
provide a roadmap for discovery in subsequent hazardous waste liability litigation. See gen-
erally DORE, LAW OF TOXIC TORTS, § 28.18 (1988); Kunzman, The Insurer as Surrogate 
Regulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution or Perversion, 20 FORUM 469, 476-78 
(1985); Del Tufo & Rohn, The Impact of Environmental Regulations on Business Transactions 
1988: Real Property Transfers and Mergers and Acquisitions, and Environmental Liabilities 
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ination claims under property policies. The question of whether 
coverage for such claims exists under homeowners and commercial 
property policies, however, has gone largely unexplored. 4 
During the 1990s most property insurers will be presented with 
first-party claims for losses arising from damage caused by the re-
moval of toxic waste, asbestos, or other harmful pollutants. It cannot 
be predicted with certainty how the respective courts in each juris-
diction will rule on claims for property insurance coverage for con-
tamination losses and clean-up expenses. Nevertheless, this Article 
analyzes noteworthy defenses to such claims under standard prop-
erty insurance policies. The Article further argues that property 
insurance policies should not cover, and were never intended to 
cover, pollution-related losses. 
The Article begins by addressing the potential for conflicting in-
terpretations of coverage, and discusses the possible bases that may 
be alleged by insureds in favor of coverage under the prevalent 
policy forms for property insurance. 5 Policy defenses that should 
exclude property insurance coverage for environmental losses are 
analyzed. These defenses include relying upon the coverage require-
ments of direct loss, comprising fortuitous physical damage to cov-
ered property, with no increase of hazard. 
and Insurance Coverage Issues: An Overview (322 Practicing Law Institute publication 561) 
[hereinafter PLIIREAL], Dec. 1, 1988, at 51-52; Hyman, Toxic Liability in Real Estate 
Transactions, 325 Practicing Law Institute Course Handbook on Real Estate Development 
and Construction Financing 837 (Feb. 1, 1989); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Liti-
gation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1577-78 (1986). 
4 The few articles addressing this question are: MALLIN, POLLUTION AND CONTAMINATION: 
How WILL PROPERTY INSURERS RESPOND? (1986); Butler, Quarantining the Contamination 
Exclusion, in THE ALL RISK POLICY: ITS PROBLEMS, PERILS AND PRACTICAL ApPLICATION, 
1986 ABA SEC. TORT AND INS. PRAC. 367; Hook, Legal Aspects of Contamination and 
Pollution Coverage (May 17, 1989) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Property Claims 
Forum of Sacramento); PROPERTY Loss RESEARCH BUREAU QUESTION & ANSWER SERV., 
85.1 Contamination by Asbestos (Oct. 1985); articles reprinted in Environmental Claims and 
Property Insurance Coverage, 1989 ABA SEC. TORT AND INS. PRAC. [hereinafter Environ-
mental Claims]; Glad & Barnes, supra note 1, at 3. See also Paris, Asbestos in Buildings, 
Property Coverage Claims, in ASBESTOS PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS SEMINAR COURSE BOOK 
906C (Def. Res. Inst. June, 1989); Hall & Hall, Property Insurance Coverage for Asbestos 
Removal Costs, in ASBESTOS IN BUILDINGS: THE LAWS, THE COSTS, THE SOLUTIONS 237 
(1988). 
5 The most commonly used property insurance forms provide all risk coverage, or named 
peril coverage for specified risks that include hail, windstorm, fire, smoke, vandalism/malicious 
mischief, and explosion. Primary property insurance policies also include debris-removal cov-
erage. S. HUEBNER, K. BLACK JR. & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 150-
60, 556-63 (2d ed. 1979) (describing the predominant combinations of "packaged" insurance 
coverages that are marketed as homeowners and commercial property policies); see also infra 
notes 6, 8. 
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Apart from the defenses showing that environmental claims often 
fall outside the scope of standard property insurance, one or more 
exclusions from coverage frequently direct that property insurance 
should not be triggered in pollution claims. Policy clauses affirma-
tively barring coverage for environmental losses include exclusions 
for losses or damage to land, the omission of water from the definition 
of covered property, and the exception from coverage of loss or 
damage due to contamination. 
The Article examines modern revisions to standard policy forms 
clarifying that little or no coverage is intended under property in-
surance for environmental risks, absent a special endorsement ex-
pressly providing such coverage. Then, the Article reviews other 
defenses that may preclude coverage based on the policy period, 
contractual limitation period, or untimely notice of the claim. 
Additionally, the Article discusses public policy considerations 
which suggest that the costs of cleaning up the environment should 
be borne by polluters and not by their property insurers. Finally, 
the Article encourages insurers to consider bringing third-party ac-
tions against parties responsible for the pollution if coverage litiga-
tion between an insurer and an insured ensues. 
II. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS THAT CONTAMINATION COMPRISES 
AN INSURED PERIL 
When confronted with a contamination loss, a predictable tension 
inevitably develops between an insured, who is seeking to realize as 
much financing as possible from every available source to repair or 
replace damaged property and to clean up the environmental hazard, 
and an insurer, who is attempting to limit coverage only to risks it 
intended to insure under the property insurance policy. It should 
not be surprising that, from time to time, insureds and insurers 
adopt conflicting interpretations of the coverage available. To re-
spond effectively, an insurer must understand the bases for the view 
of coverage adopted by an insured. Policyholders, too, must reason-
ably comprehend the terms and conditions of their policy and the 
applicable law governing their claims. 
Under standard forms of property insurance,6 there are two pri-
mary avenues an insured will likely pursue in attempting to recover 
6 For a succinct review and summary of the development of standard property insurance 
policy forms in the United States, see R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 
233-62 (7th ed. 1980) [hereinafter MEHR & CAMMACK]. See also infra note 8. 
236 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:231 
for environmental losses. Under one approach, an insured may seek 
to recover by alleging that the pollution comprises a peril insured 
under the policy. Peril in this context means the cause of the loss, 
and encompasses the risk, hazard, or contingency insured against 
by the contract of insurance. 7 Typical perils that can be insured 
against are fire, hail, smoke damage, explosion, and windstorm, as 
well as vandalism and malicious mischief. 8 Policy restrictions such 
as limitations on the original grant of coverage or exclusions from 
coverage, however, should be taken into account by an insured and 
may appropriately be considered by an insurer when responding to 
a claim. 
A second approach to gain coverage is to contend that the affected 
property and the residue of the contamination constitute "debris" 
for debris-removal coverage. Most property insurance policies, how-
ever, contain provisions requiring that the debris must be made up 
of covered property, that the loss must be from a peril insured 
against, and that the total loss to property plus the cost of debris 
removal must not exceed the amount of insurance. 9 Further, post-
1986 policy forms have limited significantly the scope of debris-
removal coverage for pollution-related losses. Possible claims under 
these two approaches for obtaining property insurance coverage are 
outlined below. 
A. Insured Risk as Proximate Cause of the Loss 
The first approach to a recovery for a contamination loss involves 
alleging a direct physical loss to covered property proximately 
caused by an insured peril during the policy term. A key aspect of 
7 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (5th ed. 1979); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 
(3d ed. 1969); see also W. RODDA, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 2 (1966). Rodda 
defines "risk," "hazard," and "peril:" "In their insurance usage, the word hazard tends to 
mean something that exposes a property to loss, and a peril is the cause of the loss, such as 
the peril of fire. The uncertainty as to whether a fire will occur." ld. (emphasis in original). 
But see R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, 
LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 10 (1988). Keeton and Widiss note that 
"[slome insurance literature suggests distinctive meanings for the terms 'risk,' 'hazard' and 
'peril.' ... However, there is no commonly accepted standard usage which establishes or 
recognizes separate and distinct definitions for these terms." ld. (footnotes omitted). 
8 MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 147-51, 245-47 (in analyzing potential coverage, 
where the perils are named, their meaning must be defined, the peril must proximately cause 
the loss, and coverage limitations on the perils must be examined). 
9 P. THOMAS & P. REED, ADJUSTMENT OF PROPERTY LOSSES 43-44 (4th ed. 1977) [here-
inafter THOMAS & REEDl. 
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any property policy10 is the statement of perils insured against, 
namely, either "risks of direct physical loss" or specific "named per-
ils. " 
1. All Risk Coverage 
Coverage under an all risk policyll extends to physical loss of, or 
damage to, property arising from any fortuitous cause, unless spe-
cifically excluded. 12 An insured has the burden of proving that the 
covered property was physically lost or damaged due to a fortuitous 
10 The Insurance Services Office (ISO) is a national organization that has developed standard 
forms of policies that are used frequently by insurers after having been filed with and approved 
by the insurance departments of the states in which the coverage is sold. I d. at 24. Standard 
ISO forms of commercial and homeowners property policies include the following: Commercial 
Policy Forms: IL 00 17 11 85 (Common Policy Conditions); CP 00 90 11 85 (Commercial 
Property Conditions); CP 00 10 11 85 (Building and Personal Property Coverage Form); CP 
10 20 11 85 (Cause of Loss-Broad Form); and CP 10 30 11 85 (Cause of Loss - Special Form). 
Commercial Lines (Special Multi-Peril Forms): MP 00 90 (Ed. 0777) (Special Multi-Peril Policy 
Conditions and Definitions); MP 00 13 (Ed. 1083) (Special Building Form); and MP 00 14 (Ed. 
10 83) (Special Personal Property Form). Personal Lines: HO-3 (Ed. 04 84) (Homeowners 
Special Form). The Commercial Policy Forms were introduced in approximately 1986 to 
replace the Commercial Lines, as well as the standard commercial fire forms (i.e., CF 00 13 
(Ed. 10 83) (Structures) and CF 00 14 (Ed. 10 83) (Personal Property)). For the most part, 
the above forms provide all risk coverage. The HO-3, however, provides all risk coverage 
only on the insured dwelling and structures. It provides named peril coverage for unscheduled 
personal property. Similarly, the CP 10 20 11 85 provides a named peril coverage for com-
mercial buildings and business personal property. Many of the forms can be found in MALLIN, 
supra note 4, at 139-92. Additional forms can be obtained directly from ISO. Citations will 
refer only to policy form numbers. 
11 Early forms of property policies, other than "named-peril," referred to all risk coverage. 
Since 1983, however, such property policies have omitted the phrase "all risk" and insure 
against "risks of direct physical loss." The term "all risk" is generally no longer used in 
insurance policies. Of course, even when policies were designated as "all risk," they did not 
cover every risk of loss that could possibly befall an insured. Under such coverage, only 
covered property that was physically damaged due to a fortuitous and nonexcludable event 
was insured. An insured had the burden of proving it had suffered a covered loss. See sources 
cited infra note 13. With these limitations in mind, for ease of reference, this Article will 
generally refer throughout to all risk coverage in order to distinguish it from named peril 
coverage. 
12 13A G. COUCH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 48:141 (2d ed. 
1982 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D); R. OSLER & J. BICKLEY, GLOS-
SARY OF INSURANCE TERMS (1982). See, e.g., Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. BACJAC Indus., 701 
P.2d 127, 128 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). The court observed: 
An "all risk" policy is a special type of coverage extending to risks not usually covered 
under other insurance, and recovery is allowed thereunder for all losses, other than 
those resulting from a willful or fraudulent act of the insured, unless the policy 
contains a specific provision expressly excluding a particular loss from coverage. 
Id. For a general review of judicial interpretation and construction of all risk insurance 
coverage, see Annotation, Coverage Under "All Risks" Insurance, 88 A.L.R.2D 1122 (1963). 
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event. 13 In evaluating a claim for potential coverage, an insurance 
company should determine whether one or more specific exclusions 
apply.14 Under the following approaches, an insured may argue that 
a contamination loss is covered under an all risk policy. 
a. Third-Party Negligence 
One theory on which an insured may rely for coverage is concur-
rent causation analysis. Application of that doctrine has been devel-
oped primarily by the California courts, but also has been applied in 
various forms in other jurisdictions. As part of the concurrent cau-
sation analysis, there will likely be a contention that third-party 
negligence constitutes an independent peril of loss that is covered. 
Even though one or more exclusions in an all risk policy may bar 
coverage for environmental losses, policyholders may adopt the view 
that there is coverage because the immediate cause of the loss was 
the negligence of a third person. 
A recent decision by the new California Supreme Court,15 how-
ever, has essentially abandoned the concurrent causation doctrine in 
California in the context of first-party property insurance claims. In 
Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty CO.,16 the court reinstated a 
13 See 21 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12245.25 (1980 & Supp. 1989); 
13A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 48:142 (1982 & Supp. 1989); THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, 
at 123-24. 
14 THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 12. 
15 Since the late 1950's, the California Supreme Court had been generally dominated by 
jurisprudentially liberal justices. In 1986, however, a highly political campaign was launched 
to oust from office Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph 
Grodin. Under California law, all three were up for confirmation re-election to the court that 
year. Critics excoriated the "liberal Bird Court" for its consistent record of reversing death 
penalty sentences on automatic appeal and for its pattern of "anti-business" decisions. The 
three justices were defeated in their bids for re-election. 
In the aftermath, California Governor George Deuekmejian fashioned a conservative ma-
jority on the court. Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas was installed and Governor Deuekmejian 
appointed Associate Justices John A. Arguelles, David N. Eagleson, and Marcus M. Kaufman. 
Holdover jurists remaining on the court were conservative Associate Justice Edward A. 
Panelli and liberal Associate Justices M. Stanley Mosk and Allen Broussard. Justice Arguelles 
retired from the court at the conclusion of the Lucas Court's second year. He was replaced 
by Associate Justice Joyce Kennard, whose appointment was not expected to have a dramatic 
impact on the outcome of pending cases. See Egelko, Duke's Court, CALIF. LAW., June 1987, 
at 28; Friend, Rose Bird's Being Run Out of Office-And She Doesn't Seem to Care, AM. 
LAW., Sept. 1986, at 335. For an analysis of the track record of decisions established by the 
Lucas court, see Uelmen, The Lucas Court: A First-Year Report Card, CALIF. LAW., June 
1988, at 30; Uelmen, Mainstream Justice: A Review of the Second Year of the Lucas Court, 
CALIF. LAW., July 1989, at 36. 
16 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989). The Garvey court reached its decision by a five-
to-two vote. Justices Panelli, Eagleson and Arguelles joined with Chief Justice Lucas in the 
majority opinion. Justice Kaufman, joined by Justice Panelli, offered a concurring opinion in 
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more traditional form of proximate cause analysis in place of con-
current causation analysis. Following the established doctrine of 
California, the trial court in Garvey ruled that a homeowner's insurer 
that issued an all risk policy would be liable to its insured for damage 
resulting from concurrent causes if either of the causes was a covered 
peril. 17 
The trial court in Garvey directed a verdict against the insurance 
company because there was evidence that negligent construction, 
considered a covered peril in California, was at least a partial cause 
in damaging the insured's home. The jury then returned a verdict 
that included one million dollars in punitive damages. 18 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal to 
reverse the trial court. The action was remanded for a new trial to 
allow the jury to resolve the causation issue as a question of fact. 19 
The Garvey decision reflected the first time the California Supreme 
Court had considered the concurrent causation doctrine in an insur-
ance context since 1973. In Garvey, the court articulated a standard 
of causation for first-party property cases for the first time since 
1963 as it rejected application of the concurrent causation doctrine 
in first-party claims. The court revived a test originally articulated 
by an earlier California Supreme Court in Sabella v. Wisler. 20 After 
which he suggested that concurrent causation should not even be applied in determining 
coverage under liability insurance policies. Justices Mosk and Broussard each authored spirited 
dissents. 
17 770 P.2d at 706, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 294. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303. The Garvey decision did not hold that coverage for the 
insurance claim before it was automatically excluded. The majority remanded the case for 
retrial and a determination of coverage under a proximate cause standard. The court expressly 
noted that its decision would not "automatically produce a victory for the insurer." [d. at 714 
n.ll, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302 n.ll. The court explained: "Indeed, a reasonable juror could find 
that under the facts of this case, negligent construction [a covered perill was the predominant 
cause of the property damage. In any event, the ultimate coverage determination is for the 
jury." [d. 
20 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). In Sabella, the insureds sought 
coverage under their "all physical loss" homeowners policy for damage to their house caused 
by earth subsidence and extensive settling caused by a leak in a sewer pipe. The applicable 
policy excluded coverage for losses caused by "settling." In ruling on the property damage 
claim, the court concluded that the settling exclusion did not apply. There was insurance 
coverage because the ruptured sewer pipe that leaked, rather than settling, was the efficient 
proximate cause of the loss. [d. at 24-26, 30-32, 377 P.2d at 890-92, 894-95, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 
690-92, 694-95. The Sabella court explained: 
"[I]n determining whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a 
concurrence of different causes, the efficient cause-the one that sets others in 
motion-is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other causes 
may follow it, and operate more immecliately in producing the disaster." 
[d. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (quoting 6 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1466, 
at 5298 (1930». 
240 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:231 
Garvey, the California standard of causation in first-party property 
insurance claims requires a finding that an insured risk is the "effi-
cient proximate cause" of the insured's 10SS.21 
The court distinguished the principles for determining coverage 
for damage to property under a first-party policy, insured versus 
insurer, from the applicable rules for tort liability coverage under a 
third-party liability insurance policy, third-party claimant versus 
insured, defended by insurer.22 Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the 
majority, criticized the application of the concurrent causation doc-
trine articulated for tort liability coverage in first-party property 
insurance claims.23 In Garvey, the court clarified that the concurrent 
causation doctrine established by the California Supreme Court for 
tort liability coverage in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Partridge24 does not apply in the context of first-party claims. 
21 770 P.2d at 714-15, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03. The causation standard for coverage under 
property insurance in California after Garvey is focused on the "predominating cause," not 
the "moving cause" or "triggering event." [d. at 708, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 296. See, e.g., Mission 
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 258 Cal. Rptr. 639, 645 (Ct. App. 1989) (where 
jury instruction defined "'efficient proximate cause'" as "the cause that sets the others in 
motion," the trial court instruction was erroneous because it suggested that the jury should 
focus on the "triggering cause" rather than the "predominating cause"). 
22 In declining to approve the extension of tort liability insurance analysis to the first-party 
insurance case before it, the court observed: 
[Tlhe distinction between first- and third-party claims can be summarized as follows: 
if the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the insured, 
the claim is first party in nature. If the insured is seeking coverage against liability 
of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature. 
770 P.2d at 705 n.2, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293 n.2 (emphasis in original). 
23 [d. at 709-11, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 297-99; see also Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85, 90 (Ct. App. 1989) (acknowledging that in Garvey the 
California Supreme Court distinguished first-party causation analysis from that applied under 
third-party liability policies) (the Prudential-LM[ case is of interest for discussion purposes 
only because, pending review by the California Supreme Court, the decision by the Court of 
Appeal has no precedential value and may not be cited as authority), review granted, Sept. 
21, 1989. 
24 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973). In Garvey, the majority noted that 
Partridge addressed causation in a third-party liability context but that it did not consider 
how concurrent causation could apply in the first-party property insurance context. In Par-
tridge, the court considered whether two negligent acts of the insured, constituting concurrent 
causes of an accident, triggered coverage under both the insured's homeowners policy and 
automobile liability policy or whether coverage was limited to the liability policy. The insured 
was sued by a passenger who had been injured while riding in the insured's vehicle, driven 
by the insured. The insured driver drove off a paved highway in pursuit of a fleeing jackrabbit 
while holding a gun that he had modified to create a "hair trigger action." The gun accidentally 
discharged when the vehicle hit a bump, and the passenger was seriously injured. [d. at 96-
98, 514 P.2d at 124-26, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 812-14. The homeowners policy expressly excluded 
coverage for "bodily injury ... arising out of the ... use of ... any motor vehicle." [d. at 
99, 514 P.2d at 126, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The insurer, which issued both policies, contended 
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The court cautioned that the application of a Partridge concurrent 
causation approach to coverage in first-party claims would essentially 
nullify the specific exclusions contained in all risk policies, and would 
abrogate the terms limiting the grant of coverage provided under 
all risk property insurance. 25 Such a result would ignore the terms 
and conditions of the all risk policy and, therefore, would be unac-
ceptable. The California Supreme Court restricted the application of 
concurrent causation analysis only to coverage questions under pol-
icies protecting the insured against liability claims by third parties. 26 
Additionally, the Garvey court continued to recognize that, in 
California, negligence constitutes an independent peril covered un-
der first-party property insurance. 27 The majority, however, ac-
knowledged that distinctions between types of negligence may be 
valid for determining coverage. Without addressing the question, 
the court left open the possibility that coverage may not exist for 
negligent acts undertaken "for the sole purpose"28 of protecting 
against an excluded risk. The court also declined to comment on 
whether it would enforce new policy language specifically excluding 
third-party negligence as a covered peril. 29 
that only the automobile policy provided coverage. The trial court found that the insured had 
been negligent both in modifying the trigger mechanism of the gun and in driving his vehicle 
off the paved road onto the rough terrain. It then concluded that both policies applied to the 
accident and that the injured third-party claimant was entitled to recover under both. Id. at 
100-01, 514 P.2d at 127, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 814. 
25 The court's criticism of the extension of the analysis in Partridge to first-party property 
claims is well summarized by the majority at the beginning of the Garvey opinion. 770 P.2d 
at 705, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293; see also Prudential-LMI, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 90 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(reiterating that in Garvey the California Supreme Court concluded that the policyholder and 
the insurance company could not reasonably expect coverage for a property loss where the 
efficient proximate cause of the loss was a peril expressly excluded by the terms and conditions 
of the policy). 
26 770 P.2d at 705, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293. 
27 Id. at 711-12, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. 
28 The California Supreme Court observed that it may be important for courts to distinguish 
between types of negligence when determining whether there is coverage for negligent acts 
under property policies. The court stated that when the issue is raised future courts might 
recognize that there should be no coverage for negligent acts undertaken for the sole purpose 
of protecting insured premises against risks specifically excluded under a policy. I d. at 712 
n.7, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 300 n.7. 
29 The California Supreme Court did not discuss the effect of the new "anti-concurrent 
cause" policy exclusions that specifically exclude third-party negligence. The majority opinion 
stated that "[blecause the effect of the new language is unclear, we refer only to pre-1983 
policies in our explanation of liability and property insurance coverage on the principles 
applicable to such policies." Id. at 710 n.6, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299 n.6. 
For a general discussion of the revised policy language adopted by insurers in response to 
the concurrent causation doctrine, see Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy 
Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985). The reaction of the courts 
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It remains to be seen whether other states that have adopted 
some form of concurrent causation analysis will follow California's 
lead in repudiating the doctrine in first-party property claims. Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers30 is a case in 
which the court was persuaded that the negligent act of a third party 
was covered under an all risk policy, even though the loss resulted 
from contamination, an excluded peril. A tank truck driver uninten-
tionally poured an entire load of fuel oil into the insured's under-
ground heptane tank at the insured's industrial storage facility. The 
fuel mixed with the heptane. The mixture was fed into an auxiliary 
tank used for production purposes and damaged the insured's work 
in progress.31 
The policy at issue provided coverage "'against all risks of direct 
physical loss or damage from any external cause to the insured 
property, except as hereinafter excluded."'32 The policy then ex-
cluded losses "'caused by or resulting from . . . contamination . . . 
unless such loss is caused directly by physical damage to the prop-
erty covered, or to premises containing such property, by a peril not 
excluded in this policy."'33 The trial court concluded that coverage 
existed for the loss under these policy terms and entered judgment 
in the insured's favor. 34 The insurer appealed. 
On appeal the court found that, under "any reasonable definition," 
the damage to the insured's work in progress was "caused by con-
to the new policy forms has been mixed. There are only a few cases at the appellate level 
addressing the redrafted policy language. Several courts, however, have enforced the revised 
language and declined to grant coverage for third-party negligence based on a concurrent 
causation analysis. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319, 321 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (applying California law) (the concurrent causation exclusion was unambiguous and 
did not violate the California Insurance Code); Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P.2d 678, 
685 (Colo. 1989) (the "efficient moving cause" rule must yield to the language of the insurance 
policy); Tzung v. State Farm, 873 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying California law) (under 
policy provisions excluding coverage for faulty workmanship and inherent defects, there was 
no coverage for losses caused by third-party negligence in the design and construction of the 
insured's apartment building); Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 258 
Cal. Rptr. 639, 646 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing with approval State Farm v. Martin); State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paulson, 756 P.2d 764, 766 (Wyo. 1988) (flood exclusion was unambiguous 
and the insured's claim for damage to his home that resulted from the entrance of water and 
hail into his basement after a severe storm was excluded). The Washington Supreme Court, 
however, has refused to enforce the revised exclusionary language. See Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Hirschmann, 112 Wash. 2d 621, 629, 773 P.2d 413, 416 (1989) (ruling that, as a matter 
of public policy, the insurer was not permitted to "circumvent" the "efficient proximate cause" 
rule by use of its exclusionary clause). 
30 289 Pa. Super. 479, 433 A.2d 906 (1981). 
31 [d. at 481, 433 A.2d at 907. 
32 [d. (emphasis supplied by the court). 
33 [d. (emphasis supplied by the court). 
34 [d. 
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tamination.":35 This finding reflected that the heptane-fuel mixture 
came into contact with the insured's work in progress and rendered 
it worthless. The court, however, did not enforce the contamination 
exclusion to bar coverage. 36 Rather, the court was persuaded that 
the proximate cause of the insured's loss was the unintentional pour-
ing of fuel oil into a tank intended for heptane, in other words third-
party negligence. 37 The court reasoned that coverage for loss or 
damage caused by, or resulting from, the negligent acts of a third 
person was not excluded by the policy.38 Relying on the express 
policy language, the court ruled that coverage existed because the 
contamination loss was caused by a nonexcluded external peril. 39 The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the 
insured. 40 
b. Contamination Characterized as a Nonexcluded Peril 
To overcome a defense based on the contamination exclusion, in-
sureds may characterize the cause of loss as some peril other than 
contamination. In Insurance Co. of St. Louis v. McConnell Con-
struction CO.,41 a loss was found to have been caused by corrosion, 
a covered peril, rather than by contamination, an excluded peril. 
a5Id. at 482, 433 A.2d at 908. 
36Id. 
a7Id. at 482-83, 433 A.2d at 908. 
:313 Id. 
:39Id. at 489, 433 A.2d at 908-09. 
40 Id. at 484, 433 A.2d at 909. In so holding, the court reasoned: "[T]he policy provided 
coverage even though the external cause brought about the loss by contaminating the contents 
of the heptane tank used for work in progress." Id. But see American Casualty Co. v. A.L. 
Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1962), in which the court declined to employ a similar 
theory. The policy covered "all risks of direct physical loss or damage to the insured property 
from an external cause ... except as hereinafter excluded." Id. at 181. The insured sought 
recovery for damage to foodstuffs made unfit for human consumption because of contact with 
ammonia gas. The court enforced the contamination exclusion and rejected the insured's 
argument that coverage should be found as if the contamination exclusion were not in the 
contract. Id. at 184. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the insured's position 
that ammonia gas was an external cause of the loss for which the exclusion did not apply. Id. 
at 183-89; see also Falcon Products v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 615 F. Supp. 37 
(E.D. Mo. 1985), aiI'd, 782 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1986). The insured purchased irradiated metal 
which was contaminated before the insured received ownership of the property. Falcon 
Products, 615 F. Supp. at 38. In order to surmount the argument that the contamination 
exclusion barred recovery, the insured argued that the efficient physical cause of the loss was 
third-party negligence of the person(s) responsible for contaminating the metal. I d. at 39. The 
court did not rely upon the insured's arguments to resolve the case. Instead, it decided the 
case on the grounds that the insured had no insurable interest in the property because the 
property was not "covered" under the applicable policy. Id. Coverage was also denied because 
of the contamination exclusion. Id. 
41 419 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), rev'd, 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1968). 
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The insured building contractor sued to recover under a builders 
risk policy insuring against "all risks of physical loss to ... described 
dwelling(s), building(s), or structure(s). "42 
The McConnell trial court granted recovery for damage resulting 
from the application of muriatic acid to brick flooring in a newly 
constructed house. 43 The builder applied the muriatic acid in an effort 
to clean the floor, shortly before conveying the house to a new owner. 
The acid reacted with mortar in the brick to produce a wet gas 
highly corrosive to metal. Severe discoloration and the appearance 
of "pit marks" on the interior metal surfaces occurred. 44 A chemist 
testified that the fumes from the muriatic acid corroded the metal 
objects inside the house.45 The insurer defended by arguing that the 
loss was excluded because it was caused by contamination.46 The 
Houston Court of Civil Appeals examined the evidence and con-
cluded that, as a matter of law, the loss was due to contamination. 47 
The appellate court ruled that coverage was precluded by a policy 
provision excluding "loss by contamination including loss by radio-
active or fissionable materials. "48 
The Texas Supreme Court, distinguishing between contamination 
and corrosion, reversed the intermediate appellate court.49 Accord-
42 428 S. W.2d at 659. 
43 I d. at 660. 
44 419 S.W.2d at 868. 
45Id. 
46 Id. at 869. Property insurers must be prepared to produce expert testimony, ifnecessary, 
establishing contamination as the cause of the loss. Butler, supra note 4, at 372. In McConnell, 
the Texas Supreme Court noted that there was no evidence in the record disputing the 
testimony of the insured's expert and explained: 
The insurance company called no witnesses in this case. The evidence as to the causes 
and factors which resulted in the corrosion of the metal parts of the house is undis-
puted and not subject to divergent or conflicting inferences. There was no occasion 
for giving the insurance company's requested instruction or definition relating to 
"contamination." There being no dispute in the facts, the question of whether the 
corrosion which occurred came within the contamination exclusion was not a jury 
issue in this case. 
428 S.W.2d at 662. In Auten v. Employers National Insurance Co., 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1986), writ denied, 749 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1988), the Texas Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court and ruled as a matter of law that coverage for the insured's losses was excluded 
because they were due to contamination. Id. at 471. The insureds sued their insurer to recover 
for losses that resulted when a professional exterminator misapplied the pesticide Dursban in 
their home. Id. at 468-69. By relying on the testimony of expert chemists, the court found 
that the excessive release of the pesticide inside the insureds' house rendered the dwelling 
"impure" and constituted contamination. Id. at 469-70; see also infra note 68. 
47 Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 419 S.W.2d at 869. 
48 Id. at 869-70. 
49 McConnell, 428 S.W.2d at 663. 
1990] PROPERTY INSURANCE 245 
ing to the court, the loss resulted from corrosion, which was not 
excluded as contamination. The court based its ruling on the expert's 
testimony and on dictionary distinctions between contamination and 
corrosion. 50 Although the court acknowledged that certain instances 
of corrosion might be classified as contamination,51 the facts before 
it established no blending of substances which resulted in an impure 
mixture. 52 
2. Named Peril Coverage 
Under named peril coverage, insurance applies only to certain 
risks specified in a policy. An insured has the burden of proving that 
its loss arose from one of the named perils. 53 In evaluating a claim, 
an insurance company must determine whether one of the specified 
perils caused a direct loss to covered property. 54 Under the following 
circumstances, insureds may argue that contamination losses con-
stitute a covered peril within a specified risk policy. 
a. Fire 
A fire may cause the release of contaminants affecting covered 
property. 55 An insured may assert that coverage exists for such 
50 I d. at 660-61. 
51 Id. at 661. In McConnell, the Texas Supreme Court found no basis in the record to 
support a finding that contamination caused the loss and held: 
Id. 
The connotation of contamination is a mixing of substances like dirt and water which 
results in an impure mixture. Corrosion on the other hand connotes disintegration, 
oxidation, decay of metal and the like. While it may be possible that under certain 
situations, a corrosion may also be classified as a contamination, that is not the 
situation here. We have no mixing of substances resulting in impurity .... We hold 
that the loss in this case was comprehended by the insuring clause of the policy and 
was not excluded therefrom. 
52 Id. The Texas Supreme Court in McConnell did not acknowledge or discuss the "unfit 
for use" approach to define "contamination," recognized in Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 283 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D. Mass. 1967), a/I'd, 391 F.2d 924 (lst Cir. 1968). 
53 Reed v. Commercial Ins. Co., 248 Or. 152, 155-56, 432 P.2d 691, 693 (1967). See, e.g., 
American Produce & Vegetable Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y., 408 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1966). Where it was undisputed that damage to the insured's food in storage was caused 
by leaking ammonia, the insured could not recover under a policy excluding losses due to 
"contamination ... unless such loss or damage is caused directly by ... bursting of pipes or 
apparatus" because the insured failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
loss was caused by the bursting of an apparatus. Id. at 955-56. 
54 THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 123. 
55 In order to constitute a fire within the coverage of a standard fire policy, a majority of 
cases holds that "there must be some visible indication of fire such as flame, glow, or light." 
Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 34 Wash. App. 257, 259, 660 P.2d 
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contamination losses under the peril of fire. 56 In Marshall Produce 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance CO.,57 a contamination loss 
was covered as damage by fire. The relev.ant policies covered the 
insured's egg and milk processing plant against "all loss or damage 
by fire originating from any cause."58 As the result of a nearby house 
fire, the insured's manufacturing plant was saturated with a dense 
blue-gray smoke. 59 
Under a contract with the federal government, the insured was 
required to supply powdered milk and eggs, which were processed 
under stringent sanitation requirements. 6o Although there was no 
proven damage to the insured's egg powder, the cans and wrappers 
768, 769 (1983). A mere showing by an insured of "the emission of smoke, steam or heat is 
not sufficient to establish the existence of a fire." Annotation, Loss by Heat, Smoke, or Soot 
Without External Ignition as Within Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 17 A.L.R.3D 1155 
(1968 and Supp. 1989). When the word "fire" is not defined within the policy, some courts 
interpret the word according to its ordinary or popular meaning. An accepted definition states 
that fire means '''the phenomenon of combustion as manifested in light, flame, and heat.''' 
Washington State Hop Producers, 34 Wash. App. at 25S, 660 P.2d at 769 (quoting WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 854 (1976». See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Electrical Dist. No.4, 452 P.2d 539, 542-43 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (damage to transformer 
from overheating of copper wiring resulting from a short circuit without ignition or flames 
was not covered by fire policy); Washington State Hop Producers, 34 Wash. App. at 258-59, 
660 P.2d at 768-69 (no coverage under fire policy for damage to baled hops by browning or 
charring due to heat when there was no evidence of any flame or glow in the damaged crops). 
56 Fire insurance policies, however, are intended to protect only against losses resulting 
from "hostile fires" and do not provide coverage for losses due to "friendly fires." See 5 J. 
ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3082 (1970 and Supp. 1988); lOA COUCH ON 
INSURANCE 2D §§ 42.13-.15 (1982 & Supp. 1988); MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 8, at 150. 
When the loss-inducing contaminant is released through some industrial process involving a 
fire set intentionally and utilized by an insured in its business, an insurance company should 
consider whether the cause of loss constitutes a friendly fire, for which there is no coverage. 
The term "friendly fire" is usually defined to mean a fire set by an insured for a manufacturing-
related purpose that remains confined in a furnace, incinerator, or other ordinary place 
intended by an insured for the fire, although damage may result where none was intended. 
See, e.g., Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 172 Kan. 111, 113-15, 238 P.2d 472, 474-76 
(1951). 
The friendly fire doctrine remains a valid basis for a defense where the facts so direct, but 
some recent decisions have followed a liberal trend and have construed the doctrine somewhat 
narrowly. See, e.g., Schulze and Burch Biscuit Co. v. American Protection Ins. Co., 96 Ill. 
App. 3d 350,421 N.E.2d 331 (1981) (unanticipated loss was covered, notwithstanding friendly/ 
hostile dichotomy of fire insurance law, when an oven used in the insured's baking business 
was inadvertently left to operate with no product to absorb heat and the temperature rose in 
excess of the normal temperature inside the oven). 
57 256 Minn. 404, 98 N. W.2d 280 (1959); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Protection 
Mut. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 323, 335 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (there was coverage under an all risk 
property policy for the expenses of cleaning up PCB contamination at the insured's manufac-
turing plant because the release of PCBs was directly attributable to a fire). 
58 256 Minn. at 409,98 N.W.2d at 285. 
59Id. at 407,98 N.W.2d at 284. 
60 Id. at 408,98 N.W.2d at 284-85. 
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in which the products were packaged were damaged by the smoke. 
When the federal government subsequently rejected the insured's 
products because of smoke damage to the cans and wrappers,61 a 
covered loss was found to have taken place. 62 
The court held that it was not necessary for coverage that any 
part of the insured's property must actually have ignited. 63 Nor was 
it necessary that the fire must have occurred within the insured's 
building for coverage to exist. 64 Under Minnesota law, the fire policy 
covered losses proximately resulting from fire, even though the fire 
itself did no injury to the objects insured. 65 
The Marshall Produce case, however, should offer only limited 
support for claiming coverage of contamination losses under the peril 
of fire. Under the "Minnesota form" of standard insurance policy, 
there was no requirement that the fire had to be a direct cause of 
the loss or damage, as was the case with the "New York form."66 
The insured, therefore, was entitled to recover for a loss in value to 
insured goods, for which a showing of physical damage to the prop-
erty was not necessary. 67 
b. Smoke 
Insureds may contend that a contamination loss is covered under 
the smoke peril. 68 Coverage for damage due to smoke is usually 
61 Id. at 428-29, 98 N.W.2d at 297. 
62 Id. at 434, 98 N.W.2d at 300. 
63Id. at 415, 98 N.W.2d at 289. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. The court held that the loss was covered as "damage by fire" because: 
Whatever the loss may have been, it is obvious that the fire was the proximate cause 
of the loss; that smoke and its resulting foul odors spread into the plant and its 
contents, which led the government officials to do what they might well be expected 
to do under the prevailing conditions; namely, to reject the merchandise and render 
the same valueless. 
Id. at 418,98 N.W.2d at 290. 
66 Id., 98 N.W.2d at 290-9l. 
67 Id. at 414-15, 98 N. W.2d at 288-89. 
68 See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 24, 1989, at 2B, col. 1. The article describes a recent 
Oregon trial court ruling that required an insurer to pay for cleaning up a residence contam-
inated by an illegal drug manufacturing lab because the resulting damage was caused by 
"smoke" from the drug-cooking process. Relying on the contamination exclusion in the appli-
cable policy, the insurer denied coverage for damage due to the chemical contaminants. 
Nevertheless, the expert hired by the insurer testified that he "couldn't exclude smoke" as a 
cause of the damage. Id. The court declined to enforce the contamination exclusion to bar 
coverage and concluded that the relevant contamination provision did not exclude coverage 
for smoke damage. Id. The ruling is believed to be the first of its kind in the United States. 
No appeal was filed. 
The insureds rented their recreational re.1tal home for one week to a tenant who, unknown 
to the owners, used the property to manufacture the illegal drug methamphetamine, also 
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limited in standard policy forms to "sudden and accidental damage 
from smoke, other than smoke from agricultural smudging or indus-
trial operations."69 Under such coverage the word "sudden" should 
exclude damage occurring over a long period of time. 70 In Henri's 
Food Products Co. v. Home Insurance Co.,71 however, a chemical 
vapor that contaminated the insured's edible goods constituted 
smoke within the coverage of a standard fire policy.72 The vapor 
escaped from agricultural chemicals stored in a warehouse and left 
a residue on the insured's packaged products. 73 The policy covered 
the insured's goods stored at a warehouse against direct loss by 
smoke. 74 
The court consulted both dictionary and judicial definitions of "va-
por" and "smoke" and applied its own understanding of the terms. 75 
Ruling in favor of the insured, it concluded that the chemical vapor 
constituted smoke within the coverage for that peril. 76 The court 
held that a loss occurred when the Food and Drug Administration 
seized the insured's packaged products. Because the loss fell within 
the coverage for smoke damage, the court did not find it necessary 
to address coverage under the all risk coverage endorsement. 77 
c. Vandalism and Malicious Mischief 
An insured may also contend that contamination losses should be 
covered as vandalism or malicious mischief,78 a risk that is usually 
included under named peril policies. To recover under this peril, an 
insured ordinarily must prove wanton or malicious acts intended by 
known as "meth," "crank," or "crystal." The substance requires somewhat readily obtainable 
ingredients and is "cooked up" in a relatively simple process. Id. A building where the drug 
has been manufactured becomes impregnated with a "sickly sweet" odor and with chemical 
residue from the vapors of the cooking that must be removed before the residence is habitable 
again. Id.; see also NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 11, 1989, at 2. 
69 MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 8, at 246. 
70 Id.; THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 115. 
71 474 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 
72 I d. at 893. 
731d. 
74 I d. at 892. 
75 I d. at 893. 
761d. 
771d. 
78 A collection of cases discussing the question of what constitutes "vandalism" or "malicious 
mischief" for property insurance coverage is set forth in Annotation, What Constitutes "Van-
dalism" or "Malicious Mischief" Within Coverage of Property Insurance Policy, 23 A.L.R.3D 
1259 (1969 and Supp. 1989). 
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the perpetrator to damage or destroy property.79 Although a minor-
ity of jurisdictions require proof of personal animosity toward the 
insured or subjective intent to damage the described property to 
establish malice,80 the growing trend, and present majority position, 
is that malice may be inferred from an unlawful act.81 The term 
"vandalism" also has been extended by its popular meaning to com-
prise unusual destruction of property resulting from the completion 
of a wrongful act. 82 
In Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District 
v. Travelers Insurance CO.,83 the court found coverage for a contam-
ination loss by characterizing it as having been caused through van-
dalism and malicious mischief. 84 The insured, a metropolitan sewer 
district, carried property insurance on its wastewater treatment 
79 13A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 48:210 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
80 See, e.g., Imperial Cas. and Indem. Co. v. Terry, 451 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
There was no evidence that damage to the motor of an insured vehicle was the result of 
malicious mischief, and the court ruled: "Regardless of how careless, negligent or even illegal 
an act might be, it is not malicious mischief absent evidence that the act was motivated by 
malice towards the property or its owner, i.e., by fixed intent to cause injury to specific 
property." [d. at 305. 
81 See, e.g., Hatley v. Truck Ins. Exch., 261 Or. 606, 616, 494 P.2d 426, 431 (1972) ("We 
think property has been damaged 'willfully and maliciously' if the damage results from an 
intentional act from which damage manifestly would or could result. "); Romanych v. Liverpool 
& London & Globe Ins. Co., 8 Misc. 2d 269, 167 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1957). The Romanych court 
held that: "Malice does not necessarily mean hatred. It may be inferred from unjustifiable 
conduct. In a legal sense, it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or 
excuse." [d. at 272,167 N.Y.S.2d at 40l. 
82 See, e.g., King v. North River Ins. Co., 278 S.C. 411, 413, 297 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1982) 
("The legal malice necessary to establish vandalism within the meaning of [a comprehensive 
fire insurance] policy need not amount to ill will or vindictiveness of purpose but is sufficient 
if the destruction was in conscious or intentional disregard of the rights of another.") Even 
under the majority view, the vandalism or malicious mischief must have been perpetrated by 
a human actor. Roselli v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 142 Misc. 2d 857,858,538 N.Y.S.2d 898, 
899 (1989) (no coverage for damage to personal property caused when a deer entered the 
insured's apartment). 
83 753 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1985). But see Swedberg v. Battle Creek Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Neb. 
447,356 N.W.2d 456 (1984). There was no coverage under the vandalism and malicious mischief 
provision of a property insurance policy for the death of cattle by poisoning. The cattle ingested 
a poisonous substance containing chlorate that had been dumped by unknown persons on land 
rented by the insured for the purpose of grazing his cattle. Abandoned machinery and other 
debris, as well as molasses and oats, had also been dumped on the ground in the area of the 
poison. The court ruled that coverage under the vandalism and malicious mischief insurance 
required a showing that the party responsible for dumping the poison intended to damage the 
insured property (i.e., kill the livestock). The fact that the dumping of the poisonous chloride 
was done willfully or deliberately failed to establish "malice" for coverage. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court, therefore, ruled that the trial court had erred in finding coverage. [d. at 451-
54,356 N.W.2d at 460-6l. 
84 753 F.2d at 537-38. 
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plant. The policy provided coverage for "direct loss by: vandalism 
and malicious mischief, meaning only direct loss by willful and ma-
licious damage to or destruction ofproperty."85 A third party dumped 
large quantities of toxic waste material into the municipal sewer 
system.86 The dumping was in violation of state and federal law and 
resulted in severe damage to the insured's primary wastewater 
treatment facility. 87 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the insurer's liability 
under the policy, and affirmed the district court's ruling to that 
effect. 88 Before the district court, the parties had stipulated that the 
act of dumping the toxic substances into the sewer system was 
unlawful and that it had caused damage to the insured's property. 89 
Evidence further established that the third party had removed a 
128-pound manhole cover in order to dump the toxic waste material. 90 
He then filled the manhole with sand and dirt to hide the dumping. 91 
The court of appeals found that the third party willfully performed 
the unlawful act under conditions that obviously would lead to prop-
erty damage. 92 
Applying Kentucky law, the court held that the unlawful act itself 
provided the requisite malice for coverage under the pertinent van-
dalism and malicious mischief provision. 93 There was no requirement 
that the act had to be performed out of personal animosity toward 
the property owner for coverage to arise. 94 The court held the prop-
erty insurer liable for the insured's unrecouped damages. 95 It also 
charged the insurer a pro rata portion of the insured's litigation 
expenses in prosecuting a claim for damages against certain third-
party tortfeasors.96 
d. Explosion 
Finally, contamination losses may allegedly arise from an explo-
sion, if explosion is a peril covered under the policy. Although there 
85 I d. at 534-35. 
86 Id. at 535. 
871d. 
88 Id. at 538. 
89 I d. at 535. 
90 Id. 
911d. at 535-36. 
92 Id. at 537-38. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 I d. at 538. 
96 Id. at 540. 
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is no reported decision awarding coverage for a contamination loss 
under the peril of explosion, a case related to this issue is American 
Alliance Insurance Co. v. Keleket X-Ray COrp.97 Under a policy 
providing coverage for expenses incurred to reduce the insured's 
business interruption loss, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
allowed an award of expenses to decontaminate a building. 98 
The insured manufactured a pocket-sized device for measuring 
exposure to radiation. As part of the manufacturing process, a cali-
bration procedure was used to determine the accuracy of the instru-
ment. 99 One of the insured's physicists, while conducting routine 
calibration operations, heard a "pop" sound. 100 He also observed the 
emission of a finely powdered radium salt from the calibration stand 
in which the known radium source was stored.lOl The radioactive 
powder and radon gas102 permeated the insured's manufacturing 
plant, contaminating it with radiation. l03 Large quantities of stock 
and other material became contaminated, all of which was un sal-
vageable.104 The insured's manufacturing operation was interrupted 
for a five-month period. 105 
The trial court addressed whether the accident constituted an 
explosion for coverage purposes. None of the policies before the 
court covered the building against damage due to explosion.106 In-
surance companies had issued stock policies and business interrup-
tion policies, however, insuring against direct loss to stock, materi-
als, and supplies by explosion and loss of gross earnings resulting 
directly from the necessary interruption of business caused by ex-
plosion.l07 The jury returned a verdict finding that there had been 
an explosion of the radium source located in the insured's plant, and, 
therefore, found the insurers liable. lOS 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.109 Even 
though the explosion was of a small magnitude, the court was per-
97 248 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1957). 
98Id. at 930-3l. 
99 Id. at 922-23. 
100 I d. at 923. 
IOIId. 
102 Radon gas is a "highly radioactive decay product of radium." Id. 
103 Id. 
104 I d. at 922. 
105 Id. 
106 I d. at 930. 
107 I d. at 922. 
10k Id. 
109 I d. at 923. 
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suaded that there was substantial evidence from which the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that an explosion had taken place. 110 
This evidence included a buildup of gas pressure within the capsule, 
the occurrence of a "popping noise," and the emission of a cloud of 
powder. III The court recognized that it was impossible to establish 
a hard and fast definition of the word "explosion" that would satisfy 
all factual contingencies. 112 Although the finding of an explosion was 
upheld, as well as the reimbursements for losses to stock and lost 
earnings, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred in 
awarding the insured's decontamination expenses. 113 
B. Contamination Coverage Under Debris-Removal Provisions 
1. Debris-Removal Coverage 
Another primary basis on which insureds may allege coverage for 
contamination losses is to claim a compensable expense for debris 
removal. 114 Ordinarily, the cost of cleaning up debris produced by an 
insured peril is a legitimate item of loss that is covered under a 
property insurance policy.ll5 Under a typical debris-removal clause 
in a commercial property form, an insurer agrees to pay an insured's 
110 I d. at 924. In explosion claims, courts usually have allowed the jury to weigh the evidence 
admitted and decide whether an explosion has occurred. Most courts have been reluctant to 
merely rely on the scientific opinions of physicists and engineers that an explosion, as scientists 
define the term, has taken place. Accordingly, in many instances insurers have been required 
to indemnify an insured for losses that were never intended to be covered under contracts 
insuring against explosion. THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 109. 
ll1 248 F.2d at 923-24. 
112Id. at 925; see also American Cas. Co. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1962) 
(discussing the definitions of "explosion" adopted by various courts). 
113 248 F.2d at 931. Such costs were awarded by the Special Master under coverage for 
expenses necessarily incurred by the insured to reduce the business interruption losses. The 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found, however, that no evidence established that the insured's 
expenditures for decontamination actually reduced business interruption losses. Id. at 930-
31. 
114 For reasons discussed below, the outlook for success in relying on this approach should 
vary depending on whether the debris-removal coverage is provided under a pre-1986 or a 
post-1986 standard policy form. See infra notes 156-89 and accompanying text. 
115 15 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 54.184 (1983 & Supp. 1988). See, e.g., Adams v. Northwest 
Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 40 Or. App. 159, 165, 594 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1979) (finding that the 
comprehensive fire policy unambiguously provided coverage for debris removal). Under the 
all risk Commercial Fire Policy Form CF 00 13 (Ed. 10 83) (Structure), debris removal is 
subject to the policy limit of coverage for property damage. Under the more recent commercial 
form designed to insure structures and personal property (CP 10 30 11 85), coverage is 
provided for debris removal as an additional coverage, with an exclusion of $5,000 over the 
policy limit. 
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expenses incurred in removing debris of covered property arising 
from a covered 10SS.116 Therefore, in order to recover for debris 
removal, the insured should be required to establish that: (1) the 
substance to be removed is "debris"; (2) the "debris" is made up of 
"covered property"; and (3) a covered loss or insured peril caused 
damage requiring that the substance be removed. 
The nationwide emphasis on cleaning up contaminants will un-
doubtedly increase claims under the debris-removal coverage for on-
premises cleanup of pollutants. 117 Insureds may argue that they are 
entitled to recover the expense of removing from the insured prem-
ises covered property that has become a contaminant. The term 
"debris" is usually not defined. An insured will employ the broadest 
possible definition consistent with common usage. The only express 
restriction under the clause is that coverage is usually limited to 
116 Building and Personal Property Coverage Form CP 00 10 11 85. Such coverage is limited 
by other terms and conditions of the policy, including the dollar limit of property insurance 
provided. The Building and Personal Property Coverage Form states that expenses arising 
from the removal of debris of covered property will be paid when the debris is "caused by or 
resulting from a covered cause of loss." CP 00 10 11 85, section A.4a. Under the Limits of 
Insurance provision the same policy form states: 
Payments under the following Additional Coverages will not increase the applicable 
Limit of Insurance: 
1. Preservation of Property; or 
2. Debris Removal; but if the sum of loss or damage and debris removal expense 
exceeds the Limit of Insurance, we will pay up to an additional $5,000 for each 
location in anyone occurrence under the Debris Removal Additional Coverage. 
[d. Section C.2, Copyright, ISO, 1983. See also ISO forms HO-3 (Ed 4-84) and MP 0090 (Ed 
0777). 
117 Fire Casualty and Surety Bulletin [hereinafter FC&S Bulletin], Nov. 1988, at EP-1 
states: "Since the exception permitting coverage for 'sudden and accidental' pollution losses 
was removed from the commercial general liability forms . . . some insureds have been 
successful in finding coverage for on-premises cleanup of pollutants under the debris removal 
clause of their property policies." [d. (emphasis in original); see, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 323, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (both insurers 
"assume[d]" that the cost of cleaning up PCB contamination at the insured's manufacturing 
plant was covered under the debris-removal clauses in their respective policies when PCBs 
were released due to a fire started by an electrical accident); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 
Dargin & Co., 748 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1988) (property insurer was entitled to reimbursement 
from the insured's liability carrier for amounts paid to clean up oil that escaped from the 
insured's property onto adjacent property but was required to pay for removing the oil from 
the insured's own property under debris-removal coverage); see also Daniels, Wedzed Enter-
prises v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., No. IP 81-1413-C (S.D. Ind. June 29, 1983), cited in Glad & 
Barnes, supra note 1, at 9. Glad and Barnes report that "the court found coverage under a 
first-party [property] policy for PCB contamination cause[d] by a fire at the in&ured's premises. 
Since fire had lead [sic] to the release of the PCBs, removal of property contaminated with 
PCBs fell within the rubric of removing debris caused by the fire." [d. 
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debris made up of insured property that has been damaged by an 
insured peril. 118 
In the absence of an express policy definition, courts oft~n will 
refer to dictionary definitions and win apply the term "debris" in a 
manner consistent with its regular usage. 119 A common dictionary 
definition provides that debris is "the remains of something broken 
down or destroyed."120 Using this approach, some courts have 
broadly interpreted the meaning of debris. 121 Debris has been defined 
judicially as including the removal of "waste material resulting from 
the destruction of some article."122 Following a windstorm, trees and 
bushes not originally a part of the insured property have been 
treated as debris,123 as have ruins from the fire-damaged portion of 
an inn.124 These courts' expansive construction of the word "debris" 
does not bode well for a restrictive application of such coverage in 
claims for the cleanup of pollutants. 
A case often relied upon by insureds to seek recovery for cleanup 
of contaminants under debris removal insurance is Lexington Insur-
ance Co. v. Ryder System, Inc. 125 The all risk policy at issue covered 
all personal property owned, leased, or used by the insured. 126 A 
policy endorsement provided coverage for oil and pipelines. Fuel 
leaked from the underground storage tanks at the insured's place of 
business. 127 The insurer reimbursed the insured for the loss of oil. 
The insurer, however, refused the insured's claim to recover for the 
cost of removing from the ground the fuel that had escaped from the 
tanks. 128 The insured's claim for removal costs was submitted under 
the following provision: "Debris Removal. In the event of claim for 
physical loss or damage insured hereunder, this company shall also 
be liable for the cost of demolition and removal of debris formerly 
118 See FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at Fire Dr-I. See § A.4.a of the Building and Personal 
Property Coverage Form CP 00 10 11 85. 
119 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Snitzer, 183 Ga. App. 395, 396, 358 S.E.2d 
925, 926 (1987); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Ryder System Inc., 142 Ga. App. 36, 37, 234 S.E.2d 
839, 839 (1977). 
120 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 212 (1972); see also FC&S Bulletin, supra 
note 117, Fire & Marine, Debris Removal Coverage, Nov. 1986, at Fire Dr-3. 
121 See, e.g., Lexington, 142 Ga. App. at 37,234 S.E.2d at 839. 
122 [d. 
128 Snitzer, 183 Ga. App. at 397, 358 S.E.2d at 926-27. 
124 See generally Kossian v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 647, 651, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 225, 228 (1967). 
125 142 Ga. App. 36, 234 S.E.2d 839 (1977). 
126 [d. 
127 [d. 
128 [d. 
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an insured part of the property and no longer suitable for the purpose 
for which it was intended. "129 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insured, 
and held the insurance company liable for the cost of removal. 130 On 
appeal, the insurance company argued that the oil did not constitute 
debris because it was not subject to demolition. 131 The Georgia Court 
of Appeals rejected this reasoning. 132 It concluded that "debris may 
mean merely waste material resulting from the destruction of some 
article. "133 Relying on a dictionary definition of "demolition," the 
court held that "escaped oil which has contaminated the surrounding 
earth is debris, and its removal is compensable because as oil in 
storage it was insured. "134 Although the insurance company argued 
that the debris-removal clause was inapplicable because there was 
no remaining property to demolish or tear down, the court construed 
the debris-removal provision in favor of the insured. In so doing, 
the court refused to define "demolish" narrowly to require proof by 
the insured that the remaining damaged portion of the insured struc-
ture had to be torn down in order to qualify for debris-removal 
coverage. 135 
Based on Lexington, insureds may seek coverage for on-premises 
cleanup of pollutants under the debris-removal clause where the 
contaminant is residue of covered property. 136 Where such coverage 
is found, the insurer's liability under pre-1986 forms of debris-re-
moval clauses can extend up to the limit of coverage for property 
damage. 137 
Claims may also be asserted under debris-removal coverage for 
damage to uncontaminated covered property that is necessarily dam-
aged in removing a contaminant from on-premises soil, water, per-
129Id. 
lao Id. at 37, 234 S.E.2d at 840. 
1a1 Id., 234 S.E.2d at 839. 
132 Id., 234 S.E.2d at 839-40. 
133 Id., 234 S.E.2d at 839. 
134 Id., 234 S.E.2d at 840. 
135 I d. The court declined to interpret the above clause as requiring the insured to establish 
"both a tearing down and a taking away" of covered property. Id. 
136Id. 
137 FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, at EP-l (Pollution Changes). The editors 
of the FC&S Bulletin caution that under such an approach even a comparatively minor 
property loss can expose the entire property limit for debris removal. Id. The editors also 
warn that under the expansive interpretation that debris-removal coverage should automati-
cally apply to all on-premises cleanup of pollutants, "even the fact that property policies 
specifically exclude land ... [may not bel enough for coverage to be denied." Id. 
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sonal property, or buildings. 13B Manduca Datsun v. Universal Un-
derwriters Insurance CO.139 will be the likely basis for such claims. 
The policyholder in M anduca Datsun suffered substantial fire dam-
age to an insured building where an automobile dealership formerly 
had been operated. 140 Under the general property coverage, the trial 
court denied recovery for asphalt damage expected to occur during 
the removal of debris because the asphalt was not damaged in the 
fire. 141 The trial court also declined to allow recovery under the 
debris-removal coverage because damage to asphalt was not specif-
ically included in the provision. 142 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed and found coverage under a 
debris-removal clause providing, in relevant part: 
DEBRIS REMOVAL-Coverage under this Coverage Part in-
cludes expense incurred in the removal of debris of property 
covered occasioned by LOSS insured against in this Coverage 
Part, but this Company shall not be liable ... for more than the 
amount for which this Company would be liable, exclusive of 
debris removal expenses, if all the property covered at the LO-
CATION where the LOSS occurred were destroyed. 143 
The record established that the most efficient way to remove the 
debris of the fire-damaged building was to use heavy equipment. 144 
Evidence also showed the use of such equipment would necessarily 
produce asphalt damage. 145 The court held that any asphalt damage 
"actually and necessarily caused" by the debris-removal process fell 
within the insurance coverage for debris removal following a covered 
loss. 146 
The court concluded that the economic purpose behind debris-
removal coverage would be defeated if such coverage "did not pro-
vide payment for damage necessarily caused by the debris removal 
process itself. "147 The appellate court remanded the case for a de-
138 Manduca Datsun v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 163, 168, 676 P.2d 1274, 
1279 (1984). 
139Id. 
14°Id. at 164-65, 676 P.2d at 1275-76. 
141 Id. at 168, 676 P.2d at 1279. 
142Id. 
143 Id. at 168 n.3, 676 P.2d at 12i'9 n.3. The debris-removal clause that applied in Manduca 
Datsun was not a standard ISO debris-removal policy form. See MALLIN, supra note 4, at 
104. 
144 Manduca Datsun, 106 Idaho at 168, 676 P.2d at 1279. 
145Id. 
146 See id. 
147Id. 
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termination of the amount of asphalt damage actually and necessarily 
incurred by debris removal. 148 
2. Possible Expanded Applications of Debris-Removal Insurance 
As one commentator has concluded, the rationale for coverage 
expressed in M anduca Datsun may provide a basis for a significant 
expansion of debris-removal coverage under pre-1986 policies as 
interpreted by some courts at the urging of insureds. 149 An insured 
may contend that debris-removal coverage must apply to damage to 
any property, not just insured property, necessarily resulting from 
the process of removing covered property turned into contami-
nant. 150 Relying on Lexington, insureds may also seek coverage for 
cleaning up pollution from adjacent noncovered land and water 
caused by a leak of insured property turned contaminant. 151 Such 
claim scenarios are plausible under the standard debris-removal cov-
erage offered before 1986 because insurers usually have paid the 
cost of removing from off-premises locations the debris of covered 
property. 152 
Expenses associated with cleaning up radioactive, toxic, or oth-
erwise hazardous debris can be staggering. 153 Special procedures for 
cleaning up, handling, and disposing of the hazardous debris may be 
required. 154 Extra transportation costs likely will be incurred to 
remove and transport the material to specially designated dump sites 
according to hazardous waste statutes and regulations. 
The devastating potential of a dramatic rise in debris removal 
claims for cleaning up environmental pollution did not go unheeded 
by the insurance industry. The prospect of a significant jump upward 
148Id. 
149 See MALLIN, supra note 4, at 24. Mallin has articulated a six-point "laundry list" of 
potential ambiguities in the standard ISO debris-removal policy form that was regularly issued 
by insurers prior to 1986. Id. at 25. He posits that such lack of clarity in drafting may provide 
a basis for insureds to urge an expansion of debris-removal coverage beyond that recognized 
in Manduca Datsun and Lexington, in the context of cleaning up pollution. Id. at 24-26. 
150 I d. at 24. 
151 I d. at 22--23. 
152 I d. at 20-21. 
153 See FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, Debris Removal Coverage, Nov. 
1986, at Fire Dr-6. The editors caution that, when purchasing debris-removal coverage, an 
insured must take into account potential contamination of otherwise undamaged property by 
smoke or water that has absorbed radioactive or toxic material as a result of a fire or other 
accident. Id. 
154 Id. 
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in such claims was a major factor in the 1986 promulgation of a 
revised standard policy form for debris-removal coverage. 155 
3. Revisions to Debris-Removal Coverage Forms and Additional 
Coverage for Cleanup and Removal of Pollutants 
Two new pollution endorsements156 for commercial policies have 
been adopted to clarify the intent behind coverage for debris re-
moval. 157 These endorsements limit the scope of potential coverage 
for contamination claims in terms of time, location, and extent of 
liability. In 1986, the Insurance Services Office Commercial Property 
Committee (ISO Committee) promulgated these new endorsements 
for commercial policy lines titled "Changes-Pollutants" (basic en-
dorsement)158 and "Pollutant Clean Up and Removal-Additional 
Aggregate Limit of Insurance" (extra endorsement).159 
155 Ozog & Ponzi, Pollution Coverage-New ISO Forms and Insured Events, reprinted in 
Environmental Claims, supra note 4. Ozog and Ponzi note that ISO proposed new policy 
fonn endorsements for debris-removal coverage in response to the expansion of such insurance 
to cover the cleanup of on-premises pollution by certain courts. Id. at 178; see also FC&S 
Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP- 1 (Pollution Changes) ("[The] Insurance Services Office filed 
an interim endorsement, changes-pollutants CP 0186 to clarify that the debris-removal clause 
did not extend to cover the clean up of sudden and accidental pollution losses and to introduce 
limited coverage to apply to these clean up costs."). 
156 The tenn "endorsement" refers to special provisions added to the standard policy fonn 
in order to complete the insurance contract. Endorsements supercede the tenns and conditions 
stated in the standard policy fonn and may be altered by later endorsements. Standard policy 
fonns sometimes do not suit a particular need of the insurer or the insured pertaining to the 
risks that are to be covered. In such circumstances, endorsements are often used to modify 
the standard coverage and satisfy the unique requirements of the contracting parties. At the 
time coverage is applied for, endorsements may be used to alter the main policy to add 
coverage for additional perils, property, losses, insured locations, hazards, and insured per-
sons. Conversely, endorsements may be used to eliminate specific coverages otherwise pro-
vided in the standard fonn. Further, after the policy of insurance is issued, endorsements 
may be added to revise the amount of insurance, correct errors in the contract, adjust a 
premium rate, or include coverage of newly acquired property. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra 
note 8, at 141. 
157 The insurance industry's ultimate objective is to incorporate the changes in the basic 
endorsement, not only into the Commercial Property (CP) fonns, but also into the Commercial 
Fire (CF) fonns, the Special Multi-Peril (MP) fonns, and the Business Owners (BO) fonns. 
MALLIN, supra note 4, at 95. There are no plans to offer the excess coverage for removal of 
pollutants provided by the extra endorsement under any fonn other than the Commercial 
Property (CP) fonns. Id. The issues addressed in these two new endorsements were also 
referred for consideration to an Ad Hoc Fonn Committee of the ISO to develop parallel 
changes for the fann coverage fonns. Presently, there is no intention to incorporate similar 
changes in Personal Lines coverage, i.e., Homeowners Policy fonns. Id. 
158 CP 01 86 04 86 (1986). This is a mandatory endorsement affecting the debris-removal 
coverage contained in virtually all commercial policies. Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 178; 
see also FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP-1. 
159 CP 04 07 04 86 (1986). Since its introduction, the extra endorsement has been revised to 
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a. Reporting Restrictions 
Under the basic endorsement, coverage for debris removal is lim-
ited to expenses reported to the insurance company within 180 days 
of whichever is earlier: (1) the date of the direct physical loss or 
damage, or (2) the end of the policy term.160 The date triggering 
subsection (1) is apparently intended to be the date on which the 
covered property became debris.161 The provision reflects an effort 
to eliminate excessively tardy reporting of debris-removal claims. 
This should preclude the receipt of stale claims for debris removal. 
The endorsement also circumvents the need for insurers to maintain 
extensive claim records for "late manifestations."162 
The basic endorsement contains no reference to the date debris-
removal expenses are actually incurred, but focuses on the date the 
loss is reported to the insurer. 163 Oral notification of the claim will 
apparently suffice, as no requirement of written notice is stated. 164 
There is no requirement that the debris-removal expenses must have 
been incurred by the insured at the time they are reported to the 
insurer. 165 The basic endorsement does not expressly restrict the 
coverage for removal of debris to designated premises and does not 
define "debris."166 
b. Dollar Limit of Liability 
To avoid triggering the policy limits for debris removal where a 
property loss is minor, a new dollar limitation has been added. 167 
The ISO Committee determined that open-ended debris-removal 
coverage was not intended to be in effect for cleaning up covered 
property turned contaminant. 168 A limitation of coverage for debris 
removal of up to twenty-five percent of the amount of the insured 
loss, or loss payment plus deductible, is contained in the basic en-
add the Standard Property Policy (CP 00 99 07 88) to the list of coverage forms it modifies. 
The extra endorsement has not been substantively revised, but is now denominated as CP 04 
070788. Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 187. 
160 Section A.2.a(1)(2). See FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP-2 (Pollution Changes). 
161 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 97. 
162 Id.; see also Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 183. 
163 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 98. 
164Id. 
165 I d. at 122. 
166 I d. at 123. 
167 I d. at 100. 
16" Id. at 101. 
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dorsement. 169 An extra debris-removal limit of up to $5,000 applies 
over and above the percentage limit, and constitutes additional de-
bris-removal coverage beyond the Limits of Insurance stated in the 
policy declarations. 17o 
c. Exclusion for Pollutant Removal 
The cost of extracting pollutants from land or water is not covered 
as debris-removal Additional Coverage, and neither is the cost of 
restoring or replacing polluted land or water, either on or off the 
insured premises. 171 There is also no coverage for the expense of 
cleaning up contaminated soil. 172 Debris-removal Additional Cover-
age may apply, however, to the cost of removing pollutants from 
buildings and personal property, on or off the insured premises, for 
which there is no express exclusion. 173 The term "pollutants" here is 
expressly defined. 174 
169 Section A.2.b(1)(2). Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 181. Ozog and Ponzi illustrate the 
operation of this clause with the following example: "A $5,000 property damage loss with a 
$500 deductible would afford $1,375 (25% of $5,000 plus $500 [deductible]) of debris-removal 
coverage." [d.; see also FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, at EP-1. 
170 Section A.4. See FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, at EP-1 (explaining 
that, if the coverage under the basic endorsement for debris-removal expense is insufficient, 
up to $5,000 of additional coverage is available on a "per occurrence" basis); MALLIN, supra 
note 4, at 101-02. By purchasing the coverage provided under ISO endorsement CP 04 15, 
the insured can increase the amount of additional debris-removal coverage beyond the $5,000 
limit stated in the basic endorsement. FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, at EP-
I, E-4 (Commercial Property). 
171 See Section A.2.c(1)(2). (Commercial Property). The editors of the FC&S Bulletin con-
clude that section A.2.c(1)(2) of the basic endorsement should preclude coverage for expenses 
incurred for the extraction of "pollutants" from the described premises or for the removal, 
restoration, or replacement of environmentally impaired portions of the described premises. 
FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP-2. Ozog and Ponzi note that "the [basic] endorsement 
distinguishes between 'debris removal' and 'pollution clean-up and removal' from land or water 
at the described premises" and state, therefore, that the revised ISO form "eliminat[es] the 
basis for the argument previously propounded by insureds that pollution clean-up expenses 
are covered under the debris-removal clause." Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 182. 
172 CP 00 10 11 85. In addition to the clarification in Section A.4 of the basic endorsement, 
the Building and Personal Property Coverage Form CP 00 10 11 85 expressly provides: 
"Covered Property does not include ... land (including land on which the property is located) 
.... [That] coverage should not apply to the clean-up of polluted land on the insured premises 
is strengthened by the inclusion of land as property not covered in the primary policy form. 
See also MALLIN, supra note 4, at 118-19. 
173 See MALLIN, supra note 4, at 103-04 (by negative implication, the above section "does 
apply to the cost of removing 'pollutants' from buildings and personal property [on or off the 
described premises]") (emphasis in original). 
174 Section A.5. provides: "Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, chemicals and waste." The 
definition of "pollutants" contained in the basic endorsement is identical to that set forth in 
CGL policy forms. See MALLIN, supra note 4, at 110. 
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d. Additional Coverage for Pollutant Cleanup and Removal 
Claims for the expense of extracting pollutants from land and 
water on insured premises have been provided for by additional 
coverage with a comparatively low aggregate liability limit, stated 
separately from the debris-removal coverage in the basic endorse-
ment. 175 The newly created pollutant clean-up and removal coverage 
provides up to $10,000 of additional coverage for the cost of extract-
ing pollutants from water or land on the designated premises. 176 
There is no coverage for neutralizing the toxic effects of pollutants, 
only their removal or extraction is covered. 177 The basic endorsement 
provides no coverage to defray the cost of removing or extracting 
pollutants from land or water on premises away from the described 
premises. 178 
Coverage is limited to pollutant clean-up and removal expenses 
arising out of "Covered Causes of LOSS."179 The $10,000 limitation of 
additional coverage is calculated on losses "occurring during each 
separate 12-month period of this policy. "180 The ISO Committee re-
portedly intended the latter phrase to mean an annual aggregate 
and to comprise the time interval between anniversary dates of the 
policy, assuming an annual renewal term. 181 The aggregate limit is 
intended to unambiguously limit the insurer's exposure to no more 
than $10,000 during anyone policy year, even when multiple occur-
rence claims are presented. 182 There is a 180-day reporting require-
ment under this Additional Coverage, similar to that set forth in the 
basic endorsement. 183 
175 Section A.3. See also Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 5; FC&S Bulletin, supra note 
117, at EP-2 (Commercial Property) (coverage for pollutant cleanup and removal characterized 
as "a new additional coverage" introduced in conjunction with the revised ISO debris-removal 
form). 
176 FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP-2 (Commercial Property). The $10,000 annual 
aggregate limit of coverage applies at any described premises if the pollution damage is caused 
by a covered cause of loss during the policy period. Jd.; see also Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 
155, at 182-83. 
177 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 119-20. 
178 See id. at 119. 
179 CP 10 20 11 85, Section A.3. 
180 Jd., Section A.3.b. 
181 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 107. 
182 J d. at 108. Because of the relatively low amount of coverage involved, the ISO Committee 
sought to simplify potential coverage disputes by setting a $10,000 aggregate limit and 
permitting coverage for unlimited occurrences under the basic endorsement. Jd.; see also 
FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, Fire & Marine, at EP-2; Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 
5-6. 
183 Section A.3. This section provides that such expenses will be paid only if they are 
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e. Increased Aggregate Limit of Coverage for Pollutant Cleanup 
and Removal 
An insured can purchase an additional aggregate limit of insurance 
to cover the cleanup and removal of pollutants from land and water 
at specified 10cations. 184 Such coverage is available under the extra 
endorsement185 for an additional premium. 186 The extra endorsement 
does not modify the basic endorsement,187 but it provides an addi-
tional annual aggregate limit as excess insurance. l88 No coverage is 
intended or expressed under the extra endorsement for removal or 
extraction of pollutants from off-premises land or water. 189 
We have examined potential bases contained within property in-
surance policies on which an insured may rely to urge that there is 
coverage for a pollution-related claim. Whether the basis of the claim 
for coverage is an allegation that pollution comprises an insured peril 
or that the contamination loss should be covered as debris removal, 
however, there usually should be valid defenses to the claim based 
on the express language of the policy. An insured's claim may fail to 
satisfy some essential prerequisite for coverage or the claim may be 
expressly excluded by a provision barring coverage for certain risks. 
reported to the insurer within 180 days of the earlier of the date of direct physical loss or 
damage or the end of the policy period. See FC&S Bulletin, Fire & Marine, supra note 117, 
at EP-2 (Commercial Property); Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 182-83. 
184 FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at EP-2, E-3 (Commercial Property). The editors explain 
that under the additional endorsement, the insured can schedule an additional annual aggre-
.gate amount for the cleanup and removal of pollutants from land or water on the insured's 
premises. [d. 
185 CP 04 07 04 86. That form was recently revised to add the Standard Property Policy 
form CP 00 99 07 88 to the list of forms it modifies. Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 187. 
186 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 111-12. 
187 See Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 187. 
188 The extra endorsement of CP 04 07 04 86 provides: 
B. We will not pay under this endorsement for pollutants cleanup or removal costs 
in any occurrence until the total of all such costs exceeds the sum of: 
1. The $10,000 aggregate limit from the basic Pollutant Clean Up and Removal 
Additional Coverage, less any prior payments for the same policy year; plus 
2. The deductible shown in the Schedule. 
We will then pay the costs in excess of that sum, until the Additional Aggregate 
Limit of Insurance shown in the Schedule is used up during the applicable 12-month 
period. 
MALLIN, supra note 4, at 111-12. See FC&S Bulletin, supra note 117, at E-3 (Commercial 
Property). The editors note that the additional aggregate amount for pollutant cleanup is 
excess insurance over the $10,000 limit on the ISO coverage form to which the endorsement 
is attached. They point out that a deductible is scheduled on the endorsement to match the 
largest property damage deductible appearing in the policy (within a minimum of $1,000). [d. 
The editors also provide a helpful illustration of the application of the additional coverage 
under the extra endorsement for the removal of pollutants from an insured's premises. [d. 
189 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 111. 
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III. POTENTIAL DEFENSES BASED ON THE RESTRICTED SCOPE OF 
PROPERTY POLICY COVERAGE 
Not all property damage losses are insurable. 190 Even under stan-
dard all risk policy forms, not every risk is covered. 191 Restrictions 
on the scope of coverage under property insurance policies are 
properly taken into account by insurers in evaluating whether cov-
erage exists for contamination-related claims. An insured bears the 
burden of proving its loss falls within the scope of coverage provided 
under the insuring agreement. 192 To meet this burden, an insured 
must establish a direct physical loss to covered property proximately 
caused by a peril insured against during the policy term. 193 In ad-
dition, standard commercial and homeowners property forms pro-
vide a number of limitations and exceptions that should negate cov-
erage for contamination 10sses. 194 In evaluating whether coverage 
exists, an insurer should consider the following elements that an 
insured is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 
A. Direct Loss 
Under certain circumstances, when the policy so requires,l95 an 
insurer may defend by contending that a loss does not comprise a 
direct loss. This defense may be considered under circumstances 
when factors of time, distance, or excluded perils render the actual 
cause of the claimed loss too remote. 196 The requirement of direct 
190 See J. MAGEE & O. SERBEIN, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE (4th ed. 1967). 
Magee and Serbein make a distinction between insurance claims and insured losses. They 
point out that there is not automatically coverage under an insurance contract simply because 
the insured has suffered a loss. For an insurance claim to constitute loss, the loss must fall 
within the coverage provided under the terms and conditions of the applicable policy. Id. at 
830. 
191 THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 123-24. 
192 See, e.g., Grzadzielewski v. Walsh County Mut. Ins. Co., 297 N.W.2d 780, 784 (N.D. 
1980) (no coverage because the evidence presented did not establish facts showing that the 
loss was a direct loss due to wind); Paris, supra note 4, at M-4. 
193 Hook, supra note 4, at 1. 
194 MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 8, at 139. The authors remark that an insurance contract 
is one of the few important contracts people regularly enter into obligations under without 
reading its contents. Mehr and Cammack contend that: "Many insurance buyers seemingly 
believe that the exclusions and conditions included in modern contracts of insurance are so 
negligible and unimportant that they are not worth reading." Id. 
195 See Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 404, 418, 98 
N.W.2d 280, 290-91 (1959) (court found that, unlike the "New York form," the Minnesota 
form of standard policy did not require that a fire be a "direct" cause of the loss for coverage). 
196 See, e.g., Brothers, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 268 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1970) (no 
coverage under the insured's business interruption policy for losses due to a precipitous decline 
in customers at the insured's restaurant). 
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loss may exclude losses that flow from, but do not comprise, physical 
loss to property. 197 
In Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of 
America,198 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals required the in-
sured to prove that its losses were directly caused by physical dam-
age to imported beans by the fumigant Phostoxin,199 a covered peril, 
rather than by the governmental detention of undamaged beans only 
suspected of being contaminated, an excluded peril. 200 In the latter 
event, the insured's losses would be due only remotely to the ex-
posure of the beans to Phostoxin and there would be no coverage. 201 
The insured, a shipper of goods, sued to recover on two marine 
insurance policies for losses sustained when a shipment of beans 
from Europe was temporarily detained, by order of the Food and 
Drug Administration, upon arrival in the United States. During the 
197 In North River Insurance Co. v. Clark, 80 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1935), there was no 
coverage under a fire policy for the loss of use of a locomotive that was untouched by a forest 
fire, but was not accessible for use. The receiver in bankruptcy of the insured sought to 
recover on a fire policy due to the collapse of railroad bridges during a forest fire. The stipulated 
facts before the court were that the fire left the locomotive untouched and undamaged. 
Nevertheless, the locomotive was so isolated as a result of the forest fire that it would cost 
all the locomotive was worth to render it accessible for use. In denying coverage, the court 
noted the alleged loss actually resulted from the insured's unwillingness or inability to rebuild 
the bridges and was not caused by the fire. Id. at 203. But see Marshall Produce Co. v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 404, 435, 98 N.W.2d 280, 301 (1959). In a result-
oriented decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished and declined to apply North 
River. The court found coverage for the loss in value of the insureds' egg powder due to 
smoke exposure because, unlike the locomotive in North River, there was no possible way 
the insureds could recover the value of the egg powder. 
198 635 F.2d 1051 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Bender Shipbldg. & Repair Co. v. Brasileiro, 874 
F.2d 1551, 1560, 1561 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (collision liability clause of a builder's risk marine 
policy did not cover the shipbuilder's liability for liquidated damages for delay in the delivery 
of a floating drydock). In Bender, the court observed that "marine insurance interpretation 
strictly applies the doctrine of causa proxima non remota spectatur ('the immediate not the 
remote cause is considered') and a court should not attempt to trace the origin of losses back 
to remote causes." 874 F.2d at 1559 (citing Blaine Richards). 
199 Phostoxin was a pesticide widely used in Europe, which had not been approved by the 
FDA. Bender, 874 F.2d at 1052. 
200 I d. at 1055-56. 
201 I d. The district court ruled that there would be no coverage for losses arising from 
"temporary physical loss of the beans" due to detention by the FDA. The court of appeals 
concluded that the insured's pleadings were imprecise in stating the exact source of loss or 
damage on which it relied in seeking insurance proceeds. It remanded the case, instructing 
the district court to determine whether any of the beans were so damaged by contamination 
with Phostoxin that contracts were cancelled due to the contamination, or whether cancellation 
of contracts was due only to the delay caused by temporary detention. There were apparently 
no exclusions in the policies for losses due to contamination. Losses sustained in reconditioning 
the beans or losses due to rejection of reconditioned beans by purchasers because of the 
physical condition of the beans would not be excluded. Id. 
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period of detention, which lasted more than six weeks, the insured 
applied for permission to segregate, clean, and rebag the beans that 
were found to contain residue of the pesticide. 202 The FDA approved 
the insured's proposal and immediately released the "clean bags" of 
beans that were unaffected by Phostoxin, and agreed to the recon-
ditioning and release of the bags of beans containing Phostoxin res-
idue. 203 
The beans ultimately had to be resold at a loss when the original 
sales contracts, both for the undamaged beans and for beans that 
were contaminated with Phostoxin residue, were cancelled. 204 The 
applicable policies provided no coverage for financial losses caused 
solely by governmental seizure and detention of the beans.205 The 
court of appeals therefore ruled that, in order for the insured to 
recover under the policies, it had to prove that the original purchas-
ers rejected the beans because of their physical condition, rather 
than because of the delay caused by governmental detention.206 
The insured argued that, even if a detention of the beans fell 
within the policy exclusions, the proximate cause of the financial 
losses was the improper fumigation of some of the beans with Phos-
toxin. 207 The insured asserted that coverage should exist for losses 
on both the "clean" and "dirty" bags of beans. That should be the 
result, the insured contended, because "but for" the improper fu-
migation the detention by the FDA would not have occurred. 208 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the insured's con-
tention that all of its losses were covered as being proximately 
caused by improper fumigation. 209 In discounting the insured's po-
sition, the court sought to determine the immediate cause of the 
losses and declined to trace the losses back to their remote causes. 210 
The court concluded that fumigation with Phostoxin was a remote 
202Id. at 1052. 
203Id. 
204 Id. 
205Id. at 1053-54, 1056. One of the marine policies was an all risk policy, which excluded 
coverage for losses due to "detainment, confiscation ... and the consequences thereof" [the 
standard "Free from Capture and Seizure Clause") and for "loss, damage or deterioration 
arising from delay." A second marine policy insured against risks otherwise excluded under 
the standard Free from Capture and Seizure Clause in the all risk policy, but excluded coverage 
for losses caused by "[s)eizure or destruction under quarantine or customs regulations" or 
"[d)elay, deterioration and/or loss of market." Id. at 1052-53. 
206 I d. at 1055-56. 
207Id. at 1054-55 & n.2. 
208Id. at 1054. 
209Id. at 1055. 
210 Id. at 1054-55. 
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cause of the losses arising from resale of the undamaged beans, 
which directly resulted from the detention. 211 The predominant and 
determining, also known as the "real efficient," cause of such loss 
was the detention, coverage for which was barred by both policies. 
The insured could only recover upon proof that direct physical loss 
or damage had occurred to the beans and resulted in the 10sses.212 
The defense that direct loss refers only to a loss resulting from 
the force of the designated peril on the insured property, however, 
probably will not be dispositive.213 Many courts have equated direct 
loss with proximate cause,214 and have applied it to first-party claims 
in a fashion similar to its meaning in negligence cases. 215 The mere 
presence of intervening time or distance between the happening of 
the event and resulting loss by contamination does not mean the 
peril was a remote cause of the 10ss.216 Rather, the court will seek 
211 [d.; see also Grzadzielewski v. Walsh County Mut. Ins. Co., 297 N.W.2d 780, 784 (N.D. 
1980). The court affirmed a jury verdict and found that the insured had failed to prove a direct 
loss by a covered peril. The applicable policy insured against "direct loss by windstorm." 
Grzadzielewski, 297 N.W.2d at 785 n.2. The insured sued to recover under the policy, con-
tending that wind had blown open a gate to a cattle pasture permitting his cattle to reach a 
feeder and consume an amount of food that proved to be fatal. The North Dakota Supreme 
Court found that the evidence presented at trial failed to establish that the death of insured 
cattle constituted a direct loss due to wind. [d. at 785. 
212 Blaine Richards, 635 F.2d at 1055-56. 
213 See, e.g., Louisville and Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 
F.2d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 1985). The insurer denied coverage under a policy insuring against 
direct loss by willful and malicious damage for damage to a sewage treatment plant caused 
by illegal dumping of toxic waste. The insurer defended, in part, by alleging that the policy 
did not afford coverage because the damage to the treatment plant was not immediate or 
expected. The insurer argued that the damage was too remote in time and place to be the 
result of vandalism or malicious mischief. It pointed out that the damage to the treatment 
area occurred several days after the dumping, that it took time for the toxic waste to move 
the three miles through the sewer system to the plant, and that it took additional time for 
the toxic waste to build up to damaging levels there. [d. at 536. The court rejected these 
arguments and held that the "loss was direct because there was no intervening act or agency; 
the toxic waste moved in the normal operation of the sewer system from the manhole to the 
treatment plant." [d. at 537; see also Gibson v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 479 F. Supp. 3, 4-6 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (court agreed with the insured's contention 
that a policy insuring their dwelling against direct loss by flood did not require physical 
damage to the premises caused by actual touching of flood waters, but that any loss proxi-
mately reSUlting from a flood was covered). 
214 18 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 74.712 (1983 and Supp. 1988). "The words 'direct cause' 
are synonymous in legal intendment with proximate cause." [d. See, e.g., Marshall Produce 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 404, 415, 98 N.W.2d 280, 289 (1959) 
(discussing that the word "direct" within a fire policy has been held to mean "immediate" or 
"proximate," as distinguished from "remote"). 
215 See, e.g., Grzadzielewski v. Walsh County Mut. Ins. Co., 297 N.W.2d 780, 783 (N.D. 
1980). 
216 In determining whether a direct loss has occurred, many courts apply a definition meaning 
"that cause which in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new and intervening 
cause produces a loss, and without which the loss would not have occurred." Federal Ins. Co. 
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to determine the predominant and determining, or the real efficient, 
cause of the 10ss.217 For example, in Henri's Food Products Co. v. 
Home Insurance CO.,218 the policy insured the product against direct 
loss caused by smoke. The court found coverage even though only 
the packaging of the insureds' product contained residue of the toxic 
chemical vapor.219 
The use of the word "direct" to modify the word "loss" generally 
has not been interpreted as altering the application of the usual 
principles of proximate causation by the courts that have considered 
the issue. 22o Nevertheless, when policy language and circumstances 
of a claim support such a defense, an insurer correctly may evaluate 
whether the loss at issue satisfies the requirement of a "direct loss" 
for coverage. 
B. Physical Loss 
Standard all risk homeowners and commercial property policies 
limit recovery to physical damage. 221 Some courts have shown a 
v. Bock, 382 S. W.2d 305, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (insured suffered a direct loss by windstorm 
and hurricane when his meat in cold storage vaults spoiled due to a rise in temperature 
proximately caused by hurricane damage to transmission lines that halted electricity); see also 
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540, 542-44 (D. Or. 1964). 
217 See, e.g., Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indem. Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 1051, 1054 (2d Cir. 
1980) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 58 (1950)). 
218 474 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Wis. 1979). 
219 Id. at 890-91. A private testing concern determined that the insured's pourable salad 
dressing, which was bottled and sealed in cartons, was not affected. Only the packaging was 
permeated with the chemical. Nevertheless, the insured "determined that the product should 
be destroyed for the good of the company's reputation of high-quality products." Id. at 891. 
In ruling on the insured's motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the 
policy, the court noted that the insurance company "offered no contrary evidence as to the 
fact that the [chemical vapor] residue contacted [the insured's] products in the warehouse." 
Id. Citing to the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) that a party opposing 
summary judgment cannot rely solely on its pleadings and must demonstrate a genuine issue 
of fact, the court found that the insured had "produced unrefuted facts showing that [it had] 
suffered a peril that caused an injury." Id. at 891; see also Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 404, 429, 98 N.W.2d 280,297 (1959) (interpreting policies 
insuring poultry, eggs, and milk powder that included "filled containers," the court concluded 
that "the cans, labels, and cases are as much a part of the products as the contents ... [and] 
the entire unit is the property which is insured"). 
220 See supra note 211. At least one commentator from an insurance defense perspective 
has cautioned that too much emphasis has been placed on the requirement of a direct loss for 
a finding of coverage. See Miller, Property Insurance for Environmental Claims-Physical 
Loss and Damage to Insured Property, reprinted in Environmental Claims, supra note 4, 
at 29. Miller has concluded that the word "direct" as a modifier for coverages is superfluous 
because it simply restates a requirement of proximate causation between the insured peril 
and damage or loss that is already imposed as a matter of law. Id. at 32. 
221 See Miller, What Constitutes Property Damage Under an All-Risk Insurance Policy, in 
THE ALL RISK POLICY: ITS PROBLEMS, PERILS AND PRACTICAL ApPLICATION, 1986 ABA 
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reluctance to extend coverage under policies requiring physical loss 
if an insured has failed to prove a loss resulting from physical damage 
to covered property. 222 
Court definitions of the term "property damage" in standard Com-
prehensive General Liability (CGL) policies illustrate the impact of 
the physical damage requirement on coverage analysis. 223 Many 
courts have given a broad interpretation to the phrase "property 
damage" in liability policies where the phrase was not limited to 
mean physical injury.224 Without the requirement of physical injury, 
SEC. TORT AND INS. PRACTICE 11. In arguing that proof of a "physical loss" should be a 
prerequisite to a finding of coverage under even an all risk policy, Miller states: "Physical 
damage is an element of liability frequently overlooked in view of the expansion of insured 
perils to all risks. Nonetheless, there still must be physical loss or damage [for coverage]." 
Id. at 12. 
222 See, e.g., Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indem. Ins. Co., 635 F.2d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir. 
1980) (holding that no coverage existed for losses to imported beans caused by delay due to 
detention by the FDA, but that coverage would exist upon a finding on remand that other 
losses arose from damage to the physical condition of the beans); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. 
Covert, 526 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (insured failed to prove that he suffered 
physical loss or damage when his products, which were sealed in a manner preventing 
inspection for damage, fell to the floor while in storage, and he decided not to sell the units 
when the manufacturer withdrew its warranty that the products were free of defects); Frue-
hauf Corp. v. Royal Exch. Assur. of Am., 704 F.2d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1983) (no coverage 
for the alleged conversion of tractors by a third party, who refused to deliver the tractors, 
because the refusal to deliver did not constitute "physical loss or damage" and there was no 
evidence that any of the tractors were damaged or destroyed); HRG Dev. Corp. v. Graphic 
Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 374,376-78,527 N.E.2d 1179, 1180-81 (1988) (insured's 
all risk policy applied only to physical losses and there was no coverage for losses due to a 
defect in the title of equipment acquired by the insured); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 132 
Vt. 97, 100, 315 A.2d 257, 259 (1974) (under a policy insuring the liability of the insured for 
physical injury to, or destruction of, tangible property, insurer was not obligated to defend 
suit against insured where color slides, for possible use in a magazine article, disappeared 
without any evidence of actual destruction). 
223 In deciding liability coverage disputes governed by CGL standard policy forms, the 
courts have carefully examined the policy language itself in determining whether a given 
incident constituted property damage. Prior to 1966, "property damage" was defined in CGL 
policies as "injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof." The 1966 
revised version of the CGL standard policy form defined "property damage" as "injury to or 
destruction of tangible property." Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance-Per-
spective and Overview, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 232 (1975). Following the 1973 revisions, 
the standard CGL form defined "property damage" as constituting: 
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the 
policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or 
(2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed 
provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period. 
Id. at 239 (emphasis in original). The 1985 CGL revision retains a definition of "property 
damage" that is substantially identical to that in the 1973 CGL form, with only a non-
substantive editorial change. 
224 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mayor's Jewelers, 384 So. 2d 256, 258 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("If [under the 1966 CGL form] ... property is damaged only when 
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these courts have interpreted property damage to be comprised of 
consequential or intangible property losses, in addition to direct 
physical damage. 225 Absent the criterion of physical injury, the in-
corporation of a defective component into tangible property has been 
found to constitute property damage, if it resulted in a decrease in 
market value of the property.226 In Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury 
Indemnity CO.,227 defective plaster that shrank and cracked forced 
the contractor to remove it and to replaster damaged walls and 
ceilings. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, although the in-
jury to the walls and ceilings could be rectified by removal of the 
defective plaster, the presence of the defective plaster on the walls 
and ceilings reduced the value of the building and constituted prop-
erty damage. 228 
In construing liability policies that define "property damage" to 
mean "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property," how-
ever, some courts have strictly enforced the requirement of physical 
injury.229 In light of the present CGL policy language, the holding 
it suffers actual, physical damage, it would have been relatively simple to include the word 
'physical' in its definition. "). 
225 See Note, Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of Property Damage" Under the 
Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 795, 803-13 (1984) (notwithstand-
ing judicial authority to the contrary, "a majority of courts and commentators consider loss 
of use of property [and diminution in value of property] to constitute 'property damage' under 
the 1966 policy"). 
226 See, e.g., Yakima Cement Products Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash. App. 536, 544-
45, 590 P.2d 371, 376 (1979), rev'd, 93 Wash. 2d 210, 218, 608 P.2d 254, 258-59 (1980) (defective 
concrete wall panels incorporated into a building); Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. 
Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 338, 341, 370 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-74 (1977) (defective valve assemblies 
used in aerosol cans); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 69, 72-73, 332 
N.E.2d 319, 322, 371 N. Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1975) (defective ski straps incorporated into ski 
bindings). 
227242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954). 
228 [d. at 358, 65 N.W.2d at 125. 
229 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250, 
254 (10th Cir. 1988) (a pre-1973 CGL policy provided coverage for diminution in value of the 
building onto which the insured installed a defective curtain wall, but the 1973 revisions in 
the relevant umbrella policy precluded coverage for intangible injuries such as diminution in 
value); American Home Assur. Co. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22, 24-29 (1st Cir. 
1986) (under the 1973 CGL revision, "some physical injury to tangible property [including the 
property of the insured] must be shown in order to trigger coverage"); Mraz v. Canadian 
Univ'l Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 1986) (response costs payable under CERCLA 
are not themselves covered "property damage" under the definition of that term in the 1966 
CGL policy, but are instead uncovered "economic loss"); McCollum v. Insurance Co. of N. 
Am., 132 Ariz. 129, 130--32, 644 P.2d 283, 284-86 (Ct. App. 1982) (a claim for the loss of 
speculative profits as a result of negligent misrepresentations by the insureds is not a loss 
arising from "injury to or destruction of tangible property"). But see Gordon & Westendorf, 
supra note 2, at 584-86 (noting that liability insurers have met with little success in arguing 
270 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:231 
in Hauenstein has been rejected. 230 In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. 
Transportation Insurance CO.,231 the Oregon Supreme Court held 
that the requirement of physical injury for property damage negated 
liability coverage for consequential or intangible losses. 232 
The Wyoming Sawmills court found that the incorporation of a 
defective product into a building did not constitute property damage. 
The insured manufactured defective two-inch-by-four-inch studs that 
warped and twisted after being installed in the building. Although 
the studs had to be replaced, they did not physically damage the 
rest of the building. The insured tore out and replaced the defective 
studs and brought an action against its CGL insurer to recover the 
labor costs associated with this remedial action. Relying on the 
requirement of "physical injury to tangible property" contained in 
the 1973 revision to the CGL form, the court declined to follow 
Hauenstein. 233 
in environmental coverage disputes that governmental cost-recovery actions for contamination 
of soil and water do not constitute claims for "physical injury to or destruction of tangible 
property"); Aylward, Covering Asbestos Property Damage Claims and the CGL Policy, in 
ASBESTOS PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIMS 906C K-l, K-6 to K-13, (DEF. RES. INST. COURSEBOOK 
1989) (all courts considering the issue have determined, with one exception, that the presence 
of friable asbestos in buildings constitutes "property damage" under the 1973 CGL definition). 
230 In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Concrete Units, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 751,756 (Minn. 
1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected its own holding in Hauenstein as being inappl-
icable to the revised CGL language requiring physical injury in order to constitute property 
damage. The insured manufactured defective concrete that was incorporated into a grain 
elevator. The court found that no property damage occurred, even though the incorporation 
of the defective concrete decreased the market value of the structure, because it did not cause 
physical damage to tangible property. [d.; see also Tinker, supra note 223, at 224-25 (the 
1973 revised CGL policy definition of "property damage" was intended to bar coverage for 
intangible injuries such as diminution in value); Note, supra note 225, at 810-13 (diminution 
in value of tangible property does not qualify as "property damage" under the 1973 version 
of the CGL policy). 
231 282 Or. 401, 578 P.2d 1253 (1978). 
232 [d. at 406, 578 P.2d at 1256. Standard property policy forms do not define "physical loss 
or damage." Therefore, most courts will likely apply the term "physical" in a manner consistent 
with common usage, and will probably construe it according to its plain and ordinary meaning. 
Such courts may refer to dictionary definitions of "physical." See, e.g., American Cas. Co. v. 
Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1962) (relying on a dictionary definition to define "explo-
sion"). A leading dictionary defines "physical" as "of or relating to natural or material things 
as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual, or imaginary: MATERIAL." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1706 (1986); see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIC-
TIONARY 887 (1984) (defining "physical" to mean "perceptible, especially through the senses"). 
Such definitions support the view that diminution in value and loss of use should not comprise 
physical damage for property insurance coverage. 
233 Wyoming Sawmills, 282 Or. at 406, 578 P.2d at 1256. The court reasoned: 
The present policy defines property damage as "physical injury to . . . tangible 
property." Apparently, none of the policies involved in the cases which are the basis 
for the plaintiff's contention [i.e. the Hauenstein progeny] included the word "phys-
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The court in Wyoming Sawmills ruled that no coverage existed 
for the insured's labor expense in taking out the defective studs and 
replacing them with nondefective ones. 234 At the same time, the 
court held that the costs associated with tearing out other parts of 
the building in order to replace the studs would be covered by the 
policy. 235 
Decisions awarding coverage in the absence of physical alteration 
or damage to insured property, however, may not be ignored by the 
insurer in analyzing contamination claims. 236 One court took the 
position that a physical loss occurred when tangible property was 
contaminated and rendered uninhabitable, although there was no 
palpable physical injury to the insured property. In Western Fire 
Insurance Co. v. First Presbyterian Church,237 the all risk policy 
limited the insured's recovery to physical losses. The Colorado Su-
preme Court held that a direct physical loss occurred when the fire 
department ordered the insured's church building closed as a health 
hazard due to contamination by gasoline vapors. 238 
ical." The inclusion of this word negates any possibility that the policy was intended 
to include "consequential or intangible damage," such as depreciation in value, within 
the term "property damage." The intention to exclude such coverage can be the only 
reason for the addition of the word. 
[d. (emphasis in original). 
234 [d. at 406-07, 578 P.2d at 1256. 
235 [d. at 407, 578 P.2d at 1256. 
236 See, e.g., Great N. Ins. Co. v. Dayco Corp., 620 F. Supp. 346, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(rejecting the insurer's contention that there was no coverage because the insured suffered a 
credit loss rather than a physical loss within the policy, where, due to an alleged theft by false 
pretenses, the insured failed to receive full payment for 12 shipments of goods). 
237 165 Colo. 34, 437 P.2d 52 (1968). 
238 [d. at 39-41, 437 P.2d at 55-56. In deciding that contamination constituted a direct 
physical loss, the Colorado Supreme Court relied upon Hughes v. Potomac Insurance Co., 
199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962). A landslide left the insured dwelling precari-
ously overhanging a 30-foot cliff and unsafe to inhabit. Hughes, 199 Cal. App. 2d at 243, 18 
Cal. Rptr. at 651. Appraisers found that only $50 of physical damage had occurred to the 
dwelling itself. [d., 18 Cal. Rptr. at 652. The insureds sued to recover the cost of building a 
retaining wall and completing a landfill which were both necessary to provide ground support 
for the dwelling. [d., 18 Cal. Rptr. at 653. As to this latter claim, the California Court of 
Appeal rejected the insurance company's contention that the loss of ground support did not 
constitute physical damage to the dwelling within the meaning of a policy insuring against all 
risks of physical loss of and damage to the insured dwelling. [d. at 248, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 655. 
The court reasoned that: "[d]espite the fact that a 'dwelling building' might be rendered 
completely useless to its owners, [the insurance company] would deny that any loss or damage 
had occurred unless some tangible injury to the physical structure itself could be detected 
.... [The insureds] correctly point out that a 'dwelling' or 'dwelling building' connotes a place 
fit for occupancy and a safe place in which to dwell or live." [d.; see also Cypress Grove 
Townhouse v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Ct. App. 1987). This case has been 
ordered not to be published in the official reporter and has no precedential value. It is of 
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Gasoline saturated the soil underneath and surrounding the church 
building. Vapors contaminated the foundation, halls, and rooms of 
the church. Ultimately, the vapors rendered the building uninhabit-
able and the use of the building dangerous. The policy apparently 
contained no exclusion for losses caused by contamination. The in-
surance company argued that, although the church suffered a loss 
of use, no direct physical loss had taken place. 239 The court, however, 
rejected that theory and affirmed the jury award in an amount 
necessary to remedy the infiltration and contamination problems. 240 
By disregarding the policy restriction that physical damage to 
property must have occurred, courts adopting that view run the risk 
of expanding coverage beyond what the insured contracted for and 
purchased. Whether mere loss of use or diminution in value of prop-
erty, without some identifiable damage, constitutes physical damage 
for coverage is a question an insurer is entitled to consider when 
investigating a claim. A valid argument exists that unambiguous 
policy language requiring physical property damage should be en-
forced where no visible or palpable damage to property can be 
established. 241 This question has not been finally resolved, and the 
defense of no "physical loss or damage" should not be overlooked 
when evaluating whether there is coverage for contamination 
10sses.242 
interest for discussion purposes only. In Cypress Grove, the court ruled that an all risk policy 
covered storm damage to sand dunes that formerly provided lateral support and protection 
from wave activity to a complex of townhouses. 242 Cal. Rptr. at 709. The insurer disputed 
that it owed coverage for the destruction of the sand dunes and loss of necessary lateral 
support. Id. at 710-11. As a defense, the insurer argued, in part, that it was not obligated 
under the policy because there had been no direct physical damage to the townhouse structure 
itself. Id. at 714-15. The court rejected the insurance company's position that "the structure 
cannot be deemed 'damaged' for purposes of property insurance until it becomes so unfit for 
occupancy, so unsuitable for its intended use, or so uninhabitable that its continued use may 
be deemed 'dangerous.'" Id. at 715. The court ruled that for coverage to exist there need not 
have been an immediate threat to the dwelling structure and the premises need not have been 
rendered uninhabitable. Id. at 714-15. 
239 165 Colo. at 38, 437 P.2d at 54. 
24°Id. at 38-39, 437 P.2d at 55. 
241 See Miller, supra note 221, at 13-18. Miller posits that property insurance should not be 
construed as insuring the habitability of a residential structure or suitability of a commercial 
building for its intended purposes where no "physical loss or damage" has taken place. Id. 
242 A failure to satisfy the requirement of "physical loss or damage" persuaded the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals to affirm summary judgment dismissing the insured's claim for 
insurance coverage under a builders all risk policy. Nuclear Power Servs., Inc., v. Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co., No. 7478-1-III (unpublished opinion) (Wash. Ct. App. May 14, 1987). The policy 
at issue provided: "This policy insures against all risks of direct physical loss or damage, and 
extra expense arising therefrom as provided herein." Id. at 6-7 (emphasis supplied by the 
court). The insured had contracted to design and fabricate supports and hangers for the 
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C. Fortuitous Loss 
The defense that a loss is not fortuitous243 is generally applied as 
a limit to the all risk coverage and is also relevant to named perils 
policies. 244 If an insured knew of the presence of the contaminant 
cooling system in a nuclear power plant. The owner was dissatisfied with the work and sued 
the insured, alleging that some of the hangers and pipe supports were negligently designed 
and did not meet contract specifications. Id. at 2--3. The court agreed with the insurer that 
its denial of the claim was proper and ruled that: 
[T]hese are not direct damages or losses; they are consequential damages arising 
from intangible injury and are recoverable only after finding a direct physical loss. 
Since NPS [the insured] does not claim a direct physical loss, the court's summary 
judgment dismissing the NPS petition for declaratory relief was proper. 
Id. at 7. 
The defense of no "physical loss or damage" may become important in deciding claims by 
insureds seeking coverage for losses arising from the discovery of asbestos in a building. If 
the insured is making a claim for diminution in value of its property due to the presence of 
asbestos, there may be no physical damage and no coverage. So long as the asbestos is inert, 
is not damaging or impairing the structural integrity of the building, is performing its intended 
function as insulation, fire retardant, or ceiling tile, and the building is habitable, there should 
be no basis to allege that a physical loss has occurred. If an event takes place that disturbs 
the asbestos or it flakes and deteriorates, becoming friable, the insured may contend that 
sufficient physical damage has occurred to trigger coverage. Paris, supra note 4, at M-6. See, 
e.g., Walters v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., No. S 86-310 (N.D. Ind.), reported in 3 Toxics L. 
Rep. (BNA) 732 (Nov. 9, 1988). The insured submitted a claim under her homeowners policy 
alleging that her home and its contents were "rendered valueless and unfit for human use due 
to the release of asbestos insulation particles caused by the water that had dripped from the 
basement ceiling." Id. The applicable policy required "physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, including loss of its use" for coverage. Id. The court, however, rejected 
the insurer's argument on summary judgment that the insured's claim was really for economic 
damages. The court was persuaded that the insured had alleged sufficient physical damage in 
the form of a broken pipe, broken antenna, and water damage. Id. No further proceedings in 
the Walters case were apparently reported. The decision points out that the presence or 
absence of identifiable physical damage should be a pivotal factor in whether a court will allow 
coverage under a property insurance policy for losses arising from the presence of asbestos 
in a building. 
243 A fortuitous event is one that is not certain to occur. Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 283 
N.C. 142, 148, 195 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1973). "Fortuitous" has been defined to mean "'occurring 
by chance without evident causal need or relation or without deliberate intention.'" Id. (quoting 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 895 (1961)). The term has also been 
defined as "[h]appening by chance or accident," "[o]ccurring unexpectedly, or without known 
cause," and "[a]ccidental, undesigned, adventitious." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 
1979); see also BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (3d ed. 1969). 
244 See Intermetal Mexicana v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1989) 
("In addition to the exclusions named in the policy itself, every 'all-risk' contract of insurance 
contains an unnamed exclusion-the loss must be fortuitous in nature.") (emphasis in original); 
Atlantic Lines Ltd. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 547 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (where 
policy exclusions are not pertinent, "for recovery under an all risks policy, an insured need 
demonstrate only that a fortuitous loss has occurred"); Cozen & Bennett, Fortuity: The 
Unnamed Exclusion, 20 FORUM 222 (1985). Cozen and Bennett imply that the doctrine of 
fortuity is inherent in the concept of a contingent risk required for all risk coverage, though 
it is not in fact an "exclusion." They point out that the burden of proof of coverage rests with 
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and was aware of the harmful effect it would have on insured prop-
erty at the time the policy was purchased, the loss may be nonfor-
tuitous and coverage may be barred.245 An insured bears the burden 
of proving that a fortuitous loss has occurred.246 Nevertheless, the 
fortuity doctrine has been transformed in recent years from an em-
phasis on an objective standard, determining whether the loss was 
physically inevitable, to a subjective standard, determining whether 
the insured knew the loss was certain to occur when the policy was 
issued. 247 
Courts employing the original fortuity doctrine have emphasized 
the physical inevitability that a loss would occur. An often-cited case 
applying an objective standard to assess the inevitability of the loss 
under the traditional fortuity doctrine is Greene v. Cheetham. 248 The 
the insured. Id. See, e.g., Falcon Products v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 615 F. Supp. 
37, 39 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (court rejected the insured's position that the contamination exclusion 
did not apply when loss was caused by a substance other than nuclear fuel or nuclear waste 
and that coverage existed "even though the property was already contaminated when occupied 
and the loss was certain to occur") (emphasis in original), a/I'd, 782 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1986); 
Mc Quade v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. 67, 68 (D. Mass. 1984) (court 
enforced the contamination exclusion and observed that all risk policies provide "'coverage for 
a variety of risks not ordinarily contemplated, and recovery is generally allowed for all losses 
of a fortuitous nature, ... unless the policy contains a specific exclusion precluding coverage"'); 
cf. Auten v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 
749 S. W.2d 497 (Tex. 1988) (no fortuitous event intervened to preclude the application of the 
contamination exclusion and no coverage existed where losses resulted from the negligent 
misapplication of pesticides in the insured's house by a professional exterminator). 
245 Closely analogous to the policy requirement of fortuity for coverage is the exclusion in 
Environmental Impairment Liability policy forms for losses due to pre-existing conditions 
known by the insured at the time the policy was issued. For instance, in Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc. v. Great American Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 199 Cal. App. 3d 791, 802, 245 
Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (1988), the court enforced the exclusion for known pre-existing conditions to 
bar coverage for costs incurred by the insured in removing toxic contamination from the 
premises of the insured's semiconductor fabrication plant. 
246 THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 123. 
247 Cozen & Bennett, supra note 244, at 223. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that a loss due to the substantial earth subsidence that occurred beneath the insured's gypsum 
processing plant was covered by an all risk policy as a fortuitous event. I d. at 153. Although 
subsidence was certain to occur because of the insured's mining activity and the insured knew 
that some limited subsidence would occur, the loss was fortuitous because the insured did not 
expect that a catastrophic subsidence of such great magnitUde would take place. Id. at 151-
52. 
248 293 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Chute v. North River Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 13,214 
N.W. 473 (1927) (loss arising from the cracking of an opal, due solely to its inherent tendency 
to crack and deteriorate and without any external fortuitous cause, was not covered under an 
all risk policy of insurance that covered breakage); Gulf Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. 
Co., 121 Miss. 655, 83 So. 730 (1920) (no coverage under marine policy because no fortuitous 
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment 
rendered in favor of the insureds, who were importers of frozen 
catfish fillets. The court of appeals remanded for a determination of 
whether the loss was inevitable, and whether frozen fish that was 
shipped had become unfit for consumption before the relevant insur-
ance coverage became effective. 
The insureds purchased three shipments of frozen fish and had 
them transported from England to the United States. FDA officials 
examined the fish upon arrival and condemned the shipment as unfit 
for human consumption. 249 The insureds notified their insurer of the 
condition of the fish and of the FDA action. 250 The insurance under-
writers denied liability under the two floating cover policies issued 
to the insured shipper. 251 
The parties stipulated that the condition of the fish remained 
unchanged from stowage in the vessel until condemnation. 252 The 
applicable insurance provided coverage for frozen fish shipments 
"against All and Every Risk whatsoever, howsoever arising .... 
Including risks of condemnation by the Authorities under Pure Food 
Laws irrespective of percentage."253 The trial court held that cov-
erage was afforded for the condemned fish because the open cover 
policy form specifically mentioned the risk of condemnation. 254 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, because 
no finding of fact had been made about when the fish became unfit 
for human consumption. 255 The court found that conflicting inferences 
could be drawn about when the fish spoiled from the evidence stated 
in the record. 256 It concluded that even under an all risk policy the 
loss occurred to an insured barge overladen with oil that leaked oil in calm waters when its 
seams ruptured due to the weight of the cargo and infirmities of the vessel itself). A highly 
influential early case on the subject of the fortuity doctrine is British & Foreign Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Gaunt, 2 A.C. 41 (1921) (providing one of the earliest comprehensive state-
ments of the fortuity doctrine and its connection with the nature of all risk coverage). See 
also Newton Creek Towing v. Aetna Ins. Co., 163 N.Y. 114, 57 N.E. 302 (1900) (coverage 
for an accident caused by collision was barred because of the insured's intentional misconduct 
when the insured barge was lost due to the decision of a tugmaster to attempt to force his 
vessel through an ice field with the barge lashed alongside). 
249 293 F.2d at 934. 
250 Id. 
251Id. 
252Id. at 937. 
2,,;] Id. at 936. 
254 Id. 
255Id. at 937. 
256 Id. 
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insurance "would not include an undisclosed event that existed prior 
to coverage."257 
Among the notable American cases enforcing the traditional view 
of fortuity is Aetna Insurance Co. v. Sachs.258 A housebound French 
poodle was not properly supervised by the insured for an extended 
period, and the dog committed irreparable damage to carpeting and 
drapes in about seventy-five to eighty different spotS.259 The court 
ruled that the insurer was not obligated to pay the claim for damage 
to the carpet because the insureds were guilty of gross negligence 
and indiscretion in failing to detect the dog's activity earlier.260 The 
court reasoned that the loss was not fortuitous. 261 
Courts applying the modern rule of fortuity no longer emphasize 
the objective inevitability of the loss, but focus instead on whether 
the loss was unplanned and unintentional from the subjective view-
point of the insured. 262 This latter approach does not consider 
whether from an objective standpoint there was a physical certainty 
that a loss would occur.263 This trend fails to take into account the 
257Id. The court explained that if the fish was already unfit for human consumption when 
it was initially shipped, there would have been no contingent risk that was insurable. Id. 
258 186 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Mo. 1960). 
259Id. at 107. 
26°Id. at 108. The court stated that it would have allowed the insured to recover for "two 
or three" incidents. Id. The loss would have been "fortuitous" in that event and the insured 
would have had an opportunity, through sight or smell, to discover the dog's activity and 
prevent its repetition. Id. A rug specialist testified at trial that the spots would have been 
easily detectable from the time they dried. Id. at 107. He further testified that "one or two" 
spots could have been easily repaired but that it would have been impossible to match the 
yarn in the rug in the 75 to 80 soiled locations. Id. The court concluded that the insured had 
not acted reasonably and that his conduct bordered on "wanton recklessness and disregard 
for which a person should not be rewarded." Id. at 108. 
26! Id. 
262 See, e.g., Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827,830,24 Cal. Rptr. 
44, 45-46 (1962). The insureds brought a declaratory judgment action under a standard fire 
policy with an all risk endorsement, asking the court to declare that coverage existed for 
damage to the insureds' property caused by a landslide. The insurance company defended, in 
part, by alleging that the earth movement constituting the landslide was inevitable, because 
of the instability of the landfill on which the insureds' house was built. On appeal from a 
verdict in favor of the insureds, the California Court of Appeal discounted this defense. The 
court noted that, given enough information, geologists could probably forecast "the possibility 
or probability of all earth movements ... with accuracy." Id. (emphasis in original). Further 
observing that, in hindsight, any movement of land might be said to have been inevitable, the 
court ruled, "[S]uch 'inevitability' does not alter the fact that at the time the contract of 
insurance was entered into, the event was only a contingency or risk that might or might not 
occur within the term of the policy." Id. (emphasis in original). For an insightful discussion of 
implications on insurance coverage of modern court treatment of the fortuity doctrine, see 
Cozen & Bennett, supra note 244, at 248-55. 
263 Under the traditional rule, when the loss was inevitable under generally recognized 
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risk-taking element generally contemplated in insurance policies. 264 
The present tendency of most courts is to construe the phrase "for-
tuitous event" in the same manner as the term "accident" in a liability 
insurance policy.265 Under the modern approach, a loss due to the 
negligence of the insured is considered to be fortuitous. 266 
A court's inquiry under the modern approach is usually limited to 
whether a named insured was aware that a loss would occur.267 The 
majority of cases addressing fortuity have now adopted the definition 
of "fortuitous event" found in the Restatement of Contracts. 268 After 
restating that an aleatory promise is one conditioned on a fortuitous 
event, the Restatement defines an aleatory promise indirectly by 
defining a fortuitous event as "an event which so far as the parties 
to the contract are aware, is dependent on chance .... [I]t may 
principles of physical and mechanical law, it would not be categorized as a risk that was 
insurable. The knowledge or ignorance of the insured was irrelevant in making this determi-
nation. Cozen & Bennett, supra note 244, at 239. 
264 See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 605, 608 (N.D. Cal. 1960) ("A 
contract of insurance is an agreement to indemnify the insured against loss from contingencies 
which mayor may not occur."). Section 22 of the California Insurance Code provides: "Insur-
ance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss, damage, or 
liability arising from a contingent or unknown event." CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972); see 
also Presley v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 399 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (loss 
was not a contingent risk and there was no coverage for property damage due to flooding 
when the insured purchased a flood policy knowing that gradually rising flood waters were 
encroaching upon the foundation of his house); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Cas. Co., 
668 F. Supp. 394, 402-03 (D. N.J. 1987) (liability insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify 
because the insured had actual knowledge that its landfill had contaminated adjoining property 
before the disputed policy became effective); 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 1:5 (1984) ("A 
contract of insurance is in its nature aleatory . . . in the sense that it depends upon some 
contingent event against the occurrence of which it is intended to provide, even though such 
event may never occur."); R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 476 (1988) ("In most 
circumstances, it is contrary to public policy to permit the enforcement of an insurance contract 
if it would provide indemnification for losses that are not fortuitous."). 
265 See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Sachs, 186 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D. Mo. 1960). 
266 See, e.g., Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1979). 
267 Cozen & Bennett, supra note 244, at 240. Cozen and Bennett point out that most courts 
now look to the subjective knowledge of the individual insured pursuing the claim. It is not 
relevant to this determination that a reasonable and prudent person would have known that 
a loss was imminent. I d. 
268 The definition contained in Restatement of Contracts § 291 comment a (1932) was 
substantially carried over into Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 76 comment c (1981), 
which defines an "aleatory promise" as one conditioned on the occurrence of a fortuitous event. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts notes that an insurance policy is a typical aleatory 
promise, in which performance is conditional on the happening of a chance event. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 comment a. See Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance 
Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369,372 (3d Cir. 1983) (listing cases adopting the definition offortuity 
set out in Restatement of Contracts § 291 comment a). 
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even be a past event, as the loss of vessel, provided that the fact is 
unknown to the parties. "269 
In Compagnie des Bauxites v. Insurance Co. oj North America, 270 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred 
in holding that an objectively inevitable loss arising from an unknown 
design defect was a nonfortuitous event and was not covered. The 
court of appeals adopted the Restatement definition of "fortuitous 
event" as the proper standard of review. 271 Because the insured 
contended it had no prior knowledge of the design defect,272 the court 
concluded that the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment 
for the insurer. 273 
In the context of a present-day claim for property losses due to 
contamination, an insurer may appropriately consider whether the 
loss is fortuitous. The loss may not be fortuitous, for example, if 
an insured knew that a process at its manufacturing plant was pro-
ducing a toxic waste product likely to result in clean-up costs or 
property damage.274 Even considering the limitations placed on 
the doctrine of fortuity by some recent court decisions,275 the re-
269 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 comment a (1932). 
270 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1983). 
271Id. 
272Id. 
273 I d. at 373. The court discussed and distinguished authority cited by the insurers for the 
position that a loss caused by a design defect constituted an inevitable certainty that should 
not be covered by insurance. Id. at 372-73. The court noted that cases frequently cited in 
support of the traditional doctrine of fortuity have been criticized as unpersuasive because: 
(a) many simply invoke fortuitousness "without any helpful analysis of the meaning of the 
requirement;" (b) others involve a finding of nonfortuitousness that is "based on the insured's 
own gross negligence or deliberate risk-taking;" (c) the doctrine is mentioned in dicta unnec-
essary to the holding of the case; and (d) the decisions emanate from a period in which policy 
coverage was construed narrowly and strictly as opposed to the broad construction that is the 
rule in many jurisdictions today. Id. 
274 For a discussion of the fortuity doctrine in the context of environmental liability claims, 
see Reeder, Fortuity: The Unnamed Exclusion in Environmental Claims Under the First 
Party Policy of Insurance, reprinted in Environmental Claims, supra note 4, at 112-19. 
Reeder takes the position that an insured cannot "in good faith" allege that its loss is fortuitous 
in an environmental claim if the insured has knowledge prior to the inception of the policy 
that its property is polluted or has polluted the environment in the regular course of its 
business without regard for the consequences or has continued to pollute despite notice of 
damage to the environment. Id. at 119. 
275 In Essex House v. St. Paul Marine & Fire Insurance Co., 404 F. Supp. 978, 990 (S.D. 
Ohio 1975), the court imposed an even more restrictive view of fortuity than that normally 
required under the modern view. It was persuaded that the loss was fortuitous because the 
insured could not have predicted that a loss would occur during the period of coverage under 
the specific policy at issue. The court noted, "[O]ne of [the insurer's] ... claims is that the 
[covered] face brick was bound to collapse within the policy time limits." Id. It went on to 
observe, however, that "even the defense experts were unable to state that it could be 
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quirement that a loss must be fortuitous remains a valid criterion 
for coverage. 276 
D. Increase of Hazard 
The "increase of hazard" defense is conceptually related to the 
doctrine of fortuity. A policy may be temporarily suspended if an 
insured volitionally makes a change in conditions on the insured 
property that creates an enhanced risk of a loss due to contamination. 
The defense applies to a change in conditions277 that increases the 
risk of loss resulting from an insured periF78 with the knowledge and 
predicted with certainty when the loss would occur." Id. Also, the court distinguished the 
holdings in Greene v. Cheetham, 293 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1961) and Chute v. Northern River 
Insurance Co., 172 Minn. 13, 214 N. W. 473 (1927), because in both cases "the loss was brought 
about by a nonobservable flaw in the insured goods." Essex House, 404 F. Supp. at 991. On 
the facts before it, the court concluded that there was no inherent undetectable defect in the 
insured face bricking that resulted in its destruction. Id. 
276 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1393, 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 277, 280 (1988). The court declined to apportion damages between successive property 
insurers for damages manifested during the period of policy coverage issued by the first 
insurer. Relying on the "loss in progress rule, i.e., that an insurance company may insure 
only against contingent or unknown risks," the court ruled that the insurer that covered the 
risk at the time damage was first discovered was obligated to pay for the entire loss. Id. at 
1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281-82. There was no duty to apportion the costs of repairing the 
property damage between the two insurers that had issued successive policies. The second 
insurer was not required to contribute toward payment of the loss, because "[l]iability will 
not be imposed under an all-property insurance policy where damages occur and are apparent 
before the date the policy takes effect." Id., 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282; accord Avis v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 283 N.C. 142, 148, 195 S.E.2d 545,548 (1973). Paint on woodwork and paneling 
began to blister and peel as the result of a fire, and the insureds sought to recover the expense 
of removing the paint and repainting. The court ruled the loss was covered, in part, because 
it "was not inevitable [i.e., did not inevitably occur with the passage of time due to an inherent 
defect); it was fortuitous in that it was caused by extraneous events not certain to occur." 
Avis, 283 N.C. at 150, 195 S.E.2d at 549. 
277 Many courts have held that only a substantial increase of risk will work a forfeiture of 
the policy. Smith v. Peninsular Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 212, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Richards, 290 S.W. 912, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). See 
generally Annotation, Change in Purposes for Which Premises Are Occupied or Used as 
Increase of Hazard Voiding Insurance Coverage, 19 A.L.R.3D 1336 (1968 & Supp. 1988) 
(summarizing cases addressing changes in the use of property where the defense of increase 
of hazard has been asserted). 
278 Whether an increase of hazard is substantial or material is generally a factual question 
to be determined by a court or a jury. See In-Towne Restaurant v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 9 
Mass. App. Ct. 534, 538, 402 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (1980) (whether gambling activities increased 
the hazard of loss); Brooks Upholstering Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 257, 262, 149 
N.W.2d 502, 506 (1967) (failing to repair a sprinkler system); Hahn v. Guardian Assur. Co., 
23 Or. 576, 581-82, 32 P. 683, 685 (1893) (change in the use of the premises from a general 
store with coal oil lamps to a theater with electric lights). 
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control of the insured. 279 Coverage is suspended until the increased 
risk is discontinued. 280 If a loss occurs while the coverage is sus-
pended due to an increase in hazard, an insured cannot recover for 
the 10SS.281 
The increase of hazard provision forms part of the "N ew York 165-
lines" standard fire policy,282 and is also included as a provision in 
the statutory fire policies adopted in some states. 283 Although the 
clause primarily is a factor in fire claims, it can expressly affect 
coverage for other insured risks. 284 
279 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D §§ 37A:274, 37A:279 (1985 & Supp. 1989). Negligence of the 
insured does not constitute an increase in the hazard unless that negligence results in a change 
of some duration in the structure, use, or occupancy of the premises. Id. § 37A:280. See, e.g., 
Plaza Equities Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 
Orient Ins. Co. v. Cox, 218 Ark. 804, 809-10, 238 S.W.2d 757, 759-60 (1951). 
280 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37 A:288 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 5 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2941 (1970 & Supp. 1988). Cases upholding the increase of hazard 
defense include: Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 
1065-66, 414 N.E.2d 205, 208-209 (1980) (insurer entitled to directed verdict on the defense 
of increase in hazard where a fire destroyed an apartment building in which the utilities and 
garbage disposal had been discontinued, tenants had vacated the building, and the doors, 
windows, and furnace were missing); Future Realty, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 315 
F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (hazard of fire was greatly increased where the insured 
permitted the premises to fall into a state of disrepair, failed to observe, inspect, or secure 
the building, allowed large amounts of debris to accumulate, and failed to prevent the premises 
from being freely and openly utilized by tramps and vagrants); Simpson v. Millers Nat'l Ins. 
Co., 175 Colo. 196, 199, 486 P.2d 12, 16-17 (1971) (evidence sustained findings that the increase 
in hazard of maintaining a cotton processing plant, as opposed to a general warehouse, was 
substantial and that the hazard was increased within the control and knowledge of the insured). 
281 See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 68 Ill. App. 3d 934, 937-38, 
386 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1979). See generally Note, The Increase of Hazard Clause in the 
Standard Fire Insurance Policy, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1963). The author argues for the 
application of a standard barring coverage for an increase in hazard only where the change in 
condition '''would materially and substantially enhance the hazard as viewed by a person of 
ordinary intelligence, care and diligence.'" Id. at 1478. Under a so-called "prudent man 
standard," the author posits that such a suspension of coverage would require: (1) an identi-
fication of the risk for which the hazard of loss has been increased; and (2) a determination of 
whether the increase of risk of loss is a substantial one under the circumstances. Id. The 
author argues that the adoption of such a standard for assessing the impact of the increase of 
hazard clause would minimize uncertainty for the insured and the insurer. Id. at 1480. 
282 In 1918, in the interest of policy uniformity and consistency of coverage interpretation, 
the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners recommended that states adopt the 
revised standard form of fire policy that had already been approved by the N ew York State 
Legislature. HUEBNER, BLOCK & CLINE, supra note 5, at 4. The 1918 New York Standard 
Policy, first revised in New York in 1943, comprised 165 lines of numbered text and is 
commonly referred to in the insurance industry as the "New York 165-lines" form. See id. at 
24,29 & nn.9-1O. For the full text of the New York 165-lines form, see id. at 27. Lines 31-
32 of the New York 165-lines form provide that the insurer will not cover a loss that occurs 
"while the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured." 
Id. at 23, 27. 
283 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 743.624 (1987) (conditions suspending insurance). 
284 See 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37A:293 (1985 & Supp. 1989). 
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Whether there has been an increase in hazard must be determined 
by a comparison with the conditions existing at the time the policy 
was written.285 Unlike the fortuity doctrine, the increase of hazard 
provision applies only to future changes and not to conditions exist-
ing when the policy was issued. 286 The provision is not an exclusion, 
but is a condition subsequent suspending coverage. 287 The burden is 
on the insurer to prove the increase in the risk of loss in order to 
sustain a denial of coverage. 288 
A split of authority exists on whether the increase of hazard must 
proximately cause the loss in order for the insurance company to 
rely on the defense. The majority view holds that the increase in 
hazard need not result in a loss to void coverage. 289 A minority of 
states holds that the increase in risk of loss must cause or contribute 
to the loss to relieve the insurer of liability.290 In Good v. Continental 
Insurance CO.,291 the court followed the majority rule and held that 
if an increase in risk is permanent and continuous it voids coverage 
under the policy, even though it does not produce a 10ss.292 The 
contrary view was expressed in Hawkeye Chemical Co. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance CO.293 Under either approach, if the in-
285 See, e.g., Future Realty, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 (S.D. 
Miss. 1970); Industrial Dev. Ass'n v. Commercial Union Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 222 N.J. 281, 
294, 536 A.2d 787, 793-94 (1988). 
286 See 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37 A:288 (1985 & Supp. 1989); see also supra note 280. 
287 See id. 
288 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Stanmike Inv. Co., 475 S.W.2d 295, 297-98 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1971); 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37 A:305 (1985 & Supp. 1989). 
289 5 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2941 (1969 & Supp. 1989); 8 COUCH 
ON INSURANCE 2D § 37A:278 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Note, supra note 281, at 1474-75 & nn.20-
21. See, e.g., Quam v. General Accident Ins. Co. of N. Am., 411 N.W.2d 270,273 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
290 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37A:278 (1985 & Supp. 1989). See, e.g., American Gen. 
Ins. Co. v. Bell, 116 S.W.2d 877,880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). 
291 277 S.C. 569, 291 S.E.2d 198 (1982). 
292 [d. at 572, 291 S.E.2d at 199. In Good, the insured permanently installed a distillery in 
his house after the insurance policy became effective. The use of the dwelling to manufacture 
liquor and to store mash and flammable liquids in large quantities substantially increased the 
hazard assumed under the policy. The court enforced the increase of hazard clause to deny 
coverage and agreed that it was "immaterial whether the use of the premises for the manu-
facture of illegal whiskey caused or contributed to the cause of the fire." [d.; see also Charles 
Stores, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 428 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1970) (observing that "the insurer 
may assert the increase in hazard defense even though the loss was not occasioned by the 
increase in hazard"). 
293 510 F.2d 322 (7th Cir.) (applying Iowa law), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). The insured 
operated a nitrogen fertilizer plant, and was insured under policies providing that the insurers 
"shall not be liable for loss incurring ... while the hazard is increased by any means within 
the control or knowledge of the insured." [d. at 323. During the period the policies were in 
effect, the risk of fire at the plant was increased when gas leaked from a "cold exchanger," a 
multi-layered pressure vessel. [d. The cold exchanger at the insured's plant exploded, causing 
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creased risk proximately causes the loss, even an occasional or tem-
porary increase of risk should be sufficient to void the policy. 294 
If an insured seeks to recover for a contamination loss under a 
policy containing an increase of hazard clause, an insurer is entitled 
to consider whether coverage has been suspended by operation of 
that provision where circumstances warrant it. 295 There may be no 
coverage where an insured is an industrial concern that knowingly 
alters its manufacturing processes in a manner that heightens the 
risk of a release of toxic wastes. Likewise, there may be no coverage 
if an insured is a manufacturer who undertakes for the first time, 
during the policy period, the production of a line of products that 
generate toxic wastes as a by-product. In either instance, if there is 
an accidental release of pollutants, there may be no coverage for a 
resulting property damage claim for contamination losses because 
an insured has knowingly increased the risk of such losses in a 
manner within its control. 
E. Covered Property 
Commercial and homeowners policies insure only the real and 
personal property designated in the declarations. Accordingly, an 
insured must have an insurable interest in the property at the time 
the loss occurred. 296 In Falcon Products, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of 
the State of Pennsylvania, 297 there was no coverage for a loss arising 
from the retrieval and disposal of contaminated metal table bases 
when the irradiated metal was contaminated before ownership 
passed to the insured.298 Because the contaminated metal was not 
covered property when the loss occurred, the all risk insurance policy 
did not apply.299 This case illustrates the importance of evaluating 
substantial property damage. [d. at 324. Contending that the explosion was causally related 
to the leak, the insurers denied coverage. The insured sued, and the jury found that, although 
the insured increased the risk of loss in a manner within its knowledge and control, the 
increase in hazard did not contribute to the explosion. [d. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying Iowa law, held that the increase of hazard defense "is inoperative 
in relation to the facts of this case. " [d. at 327. 
294 See generally 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 37A:278 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Note, supra 
note 281, at 1474-75 & nn.20-21. 
295 Arguably, an application of the increase of hazard defense should suspend coverage if an 
insured was involved in illegal activity on the property or knew in advance that the property 
was going to be used for an illegal purpose. See supra note 68. 
296 See 3 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 24:12 (1984 & Supp. 1989); 4 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 2121 (1969 & Supp. 1989). 
297 782 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1986), aff'g 615 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
298 [d. at 779; 615 F. Supp. at 39. 
299 615 F. Supp. at 39. 
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when the loss occurred before making the determination of whether 
or not there is coverage. 
In Falcon Products, the Difference in Conditions property policy 
provided: "This policy insures against all risks of direct physical loss 
or damage to the property covered hereunder from any external 
cause ... except as herein excluded and subject to all other provi-
sions of the policy. "300 The property covered under the policy in-
cluded: "[t]he interest of the insured in personal property owned or 
[thereafter] acquired, all while on premises owned, leased or occu-
pied by the insured, together with its interest in personal property 
of others in the insured's custody."301 Among the perils excluded 
were loss or damage caused by or resulting from contamination. 
The insured's subsidiary purchased the contaminated scrap metal 
and then melted it at its foundry to form the metal into table base 
castings. 302 The table bases were sold to the parent corporation and 
distributed to customers. 303 After the contamination was discovered, 
the table base castings were retrieved from the customers and dis-
posed of by the insured. 304 The policyholder incurred major expenses 
and sustained substantial losses, for which it submitted a property 
insurance claim. 305 
To circumvent the exclusion for contamination losses, the insured 
argued that its loss was not the proximate result of contamination. 306 
The insured claimed that the "efficient physical" cause of the loss 
was the negligent conduct of the person(s) responsible for the release 
of radioactive pellets that contaminated the scrap metal. 307 The trial 
court rejected the insured's interpretation of the contamination ex-
clusion,308 but did not rule on the insured's view that the loss was 
covered as third-party negligence. 309 In its order granting summary 
judgment for the insurance company the trial court ruled, and the 
300Id. at 38 (emphasis in original). 
301 Id. (emphasis in original). 
302 Id. 
3(J3Id. 
804Id. 
3(J5Id. 
306 I d. at 39. 
807Id. 
308 Id. at 38--39. The district court found that the metal was "contaminated" within the 
meaning of the policy exclusion for "contamination." Id. On appeal, it was held that the 
contamination exclusion provided an independent basis for denial, apart from the court's 
finding that the metal was not "property covered" by the policy at the time of the loss or 
damage. 782 F.2d 779, 779-80. 
309 615 F. Supp. at 39. 
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, that the insured had not 
sustained an insurable loss to covered property. 310 
An insurer should evaluate carefully whether the contamination-
related loss has occurred to property satisfying the definition of 
"covered property" under the policy. As part of this evaluation, an 
insurer should analyze when the loss occurred. Even if caused by an 
insured peril, there is no coverage for damage to contaminated prop-
erty that does not constitute covered property at the time of the 
loss. With that consideration in mind and to clarify coverage for 
contamination losses, recent revisions to standard forms of property 
insurance policies have expressly excluded certain additional types 
of property from the definition of covered property. 
IV. SPECIFIC EXCLUSIONS IN STANDARD PROPERTY POLICIES 
Apart from the defense that a claim falls outside the intended 
scope of insurance coverage, a specific exclusion from coverage may 
apply. An insurance company is entitled to enforce exclusions when 
a conscientious investigation of a loss establishes that the efficient 
or proximate cause of the loss was an excluded peril. 
In Mc Quade v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance CO.,311 the 
court granted the insurer's motion to dismiss the insured's action to 
recover for the insurer's alleged unfair and deceptive business prac-
tices. 312 The insured claimed the insurance company acted in an 
unfair and deceptive manner in relying on the contamination exclu-
sion to deny coverage when the all risk policy otherwise granted 
very broad coverage. 313 The court concluded that the policy terms 
were unambiguous and that the insured's claim was clearly barred 
by the terms of the policy.314 The insured's complaint was dismissed 
310 782 F.2d at 779; 615 F. Supp. at 39. The district court explained: 
[T]he policy provided insurance (subject to exclusions) only against all risks of direct 
physical loss or damage to property covered thereunder, namely, the interest of [the 
insured] Falcon in property owned or in Falcon's custody on Falcon's premises at the 
time of the loss. It follows as a matter of law and fact that irrespective of what or 
who caused the scrap metal to be contaminated, plaintiffs could not have sustained 
an insurable loss based on negligent conduct of third persons which occurred on 
premises in which Falcon had no interest and which resulted in contaminating prop-
erty in which Falcon then had no interest whatever. 
615 F. Supp. at 39 (emphasis in original). 
311 587 F. Supp. 67 (D. Mass. 1984). 
3121d. 
313 I d. at 68. 
3141d. 
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for failure to state a claim because the insurance company acted 
properly in enforcing the contamination exclusion. 315 
In most jurisdictions, the insurer has the burden of proof of es-
tablishing that a given exclusion bars coverage for a claim.316 The 
following exclusions are among the exceptions to coverage that an 
insurance company should validly consider in assessing the merits 
of a contamination claim. 
A. No Coverage for Losses to Land or Water 
Losses resulting from contamination of land ordinarily fall outside 
the scope of coverage or are expressly excluded. No standard prop-
erty forms specifically include land in the definition of "covered 
property."317 A currently used ISO homeowners policy form excludes 
coverage for land, including land on which the dwelling is located.318 
The recently promulgated ISO endorsement clarifying coverage for 
pollutants in commercial risks also contains an express exclusion of 
land from covered property. 319 
There is a dearth of reported authority interpreting a policy ex-
clusion of coverage for land. Cases addressing related issues may be 
relied upon by insureds, however, in claims that should trigger the 
land exclusion. 320 In Gibson v. Secretary of United States Department 
315Id. 
316 See THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 123; 13A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 48:142 (1982 
& Supp. 1988); 21 J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12245.25 (1980 & Supp. 
1988). In Texas, however, when an insurer alleges that an exclusion applies, the insured bears 
the burden of establishing that its loss did not come within the exclusion. See Travelers Indem. 
Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971); TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. r. 94 (Vernon 1979 
& Supp. 1988). 
317 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 45. 
318 HO-3 (Ed. 04 84) (SECTION I-PROPERTY COVERAGES, Coverage A-Dwelling). 
319 CP 01 86 04 86. See also the ISO Building and Personal Property Coverage Form (CP 
0010 1185), which, under the section "Property Not Covered," excludes land, "including land 
on which the property is located." The special Multi-Peril Forms do not contain an express 
exclusion for land. See MP 00 90 (Ed. 07 77), MP 00 13 (Ed. 10 83); MP 00 14 (Ed. 10 83). 
Indeed, the latter two forms each provide named peril coverage of up to $1,000 for exterior 
trees, shrubs, and plants (limited to $250 for each tree, shrub, or plant). The Building and 
Personal Property Coverage Form CP 00 10 11 85 includes coverage on a named peril basis 
of up to $1,000 for trees, shrubs, and plants (limited to no more than $250 for each tree, 
shrub, or plant) and excludes lawns and crops. The MP 00 13 excludes coverage for lawns, 
while the MP 00 14 excludes coverage for lawns and crops. Forms CP 00 10 11 85 and MP 00 
13 (Ed. 10 83), however, exclude the "cost of excavations, grading or filling." 
320 An insurer unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment based on the exclusion of 
coverage for "loss or damage to land" in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Protection 
Mutual Insurance Co., 664 F. Supp. 328 (N .D. Ill. 1987). As the direct result of the fire, PCB 
mixed with water and was discharged onto the land outside the insured building. Id. at 331. 
The court declined to rule in favor of the insurer because the available evidence indicated that 
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of Housing and Urban Development,321 the policy insured a dwelling 
against direct loss by flood, but excluded land values as "Property 
Not Covered."322 Under "Property Covered," the policy specified 
"One Family Dwelling" and "Household Goods. "323 The federal dis-
trict court ruled that there was coverage for the insured's loss of a 
dwelling because the insureds suffered a loss of use of the residence 
due to periodic flooding. The court characterized this loss as the loss 
of a property right associated with their dwelling rather than with 
the land on which it sat. In reaching its decision, the court agreed 
that only the dwelling and its contents were covered and not the 
surrounding land. 324 
Some courts have found land to be covered when an insured dwell-
ing is threatened structurally because the land beneath it has become 
unstable. In homeowners coverage disputes, some California courts 
have held that damage to the land underlying an insured structure 
falls under the term "dwelling" and therefore is covered, or, alter-
natively, that the insurer was liable for land stabilization costs nec-
essary to provide lateral support to a structure. 325 
Insureds may rely upon the above case law in claims under home-
owners policies for the cleanup of pollutants from residential prop-
erty where a dwelling structure is rendered uninhabitable. Such 
judicial authority should not be persuasive in interpreting the new 
policy language, however, because the policies involved in the earlier 
cases did not expressly exclude land from the definition of covered 
property. Further, such authority is readily distinguishable and 
the insured also incurred unsegregated costs for the removal of PCB contamination inside its 
plant. Id. at 333 n.8. There was no evidence presented about how much money was spent on 
the removal of PCB from the land outside the insured's building. In dicta, however, the court 
stated that it would have been willing to enforce the land exclusion had the facts warranted 
it.Id. 
321 479 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1978). 
322 Id. at 6. 
323 Id. 
324 I d. at 5-6. 
325 See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. General Ins. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (applying the 
common-law doctrine that a dwelling includes the curtilage and finding that repairs to the 
structure alone would not cure the damages until earth movement under the house was 
stabilized); Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co., 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 247-48, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650, 
653-55 (1962) (followed the Pfeiffer case in holding that the policy insured against all physical 
loss to the dwelling or dwelling building and did not expressly provide that ground underlying 
the dwelling was to be excluded from coverage); Cypress Grove Townhouse Project Comm. 
v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1987) (under a policy insuring "buildings 
and/or structures in all parts," the insurer was obligated to pay for necessary measures to 
provide the same degree of lateral support and protection from ocean waves as existed prior 
to the erosion precipitated by ocean storms). 
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should not apply to claims under commercial property policies for 
losses due to land contamination. In the absence of reported cases 
addressing a property insurer's policy obligations for the cleanup of 
contaminants from land, a claim for losses due to land contamination 
should fall outside the policy coverage unless there is an express 
reference in the policy that land qualifies as covered property. Where 
there is an express exception of coverage for land, the argument 
that there is no coverage to remove contaminated land is even 
stronger. 
There also should be no insurance for water as covered property 
under the latest ISO endorsement. 326 The newly released endorse-
ment entitled "Changes-Pollutants" (CP 01 86 04 86) amends the 
Building and Personal Property Coverage Form (CP 00 10 11 85) to 
exclude water as covered property.327 The intent behind this clarifi-
cation is to exclude all coverage for water within or upon the ground, 
as well as for water constituting personal property, such as that 
within any type of above-ground container. 328 
326 At least one court has reportedly allowed insureds to recover against their property 
insurers for their bad-faith failure to pay claims under homeowners policies due to damages 
caused by groundwater contamination. Potter v. Fire Ins. Exch., No. 606612 (Cal. Super. 
Ct., Santa Clara County, July 8, 1988), reported in 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 308 (1988). The 
insureds submitted claims to recover under their homeowners policies on the theory that 
contamination of their groundwater rendered their property uninhabitable. The insurer denied 
the claims in reliance on the contamination exclusion in the policies. After denying the claims, 
the insurers obtained the opinion of an outside law firm that there was likely coverage under 
California's concurrent causation doctrine as it was applied at the time. One of the insurers 
did not contest its liability under its policy and presented evidence at the trial that the claim 
was supposed to have been paid but was not because of an oversight. [d. 
The outcome of the insureds' claims in Potter would likely be very different if that case 
were decided today under a revised standard policy form and pursuant to the present law of 
California on concurrent causation. Most policies now contain "anti-concurrent causation" 
language. See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Glad & Barnes, supra note 1, 
at 8 (authors observe that property insurance "was never contemplated to extend to ground-
water and its required cleanup is beyond the scope of first-party coverage"). 
327 The new endorsement modifies the Standard Commercial Property Form by providing 
in relevant part: 
CHANGE~POLLUTANTS 
This endorsement modifies insurance provided under the following: 
A. The changes below apply to the following forms: 
BUILDING AND PERSONAL PROPERTY COVERAGE FORM 
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION COVERAGE FORM 
CONDOMINIUM COMMERCIAL UNIT-OWNERS COVERAGE FORM 
BUILDERS RISK COVERAGE FORM 
TOBACCO SALES WAREHOUSES COVERAGE FORM 
1. Under PROPERTY NOT COVERED the following is added: 
Covered Property does not include water. 
Copyright, ISO Commercial Services, Inc., 1986. See MALLIN, supra note 4, at 189. 
328 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 96 n.145. 
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B. Contamination Exclusions 
Many standard all risk property forms have traditionally contained 
an exclusion for losses caused by contamination.329 This exclusion 
has appeared in the policy form along with other excluded causes of 
loss. It has been the focus of relatively little attention, however, 
compared with the other exclusions that have been invoked more 
frequently.330 In recent years, though, the public has become more 
aware of the deleterious effects of toxic waste, asbestos, and other 
harmful pollutants. Given the high cost of cleaning up these sub-
stances, insurance companies can anticipate a dramatic increase in 
property claims by insureds aggressively pursuing coverage. 331 To 
prepare for such claims arising in the future, the insurance industry 
has modified the standard contamination exclusion to clarify the 
policy intent. 
Decisions from various jurisdictions interpreting the standard con-
tamination exclusion332 have applied inconsistent reasoning. On the 
329 The prevalent commercial form used to insure structures and personal property, the CP 
10 30 11 85, applies an exclusion for contamination losses to both real and personal property 
claims. A widely used standard commercial property form primarily intended to insure build-
ings, the MP 00 13 (Ed. 10 83), does not contain an express exclusion for losses caused by 
contamination. A commercial policy form used to insure personal property, the MP 0014 (Ed. 
1083), however, does contain an express exclusion for contamination losses. Similarly, between 
the All Risk Commercial Fire Policy forms, the CF 00 13 (Ed. 10 83) (Structures), and CF 00 
14 (Ed. 10 83) (Personal Property), only the personal property coverage form contains a 
specific exclusion for contamination. Standard Named Perils Coverage forms traditionally 
have not included a contamination exclusion. 
330 Butler, supra note 4, at 368. For a review of judicial treatment of the contamination 
exclusion, see Annotation, Property Damage Insurance: What Constitutes "Contamination" 
Within Coverage, or Exception or Exclusion from Coverage, 96 A.L.R.2D 1360 (1964) and 
A.L.R.2D Later Case Service (1983 & Supp. 1989). 
331 See Falcon Products v. Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 615 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D. Mo. 
1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1986). The insured tried to recover for losses it sustained 
in retrieving and disposing of irradiated metal table base castings. The relevant all risk policy 
contained an exclusion for loss or damage caused by or resulting from "contamination." I d. at 
38. The insured argued that, when read in conjunction with the policy's nuclear exclusion 
clause, the contamination exclusion did not apply to contamination resulting from contact with 
a radioactive substance other than nuclear fuel or nuclear waste. The court analyzed the 
insured's contentions and ruled that "[nJo such intent is here manifested." Id. at 39. 
332 Standard all risk forms containing an express exclusion for contamination losses have 
generally grouped contamination along with a lengthy list of other excluded loss causes. For 
example, the standard homeowners form HO-3 (Ed. 03 83) provided coverage for a "direct 
physical loss to property . . . except . . . wear and tear; marring; deterioration; inherent vice; 
latent defect; mechanical breakdown; rust; mold; wet or dry rot; contamination." A commercial 
form used to insure personal property, the MP 00 14 (Ed. 10 83), states that it does "not 
insure under this form against loss caused by ... rust, mold, wet or dry rot, [orJ contami-
nation." The Standard Building and Personal Property Coverage Form (CP 00 10 11 85) 
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one hand, many courts have enforced the exclusion regardless of the 
cause of the contamination when the insured property was in a 
contaminated state. On the other hand, if the cause of the contami-
nation is found to be a covered peril, some courts have refused to 
apply the contamination exclusion.333 
1. "Contamination" Defined 
Although many homeowner and commercial policies contain an 
exclusion for losses caused by "contamination," the term is not usu-
ally defined in the policy. A leading judicial definition has referred 
to dictionary definitions of the term and has focused on the condition 
of the insured property. In American Casualty Co. v. Myrick,334 the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that '''Contamination' connotes 
a condition of impurity resulting from mixture or contact with a 
foreign substance. "335 
Other cases have recognized that property can be contaminated 
when a foreign substance merely reduces its usefulness without 
affecting its original physical characteristics.336 Under this view, 
contamination means "to make unfit for use by introduction of an 
unwholesome or undesirable element," and implies "intrusion of or 
contact with an outside source as its cause."337 In Hi-G, Inc. v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance CO.,338 the First Circuit Court of 
provides, however, that the insurer "will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting 
from ... [rlelease, discharge or dispersal of contaminants or pollutants." 
333 For an overview of concurrent causation analysis employed in states that have adopted 
the doctrine, see supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text. 
334 304 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1962). 
335Id. at 183; see also Auten v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1986) (applying the Myrick definition), writ denied, 749 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1988); Ray-
bestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 289 Pa. Super. 479, 482, 433 A.2d 906, 
907-08 (1981) (citing with approval the definition of "contamination" stated in Myrick). 
336 In Hartory v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., No. 1395 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
24, 1988), the court applied a dictionary definition and interpreted contamination as meaning 
'''to render unfit for use by the introduction of unwholesome or undesirable elements.'" Id. 
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (l981)). By so doing, the court 
denied coverage for a homeowner's claim to recover losses arising when methane gas from a 
nearby landfill permeated the insured's home and water well. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled 
that the methane gas rendered the insureds' home and well unfit for use, but that the policy's 
contamination exclusion precluded coverage. Id.; see also Falcon Products v. Insurance Co. 
of the State of Pa., 615 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (exposure to a radioactive substance, 
which was later incorporated into the insured's products, destroyed the products' usefulness 
and they were contaminated, although there was no visible defect), aJJ'd, 782 F.2d 779 (8th 
Cir. 1986). 
337 Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D. Mass. 1967), 
aJJ'd, 391 F.2d 924 (lst Cir. 1968). 
338 391 F.2d 924 (lst Cir. 1968). 
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Appeals held that "while the introduction of an .. [undesirable] 
element may change the product itself, it is not essential to contam-
ination that it do so. "339 The district court in Hi-G made this same 
point by noting that a "thing may be contaminated when it is cor-
rupted by the touch or contact of an external object, even though it 
does not itself change in form or substance. "340 Under this reasoning, 
no palpable physical transformation in the substance or appearance 
of the covered property is required to constitute a loss due to the 
contamination exclusion. 
Potential fact scenarios triggering a claim under property insur-
ance to recover for contamination losses probably are unlimited. 341 
On industrial property, for example, soil contamination by common 
industrial substances is likely and may result in groundwater con-
tamination. Agricultural properties also may become contaminated 
by pesticides. 
Common sources of contamination at commercial properties in-
clude: asbestos (widely used as sprayed-on insulation for structural 
steel and in ceiling tiles in new buildings from the 1950's to the early 
1970's); PCBs (once widely used in electrical transformers and other 
electrical equipment); leakage of product residues (for example, a 
large concentration of sugar from a confectionary plant leaking into 
a nearby pond on adjacent land); and underground storage tanks (for 
example, abandoned heating oil tanks). Residential property may 
become contaminated by a number of sources, including the overuse 
of pesticides, leakage of hazardous waste or penetration of fumes 
from adjoining property, and asbestos. 
Federal, state, and local laws in some instances regulate accept-
able levels of certain contaminants and mandate remedial cleanup of 
hazardous substances where the presence of such substances is un-
safe or exceeds established safety levels. 342 Under the definitions 
339 I d. at 925. But see McConnell Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 428 S. W.2d 659, 
661 (Tex. 1968). The Texas Supreme Court held that damage to metal in a newly constructed 
house, due to an application of muriatic acid to floors, was not caused by contamination, but 
resulted from corrosion. I d. The court relied on the definition of contamination in American 
Casualty Co. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1962), denoting a state of impairment or "an 
impure mixture." McConnell, 428 S.W.2d at 661. The McConnell court did not consider or 
note the "unfit for use" approach employed by the court in Hi-G to define contamination. 
340 283 F. Supp. at 213 n.1. 
341 For a discussion of hypothetical situations illustrating potential contamination losses 
giving rise to claims under a property policy, see MALLIN, supra note 4, at 6-9, 112-23. 
342 Major federal statutes governing environmental conditions include: The Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 
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addressed above, contaminated property can be almost any property 
made impure or rendered unfit for use or occupancy by the intro-
duction of a hazardous substance. 
2. Case Authority Enforcing the Contamination Exclusion 
Many courts have found no coverage for losses arising from con-
tamination damage to property because the relevant all risk policy 
contained a contamination exclusion. The following cases highlight 
that claims for losses caused by contamination are not properly 
covered under such insurance policies. 
a. The Auten Case 
A recent case enforcing the contamination exclusion and denying 
coverage is Auten v. Employers National Insurance CO.343 The 
Auten court declined to follow the decision in Raybestos-Manhattan, 
Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers,344 a case holding that there was 
coverage for a loss resulting from third-party negligence even though 
the property damage was caused by "contamination," which was a 
specifically excluded peril. 345 The Auten court expressly rejected the 
insureds' argument that concurrent causation analysis applied,346 and 
held that "the policy excludes all losses caused by contamination 
regardless of the cause of the contamination. "347 
In Auten, the insureds contracted with an exterminating service 
to have a portion of their residence sprayed with an insecticide. 348 
u.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9605-9675 (Supp. v 1987); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6975 (1982 & Supp. v 1987); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 
& Supp. v 1987); and HWSE. Many state governments have also passed laws regulating 
hazardous substances and mandating the cleanup of such substances. See, e.g., The New 
Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 to 
:1K-35 (West Supp. 1989). A discussion of the regulatory scheme imposed by the respective 
acts noted above is beyond the scope of this Article. 
043 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 749 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1988). After 
hearing oral argument, the Texas Supreme Court determined that the writ of error had been 
granted improvidently and ultimately denied review on May 11, 1988. Auten, 749 S.W.2d at 
497. 
044 Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 289 Pa. Super. 479, 433 A.2d 
906 (1981). For a discussion of Raybestos-Manhattan, see supra notes 30-40 and accompanying 
text. 
345 Raybestos-Manhattan, 289 Pa. Super. at 483, 433 A.2d at 90S. 
346 722 S.W.2d at 470-7l. 
347 I d. at 468. 
348Id. at 468-69. 
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After the exterminator completed his treatment, the insureds dis-
covered that their furniture was covered with an oily film, their 
carpet was stained, and a strong chemical odor pervaded their 
home. 349 The insureds steam-cleaned the affected portion of the car-
peting and thoroughly cleaned and ventilated their house. N ever-
theless, the stain, odor, and oily film remained. The insureds also 
began to experience symptoms of physical illness. 350 
When the property insurer denied their insurance claim for the 
alleged resulting losses, the insureds sued to recover the loss in 
value to their home and their increased living expenses. 351 The ap-
plicable all risk policy provided that it did "not cover . . . [1]oss 
caused by contamination. "352 The property insurer defended by re-
lying on the contamination exclusion, contending the peril that 
caused the loss was excluded from coverage by the terms of the 
policy. 
Evidence produced at trial established that the insureds' house 
contained an above-normal level of Dursban, an oil-based pesticide, 
which had been applied by fogging rather than spraying. There was 
also medical testimony that Dursban caused the physical symptoms 
that the insureds suffered. 353 The only remedy was to eliminate the 
insureds' exposure to the chemical. Before the insureds' suit against 
their insurer could be finally adjudicated, the insureds settled with 
the exterminator.354 After the jury found coverage and returned a 
verdict for the insureds, the trial court awarded the insureds only 
their attorney fees. 355 
To surmount the insurer's contamination exclusion defense, the 
insureds argued on appeal that the ultimate cause of their loss was 
the negligence of the exterminator.356 Relying on case law supporting 
California's concurrent causation analysis, they urged the court to 
rule that they were entitled to recover under the all risk policy 
because third-party negligence was not expressly excluded from 
coverage. The Texas Court of Appeals rejected the insureds' argu-
ment. 357 It reversed the trial court judgment in favor of the insureds. 
349 [d. at 469. 
350 [d. 
351 [d. at 468. 
352 [d. at 470. 
353 [d. at 469. 
354 [d. at 468. 
355 [d. 
356 [d. at 470. 
357 [d. at 470-71. 
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b. The Mc Quade Case 
An exclusion for contamination losses was also enforced in an all 
risk homeowners policy in Mc Quade v. Nationwide Mutual Fire 
Insurance CO.358 The Mc Quade court found for the insurer on the 
ground that the contamination exclusion precluded any recovery. 359 
During the policy period, the insured hired an exterminator to rid 
his house of termites. 36o The exterminator applied the chemical 
Chlordane in such liberal amounts that the house allegedly became 
uninhabitable for an extended period of time during which the in-
sured temporarily resided elsewhere. The insured submitted a claim 
to recover under his homeowners policy. The property insurer denied 
coverage, citing the contamination exclusion. 361 The insured then 
sued the insurance company, alleging that it engaged in unfair and 
deceptive practices in relying on the contamination exclusion to deny 
coverage because the policy purported otherwise to give very broad 
coverage. 
The policy at issue in Mc Quade provided that "We cover all risks 
of physical loss to the property described in Coverages A [Dwelling] 
and B except: . . . contamination. "362 The insured did not dispute 
that he sought to recover under the policy due to the Chlordane 
contamination of his home. The insurance company moved to dismiss 
the suit for failure to state a claim. In analyzing the language of the 
policy, the court found the policy to be unambiguous and ruled that 
the claim was barred by the express terms of the insuring agree-
ment.363 Therefore, the court dismissed the insured's complaint. 364 
c. The Hi-G Case 
In Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance CO.,365 the 
court also enforced the contamination exclusion. The insured man-
ufactured small electromechanical switching devices known as re-
lays. The insured sued its property insurer to recover under a man-
ufacturer's output insurance policy for a loss resulting from damage 
to the insured's products. 366 As part of the insured's manufacturing 
358 587 F. Supp. 67 (D. Mass. 1984). 
359 I d. at 68. 
36°Id. 
361Id. 
362Id. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. 
365 283 F. Supp. 211 (D. Mass. 1967), aii'd, 391 F.2d 924 (lst Cir. 1968). 
366 Id. at 211, 212. 
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process, relays were placed in a heated industrial oven with a vac-
uum environment. A brief power interruption occurred. When the 
electrical power resumed, an oil vapor permeated the oven and its 
contents. A nonremovable oil film coated the intE~.rnal and external 
surfaces of the relays, destroying their usefulness and damaging the 
relays beyond repair. 367 The insurer declined to pay because the 
policy contained the following exclusion: "PERILS EXCLUDED: 
This policy does not insure against . . . Loss or damage caused by 
or resulting from . . . contamination. "368 The question before the 
district court was whether or not the damage to the relays consti-
tuted contamination within the meaning of the policy. 369 
The insured asserted that there could be no contamination of a 
product unless an actual physical change in the form or substance of 
the product took place. The trial court declined to restrict the con-
tamination exclusion to such a degree. 37o The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that it was not significant to the applica-
tion of the contamination exclusion that a detectable physical change 
in the appearance of the property occurred. 371 The court held that 
contamination occurs within the meaning of the exclusion if a foreign 
substance injures a product's usefulness, even without affecting the 
product's original physical characteristics. 372 
d. The Myrick Case 
An early case enforcing the contamination exclusion is American 
Casualty Co. v. Myrick. 373 There was no coverage when the insured's 
poultry products were damaged after ammonia escaped from a metal 
pipe. 374 The insured was in the business of processing and distrib-
uting poultry and eggs. A large refrigerated storage room used by 
the insured was cooled by an ammonia coolant flowing through a 
system of overhead coils. Goods belonging to the insured became 
367 391 F.2d at 925. 
368 283 F. Supp. at 212. 
369Id. 
370 I d. at 212-13. 
371 391 F.2d at 925. The court of appeals reasoned: "We cannot see how anyone could 
reasonably think that whether the contaminant entered into a chemical reaction with the 
spoiled goods was in any way significant [to the coverage issue]." Id. 
372 Id. 
373 304 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1962). 
374Id. at 181, 184. 
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unfit for human consumption when the overhead coils fell to the floor, 
allowing gaseous ammonia to saturate the storage room. 375 
The insured submitted a claim to recover for the value of the lost 
goods under two insurance policies. One policy insured against "di-
rect loss resulting from . . . explosion. "376 The second policy insured 
all risks of "direct physical loss or damage to the insured property 
from an external cause. "377 The latter policy contained an exclusion 
for "contamination ... unless caused by or resulting from loss of or 
damage to the property covered by . . . explosion. "378 
The insured asserted that there was coverage because the am-
monia escaped with sufficient violence to constitute an explosion. 379 
Alternatively, the insured contended that the loss was proximately 
caused not by contamination but by the covered external cause of 
exposure to ammonia gas.380 The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the insured. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed at length 
the meaning of the word "explosion,"381 and concluded that the evi-
dence was insufficient to find that an explosion had occurred. 382 The 
court then rejected the insured's argument that exposure to am-
monia gas constituted a covered external cause apart from the con-
tamination that proximately caused the 10ss.383 In light of testimony 
by a chemist that the damage was caused by a chemical reaction 
between ammonia and the water in the poultry goods, the court 
concluded that the loss was due to contamination. 384 In reversing the 
trial court judgment, the court of appeals held that "[t]o say that 
there was an external cause which was the proximate cause of the 
loss does not eliminate the exclusion from the contract. Since the 
375 I d. at 18I. 
376 I d. at 182. 
377 I d. at 18I. 
378 Id. 
3791d. at 181-82. 
380 I d. at 182. 
381 I d. at 182-83. 
382Id. at 183. But see American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Keleket X-Ray Corp., 248 F.2d 920, 
923 (6th Cir. 1957) (affirming a jury verdict that the escape of radium salt from a capsule was 
of sufficient magnitude to comprise an explosion). 
383 304 F.2d at 184. 
384 Id. at 183-84; see also American Produce & Vegetable Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of 
N.Y., 408 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (coverage was barred under a policy con-
taining a contamination exclusion, where it was undisputed that damage to the insured's food 
in storage was caused by leaking ammonia). 
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evidence establishes that the appellee's goods were contaminated, 
the exclusion in the policy must be given effect. "385 
3. Revised Contamination Exclusion 
A recent ISO endorsement titled "Changes-Pollutants"386 is in-
tended to address contamination claims in commercial policies. 387 It 
replaces the former contamination exclusion. 388 The express wording 
of the endorsement makes no reference to contamination or contam-
inants, but refers to "pollutants," a term defined in the endorse-
ments. 389 
The endorsement, by its express terms, is intended to apply to all 
losses where covered property becomes contaminated as the proxi-
mate result of an insured peril. 390 The endorsement alters the Com-
mercial Property Cause of Loss-Special Form391 by providing that 
there is no coverage unless a release, discharge, or dispersal of 
pollutants is caused by one of the specified causes of 10ss.392 When 
there is an ensuing loss by one of the specified causes of loss, 393 there 
is an exception to the new contamination exclusion, and coverage 
will exist solely for the damage resulting from anyone or more of 
the specified causes of loss. This provision continues the exception 
of coverage, found in earlier all risk policies, for losses due to non-
385 304 F.2d at 184. 
386 CP 01 86 04 86. 
387 Ozog & Ponzi, supra note 155, at 179. 
388 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 109. 
389 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
390 MALLIN, supra note 4, at 109. 
391 CP 10 30 11 85. 
392 CP 01 86 04 86. Section C of the endorsement modifies Special Form CP 10 30 11 85 in 
the following manner: 
C. The CAUSES OF LOSS-SPECIAL FORM is revised as follows: 
1. The exclusion of "Release, discharge or dispersal of contaminants or pollutants" 
in paragraph B.2.d.(4) is deleted. 
2. The following Exclusion is added: 
We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from the release, 
discharge or dispersal of "pollutants" unless the release, discharge or dispersal is 
itself caused by any of the "specified causes of loss." But if loss or damage by the 
"specified causes of loss" results, we will pay for the resulting damage caused by the 
"specified cause of loss." 
Copyright, ISO Commercial Risk Services, Inc., 1986. 
393 The definition section (§ F) of the Causes of Loss-Special Form CP 10 30 11 85 defines 
"Specified Causes of Loss," in pertinent part, to mean: "Fire; lightning; explosion; windstorm 
or hail; smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil commotion; vandalism; leakage from fire 
extinguishing equipment; sinkhole collapse; volcanic action; falling objects; weight of snow, ice 
or sleet; water damage." Id. Copyright, Insurance Services Office. Inc., 1986. 
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excluded perils that happen as a result of an excluded risk. Although 
the new endorsement does not expressly refer to coverage for "en-
suing losses," case law interpreting that phrase in earlier policy 
forms may presage how some courts will interpret and apply the 
new endorsement. 394 
Under this endorsement, if a fire results from the release of a 
pollutant, there should be no coverage for damage to covered prop-
erty due solely to contamination. Coverage should exist, however, 
for damage caused by the resulting fire. No reported cases have yet 
interpreted the above provision of the endorsement. It is anticipated, 
however, that the endorsement will be a significant improvement in 
clarifying the scope of property insurance coverage over earlier 
standard contamination exclusions. It should reduce the possibility 
that coverage will be found for contamination claims where none was 
intended. 395 
v. DEFENSES BASED ON POLICY PERIOD, CONTRACTUAL 
LIMITATION PERIOD, AND UNTIMELY NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Quite apart from the mandatory elements of a loss that must be 
satisfied for coverage or the exclusions that may preclude coverage 
394 In Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 146 Ariz. 284, 705 P.2d 1335 (1985), the 
court found the standard ensuing loss clause to be unambiguous. The phrase was not defined 
in the policy. The court relied, however, upon a dictionary definition to find "ensuing" to mean 
'''to take place afterward ... to follow as a chance, likely or necessary consequence: RESULT 
... to follow in chronological succession.'" Id. at 286, 705 P.2d at 1337 (quoting WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 756 (1969». The policy excluded coverage for loss 
caused by insects. A swarm of bees built a hive in an inaccessible location in the insured's 
attic. After the bees were exterminated, honey from the vacant hive began to leak into the 
insured's dining room, causing damage. The insureds sought to recover the cost of repairing 
the damage to the dining room as an ensuing loss, but conceded that the actual damage caused 
by the bees themselves-the cost of tearing out the hive and the accompanying repairs-was 
not covered. The court applied a plain-meaning reading and ruled that "the loss, due to honey 
seepage, is an ensuing loss and is covered by the policy, unless one of the other various 
exclusions applies." Id. (emphasis in original); see also Lambros v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 
530 S.W.2d 138, 141-43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (where underground water damage was the 
cause rather than the consequence of the settling of the dwelling foundations, a policy covering 
ensuing loss caused by water damage and excluding loss caused by the settling of foundations 
did not provide coverage); Goldner v. Otsego Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 440, 443, 336 
N. Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1972) (finding the phrase ambiguous and ruling that if the covered peril of 
explosion proximately caused the excluded peril of water to enter the structure and cause 
damage, such water damage constituted an ensuing loss); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Getchell Steel 
Treating Co., 395 F.2d 12, 15-17 (8th Cir. 1968) (a control panel fire occurring contempora-
neously with an electrical disturbance was covered as an ensuing fire under an unambiguous 
policy clause excluding coverage for losses resulting from an electrical disturbance to electrical 
appliances unless fire ensued). 
395 See generally MALLIN, supra note 4, at 109. 
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for certain risks, there may be no coverage because the claim oc-
curred outside of the period of time the policy was in effect. Also, 
in instances where the insured elects to file suit to seek a recovery 
on the policy, the insured's court action may be time-barred by the 
contractual limitations provision in the relevant policy. In some in-
stances, moreover, the claim may not be covered because the insured 
has failed to give timely notice of the contamination loss to the 
insurance company. 
A. Policy Period Defense 
Property insurance policies are intended to afford protection only 
for covered losses that occur during the period of coverage desig-
nated in the declarations. 396 The policy period defense may succeed 
where the insurer can establish that the contamination loss took 
place either before the policy became effective or after it termi-
nated. 397 Unlike fire losses, where the date ofloss is usually obvious, 
different legal questions arise where there is an interval of time 
between the act giving rise to contamination and the occurrence of 
the actual damage.398 Contamination losses may fall under the cate-
gory of continuing property damage that takes place during overlap-
ping policy periods with successive insurers. 
A recent decision by the California Court of Appeal should provide 
renewed credibility to the policy period defense in continuing-dam-
age claims. The case addressed coverage for a continuing-damage 
claim for property damage that first manifested itself before one of 
the insured's policies was issued. In Home Insurance Co. v. Land-
mark Insurance Co. ,399 the court declined to apportion responsibility 
396 See, e.g., Cambron v. North-West Ins. Co., 70 Or. App. 51, 54, 687 P.2d 1132, 1134 
(1984) (there was no coverage under a homeowners policy that specified that the "policy 
period" expired at 12:01 a.m. on the date of the fire for damage to the insured's property that 
took place at 3:00 a.m. on the morning the policy expired). 
397 See, e.g., St. Michael's Orthodox Catholic Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 146 
Ill. App. 3d 107, 110-11, 496 N.E.2d 1176, 1178-79 (1986) (a church could not recover for 
damage caused by the leakage of its roof where the leaking started nine months before the 
policy went into effect and the insured failed to establish the extent of damage that took place 
after the policy was issued); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 
747, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 106, 113 (1978) (insured not entitled to reimbursement of expenses 
under property insurance for "mudjacking operations" to minimize damage from faulty foun-
dations because the cause and damage by differential settlement had occurred and were 
apparent prior to the date the property policy took effect). 
398 See generally Hook, Respective Liability of First Party Policies Where Loss is Contin-
uous Throughout Several Policy Periods, in The All Risk Policy: Its Problems, Perils and 
Practical Application, 1986 ABA SEC. TORT AND INS. PRAC. 257. 
399 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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for the loss between successive property insurers where the damage 
was apparent before the second policy took effect.40o The two insur-
ers had issued successive policies covering a hotel during a period 
of continuing property damage due to concrete spalling (cracking 
and chipping).401 The court ruled that the insurer covering the risk 
at the time of the first visible manifestation of damage402 was re-
sponsible for the entire 10ss.403 The second insurer had no responsi-
bility for indemnifying the insured for the damage. 404 
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the first insurer's ar-
gument that coverage for the loss should have been apportioned 
between the insurers, based on the exposure theory commonly used 
in asbestos cases in California. 405 In rejecting the arguments for 
400 I d. at 281. 
401 Id. at 278-79. The case was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment based upon 
an agreed statement of facts. Id. at 279. The insurers stipulated that the insured's hotel 
contained structural defects that first became visible in December, 1980 in the form of concrete 
spalling. Id. One insurer issued a policy that covered the hotel from October, 1980 through 
October, 1981. Id. at 278. The second insurer issued coverage on the hotel through the date 
the claim was made in 1983. Td. Spalling of the concrete exterior of the hotel became pro-
gressively worse from the time 0f its first manifestations until the damage was repaired in 
December, 1983. Id. at 279. The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly 
ruled that the insurer on the risk at the time of the first visible manifestation of damage was 
responsible for the entire loss. The appellate court, therefore, affirmed the trial court's 
judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the second insurer. Id. at 278. 
402 The court used the term "manifestation" to mean "when the damage first 'bec[ame] 
apparent.'" Id. at 280 (quoting California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 
3d 462, 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469 (1983». The court limited its analysis to the stipulated 
facts before it, under which the date of manifestation and discovery of the property damage 
were the same. Id. The court declined to consider the question of whether the date of 
manifestation might differ from the date of discovery in some cases. Id. 
40:< I d. at 280-81. 
404 Id. at 281. The court held: 
Id. 
[A]s between two first-party insurers, one of which is on the risk [i.e., covered the 
risk of loss] on the date of the first manifestation of property damage, and the other 
on the risk after the date of the first manifestation of property damage, the first 
insurer must pay the entire claim. We wish to stress that our holding is limited to 
the stipulated facts before us. 
405 Id. at 281-82. Under the exposure theory relied on in California for asbestos bodily 
injury cases, an insurer is liable during any policy period in which there is exposure to an 
injury-causing agent. Id. at 281. The court declined to apply a recent California case th?t 
employed such reasoning in construing liability coverage for a third-party claim against an 
insured arising from continuing property damage. Id. (discussing California Union Ins. Co. v. 
Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983». Based upon California 
Union, in an effort to recover for continuing earth movement damages or pollution losses 
occurring over time, many insureds have filed claims against a series of successive insurers. 
Utilizing such an approach, insureds have often succeeded in obtaining a settlement from each 
of the successive carriers. See generally Hook, Multiple Policy Period Losses and Liability 
Under First-Party Policies, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 393, 397-401 (1985) (discussing apportion-
300 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:231 
apportionment,406 the court distinguished between property damage 
claims and asbestos bodily injury claims. 407 The court reasoned that 
a ruling to the contrary would have violated the rule that only 
fortuitous losses are insurable. 408 Even though additional property 
damage occurred during the period when the second insurer covered 
the risk, the court refused to find the second insurer liable in any 
amount for the continuing damage that first materialized before its 
policy was issued. The court was persuaded that a different result 
would foster uncertainty within the insurance industry about the 
nature and extent of risks that were covered. It reasoned that such 
uncertainty would ultimately increase the cost of insurance for con-
sumers and provide a disincentive to insureds to purchase adequate 
coverage. 
An important issue not addressed in Home v. Landmark was the 
question of when damage was sufficiently manifested to establish 
the liability of the successive insurers. The court tacitly applied a 
"reasonable person" standard of discoverY,409 but specifically left 
open the question of the correct standard to apply.410 The court also 
left open the question of whether successive property insurers could 
be liable on the loss before the damage was discovered. 411 
ment of damages among successive insurance carriers). The Home v. Landmark decision 
should effectively put an end to that practice. See Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California 
Homeowners Recover From Their Insurer For Subsidence Damages to Their Homes? 20 PAC. 
L.J. 783, 800-01 (1989) (contrasting the outcome for coverage among successive insurers 
under California Union with the result directed by Home v. Landmark). 
406 In concluding that the trial court properly declined to follow the exposure theory em-
braced in California Union, the court criticized that decision and noted that the decision 
"misapplied three pre-manifestation cases to hold a post-manifestation carrier jointly and 
severally liable." Home v. Landmark, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282. The Home v. Landmark court 
also observed that the holding in California Union had been limited to the specific circum-
stances of that case by the same appellate court that decided it. Id. at 281 (citing Harbor Ins. 
Co. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 1038,211 Cal. Rptr. 902, 908 (1985)). 
407 The Home v. Landmark court explained that the exposure theory is inapplicable in the 
context of first-party property damage claims. 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281; accord Hook, supra note 
405, at 398-99 (discussing the difficulties in applying standard rules of first-party policy 
interpretation to claims involving progressive loss or damage). 
408 The court relied upon the "loss in progress" rule. Home v. Landmark, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 
281-82 & n.4 (citing Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harper Jns. Co., 83 Cal. App. 3d 747, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 106 (1978)). 
409 Id. at 282-83. The first insurer argued that the trial court erred in inferring that the 
deterioration in the concrete exterior was severe enough in December, 1980 to put a reasonable 
person on notice of a loss. The court rejected that argument. I d. at 282-83. The court indicated 
that it would rule that a property loss should be covered by the insurer that insured the risk 
during the period it first became "reasonably observable by the insured" if it had the oppor-
tunity to do so. See id. at 279-80. 
410 Id. at 282 n.5. 
411 I d. at 279-80. 
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The unanswered questions in Home v. Landmark have now been 
addressed in subsequent decisions by the California Court of Appeal 
in determining the timeliness of an insured's lawsuit against a prop-
erty insurer. In Prudential-LMI v. Superior Court,412 the court 
expressly adopted a "reasonable person" standard, and held that the 
"inception of the loss" for evaluating the insured's duty to make a 
claim began to run when the loss became "reasonably observable. "413 
In cases involving progressive property damage unknown to the 
insured, the court implicitly recognized that undiscovered property 
damage may trigger coverage. 414 
The Washington Supreme Court enforced the policy period defense 
in a latent defect case in Villella v. Public Employees Mutual In-
surance CO.415 The court ruled that coverage was triggered only 
after compensable damage took place. 416 There was no covered loss 
during the effective period of one of the insured's two policies. The 
insured argued, however, that the alleged negligent installation of a 
drainage system around his house set in motion a continuous process 
of soil destabilization that resulted in differential settlement of the 
foundation.417 Because the alleged negligence and destabilization of 
the soil occurred during the period that the first policy was in effect, 
the insured asserted that coverage existed for damage to his resi-
dence that subsequently manifested itself.418 The insurer defended 
by pointing out that the first policy lapsed in August, 1982, and that 
the insured's own experts confirmed that the residence was not 
damaged until November, 1983.419 
The court in Villella did not reach the issue of apportioning in-
demnity for continuing damage among successive property insur-
412 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Ct. App. 1989) (the Prudential-LMI case is of interest for discussion 
purposes only because, pending review by the California Supreme Court, the decision by the 
Court of Appeal has no precedential value and may not be cited as authority), review granted, 
Sept. 21, 1989; see also Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 339, 260 Cal. 
Rptr. 299 (1989). 
413 260 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court held that both the insured's duty to make a claim under 
a property policy and the policy's one-year suit limitation provision are triggered when the 
damage becomes sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice of the defect in the insured's 
property. Id. at 86, 98. 
414 Id. at 99. See INS. LIT. REP., Sept. 1989, at 374,375-76. While not a necessary part of 
its decision, the court implied that the prior insurers could be liable instead of or in addition 
to the insurer on the risk at the time that the damage first became manifest. 
415 106 Wash. 2d 806, 725 P.2d 957 (1986). 
416 Id. at 814, 725 P.2d at 961. 
417 Id. at 810-11, 725 P.2d at 959-60. 
418 Id. at 811, 725 P.2d at 960. 
419Id. at 810-11, 725 P.2d at 959-60. 
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ers.420 Distinguishing the authority that construed liability policies 
on which the insured relied,421 the court concluded that there had 
been no continuing process of damage to the insured's residence 
during the effective period of the first policy.422 Although the' alleged 
latent defect in the drainage system and the soil destabilization 
occurred during the policy period, the insured could not recover 
under the first policy because there was no compensable damage 
during that policy period. 423 
There are no reported decisions enforcing the policy period defense 
in the context of a contamination claim.424 Cases addressing such a 
defense in other contexts, however, illustrate that whether the de-
fense succeeds will probably depend on when actual damage became 
420 See id. at 811-14, 725 P.2d at 960-61. 
421 The insured relied primarily on the earlier Washington case of Gruol Construction Co. 
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 11 Wash. App. 632, 633, 637, 524 P.2d 427, 429, 431 
(1974), which held that where property damage was a continuous process involving an undis-
covered, progressively worsening condition of dry rot that was set in motion at the time of 
construction, all three liability insurers of the contractor at different times were jointly and 
severally liable. See Villella, 106 Wash. 2d at 811, 725 P.2d at 960. The Villella court 
distinguished Gruol, noting that in Gruol the damage to the building was initiated at the time 
of construction and continued throughout the time that each of the three insurers provided 
liability coverage. Id. Unlike the situation before the Villella court, in Gruol the insured 
structure itself was damaged during each policy period. See id. at 811-12, 725 P.2d at 960. 
The Villella court was also persuaded by other Washington authority that construed the 
continuous coverage rule of Gruol as requiring that a covered injury occur during the effective 
period of the contested policy. See id. at 812, 725 P.2d at 960 (citing Castle & Cook, Inc. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 42 Wash. App. 508, 517, 711 P.2d 1108,1113 (1986». The Villella court 
noted that, under Gruol and similar California cases, the insurer "'on the risk' when the 
negligent act was committed and the initial damage suffered, was responsible for ... the 
damages that accrued after its policy expired." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing California 
Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 211 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1985». 
Because there was no covered injury during the first policy period, the Villella court did not 
decide the apportionment question. See id. at 814, 725 P.2d at 961. 
422 Villella, 106 Wash. 2d at 811-12, 725 P.2d at 960. 
423 Id. at 814, 725 P.2d at 961. 
424 In Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of America, 635 F.2d 1051 
(2d Cir. 1980), however, the insurer defended a claim for losses due to Phostoxin-contaminated 
beans by alleging that the damages did not arise during the period of coverage of the policies. 
Id. at 1053. The district court did not consider this defense, but granted summary judgment 
in favor of the insurer based on exclusions in the policies. Id. On appeal, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, while reversing in part and affirming in part, noted the defense, but did 
not address it on the merits. See id. at 1056. A related defense was addressed, however, in 
Advanced Micro Devices v. Great American Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 199 Cal. App. 3d 
791, 245 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1988). In this case, there was no coverage for the insured's costs 
incurred in removing a toxic contaminant from the premises of its semiconductor fabrication 
plant. Id. at 802,245 Cal. Rptr. at 50. Such damage had already occurred prior to the inception 
of the policy and fell within the policy exclusions for pre-existing conditions known to the 
insured at the time the coverage went into effect. I d. 
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discernible, rather than when the latent contamination began. 425 In 
Western Fire Insurance Co. v. First Presbyterian Church,426 a direct 
physical loss to property was caused by the accumulation of gasoline 
in the land around and underneath a church. 427 The court did not 
agree with the insurance company's defense that the loss occurred 
before the policy went into effect.428 The pertinent insurance policy 
became effective on March 16, 1963.429 Several persons had previ-
ously noticed a strange odor in the basement of the church. 430 The 
odor problem was considered to have been solved in February, 1963, 
when a leak in a natural gas line was discovered and repaired. 431 On 
March 28, 1963, the fire department issued an order closing the 
church as a health hazard due to the infiltration of gasoline into the 
soil under and around the church. 432 
The insurance company argued that the infiltration of gasoline 
onto the premises took place before the inception date of the policy. 433 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in 
favor of the insureds, ruling that the direct physical loss was sus-
tained by the church within the policy period. 434 The court held that 
the direct physical loss occurred when the gasoline accumulated 
around the church to the extent that the building was rendered 
uninhabitable. 435 
B. Contractual Limitation and Untimely Notice of Claim 
Defenses 
Apart from the policy period defense for claims in which the date 
of first manifestation so directs, the insurer should consider whether 
the contractual period for bringing suit has expired. 436 A clause in 
425 In McConnell Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 428 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 
1968), the insurer alleged that the Builders Risk Policy had expired before physical damage 
occurred. Id. at 662. The policy expired upon occupancy by the owner. Id. at 660. The Texas 
Supreme Court rejected the defense because the jury did not find that corrosion to the internal 
metal surfaces occurred only after the house was occupied by the new owner. Id. at 662. 
426 165 Colo. 34, 437 P.2d 52 (1968). 
427Id. at 38-39, 437 P.2d at 55. 
428 Id. at 39, 437 P.2d at 55. 
429Id. at 36, 437 P.2d at 53-54. 
430Id. 
431Id. 
432Id. at 39-40, 437 P.2d at 55. 
433Id. 
434Id. at 40, 437 P.2d at 55-56. 
435Id. at 39, 437 P.2d at 55. 
436 Examples of suit limitation provisions in standard property policies are: Commercial Line 
MP 00 90 (Ed. 07 00) (conditions applicable to Section I), which provides: "No suit shall be 
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an insurance policy limiting the time within which suit may be ini-
tiated on the policy is valid and enforceable absent a statute to the 
contrary.437 An action to recover policy proceeds is usually barred, 
when reasonable under the circumstances, if it is brought after the 
expiration of the contractual time limit. 438 
No decisions exist that apply the suit limitation defense in a con-
tamination context. 439 An insurer, however, should not overlook the 
brought on this policy unless the insured has . . . commenced the suit within one year after 
the loss occurs;" and Homeowner Form HO-3 (Ed. 0484) (Sec. I-Conditions), which provides: 
"N 0 action can be brought . . . unless the action is started within one year after the date of 
loss." 
437 See 18A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 75:88 (1983 & Supp. 1989); 20A J. ApPLEMAN, 
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11611 (1980 & Supp. 1989); Reader & Polk, The One-Year 
Suit Limitation in Fire Insurance Policies: Challenges and Counterpunches, 19 FORUM 24 
(1983). Statutory treatment of such clauses among the states varies. Oregon has adopted a 
one-year contractual limitation provision as part of a statutory fire policy. OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 743.660 (1987). New Hampshire has required the insurer to notify the insured of the deadline 
for bringing suit before the period expires. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407:15 (1983) (also 
mandating that the contractual limitation becomes effective only 12 months after the insured 
is notified of the clause by the insurance company). At least one state has enacted legislation 
declaring such provisions void. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1989) (restraint upon legal 
proceedings void); see also Fremont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass'n, 171 
Mich. App. 500, 502, 430 N.W.2d 764, 766 (1988) (suit for contribution filed by a fire insurer 
against a successive insurer was time-barred as a "suit or action on the policy" subject to the 
one-year contractual limitation period in a relevant policy). 
438 See Reader & Polk, supra note 437, at 25. The authors discuss the extent to which suit 
limitation provisions are enforceable. The majority rule is that "inception of the loss" refers 
to the time the physical loss occurred. I d. at 34 & n.76. At least one court has ruled that the 
phrase means the date when a cause of action accrues. Id. at 35 & n.81. Courts sometimes 
avoid the impact of the suit limitation provision by finding that the running of the period has 
been tolled. I d. at 35~6. In some circumstances, courts will decline to enforce the provision 
by finding that compliance has been excused or that the insurer is precluded by waiver or 
estoppel from asserting the defense. Id. at 37-47. 
Two recent California Court of Appeal decisions have enforced the contractual limitation 
defense to bar coverage and found that the period for bringing suit began to run when the 
property damage at issue became reasonably observable. See Prudential-LMI Commercial 
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86 (Ct. App. 1989) (pending review by the 
California Supreme Court, the decision by the Court of Appeal has no precedential value and 
may not be cited as authority), review granted, Sept. 21, 1989; Fire Ins. Exch. v. Superior 
Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304 (Ct. App. 1989). See generally Annotation, Validity of Con-
tractual Time Period, Shorter Than Statute of Limitations, For Bringing Action, 6 A.L.R.3D 
1197 (1966 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Property Insurance: Insured's Ignorance of Loss or 
Casualty, Cause of Damage, Coverage or Existence of Policy, or Identity of Insurer, as 
Affecting or Excusing Compliance with Requirements as to Time for Giving Notice, Making 
Proof of Loss, or Bringing Action Against Insurer, 24 A.L.R.3D 1007 (1969 & Supp. 1989). 
439 In Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indemnity Insurance Co. of America, 635 F.2d 1051 
(2d Cir. 1980), the insurer defended a claim for losses due to bean contamination by alleging 
that the suit was untimely. I d. at 1053. The district court did not rule on that defense and 
the court of appeals merely noted, but did not discuss, the defense. Id.; see also United 
Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-7172, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 
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limitation of suit defense where the time of loss can be isolated to a 
period outside the limitation. On a related point, if an insured delays 
in notifying an insurer of the loss, it may prejudice the insurer's 
ability to properly investigate the claim.440 In such instances, an 
insurer should consider whether an insured has violated the policy 
condition requiring prompt or immediate notice of 10ss.441 
We have analyzed many of the valid terms and conditions regularly 
included in standard property policies that limit coverage or that 
exclude risks from coverage so that there should be no insurance 
protection for contamination claims. Nevertheless, we also have re-
viewed potential reasons why an insured might allege that coverage 
for contamination losses should be provided. An insurer that denies 
a claim for pollution-related losses should do so only after making 
an in-depth investigation of the facts and a close review of the 
applicable insurance policy, as well as consulting with legal counsel. 
1988), reported in PROPERTY Loss RES. BUREAU L. REV., Nov. 1988, at 2966. The court 
dismissed the insured corporation's declaratory judgment action complaint against its property 
insurers because the insured failed to comply with the relevant policies' pre-suit requirements, 
that is, the insured gave no notice of the potential claims and conveyed no information 
regarding the damage or extent of the losses prior to filing suit. Id. at 2967. The property 
insurers had issued insurance policies covering 40 separate locations that were implicated in 
environmental claims for which the insured sought coverage. Each of the policies provided: 
"No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court 
of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with." Id. 
(quoting slip op. at 3). 
Because the insured had not satisfied its pre-suit policy obligations, the insurers had not 
carried out any investigations, adjustments, or appraisals relating to the insured's claim. The 
court was persuaded that, in the property insurance context, compliance with pre-suit policy 
conditions lessens the litigation burden on the judiciary by defining specific areas of disagree-
ment between the insurer and the insured. Id. at 2967-68. 
440 See, e.g., Colonial Gas Energy Sys. v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 441 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977). Substantial prejudice was established as a matter of law when an insured, seeking 
to recover for physical loss or damage to a liquid natural gas storage tank, altered and resealed 
the tank before giving the insurer notice of the claim. By so doing, the insured made inacces-
sible the only source of evidence that could have established the insurer's sole defense. Id. at 
769-71. But see United Technologies, No. 87-7172, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1988) 
(property insurers were not required to show that they were prejudiced by the insured's 
failure to satisfy the pre-suit policy conditions). 
441 For a discussion of the general principles governing the requirement of timely notice of 
loss, see 13A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 49:34 (1982 & Supp. 1989); 3 J. ApPLEMAN, 
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1391 (1967 & Supp. 1989). Most jurisdictions require a 
showing of actual prejudice by delay in order to sustain a denial of coverage for lack of timely 
notice. See, e.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85, 
99 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[Mjere delay or lateness of notice does not result in a presumption of 
prejudice to the insurer, who bears the burden to show it suffered actual prejudice, in the 
form of inability to conduct an adequate investigation or otherwise defend the claim. "), review 
granted, Sept. 21, 1989. 
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE 
AVAILABILITY OF PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
POLLUTION LOSSES 
In addition to the policy terms and conditions explored above, 
there are compelling public policy considerations that favor enforcing 
limitations on coverage to deny insurance protection for cleaning up 
environmental pollution. At the crux of the issue is the question of 
who should bear the costs of polluting our environment.442 The an-
swer to that question can be found in the public policy expressed by 
the United States Congress in enacting the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).443 
Congress established CERCLA's unique liability provisions in or-
der to require those who "profited or otherwise benefited from com-
merce involving [hazardous] substances" to pay the costs of cleaning 
up hazardous wastes. 444 Congress intended that those who derived 
financial benefits from activities resulting in pollution should be re-
quired to internalize the health and environmental costs of such 
activities into their costs of doing business. 445 
442 This question was recently addressed by the Washington Supreme Court in Boeing v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 55700-4, slip op. at 6 n.1 (Wash. Jan. 4, 1990) (en banc). 
The court held that the term "damages" in a pre-1986 CGL policy included response costs to 
investigate and remedy actual releases of hazardous wastes. In a spirited dissent, two justices 
of that court argued that the holding of the majority violated the public policy expressed by 
the United States Congress in CERCLA that polluters, not their insurers, should pay to clean 
up environmental pollution. [d. at 21-29 (Callow, C.J., dissenting). 
443 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-9657 (1982). 
444 Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 21 (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 848, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T. & PUB. WORKS, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIA-
BILITY ACT OF 1980, PUBLIC LAW 96-510, Vol. 1 at 308, 405, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983) 
(statement of EPA Administrator Costle)). See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. 
& Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (Congress intended to impose Superfund 
liability for the effects of past disposal practices "as a means to spread the costs of the cleanup 
on those who created and profited from the waste"). 
445 Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 22 (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 848 at 
n.2). See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1477 
(1986) (explaining that Congress intended to promote "corrective justice" by making respon-
sible parties liable for cleaning up hazardous waste releases under the federal hazardous waste 
statutory scheme presently in place); see also City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 
F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting that the one key objective of CERCLA is to 
promote cleaning up the environment and placing the ultimate financial burden on those 
responsible for the hazardous wastes); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems 
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the 
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Congress did not intend that insurers should bear the expense of 
cleaning up environmental pollution. 446 Insurers, under either prop-
erty or liability policies, should not be called upon to indemnify 
polluters-such as waste generators, transporters, toxic chemical 
users, or dumpsite owners or operators-for environmental losses. 
A finding of insurance coverage for such claims will permit the 
polluters to enjoy the maximum benefits of their polluting activity 
while spreading the financial burden of their actions to non-polluting 
insureds. 447 The net effect of allowing insurance coverage for pollu-
tion claims is to cause non-polluting policy holders to subsidize the 
activities of polluters. The recognition of insurance coverage for 
pollution risks, therefore, may operate to defeat the congressional 
intent that those responsible for pollution should pay to clean it up. 448 
Providing insurance protection for contamination risks actually 
may promote greater risk-taking by insureds and result in increased 
environmental pollution. 449 If some courts impose coverage for pol-
harmful conditions they created."). The congressional intent can be summed up in the slogan, 
"Make the polluter pay." See Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 22 (Callow, C.J., dissenting); 
Developments, supra note 5, at 1477. 
446 See Letter from Douglas M. Costle, EPA Administrator, to Hon. Jennings Randolph 
(Sept. 25, 1979), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIA-
BILITY ACT OF 1980, PUBLIC LAW 96-510, Vol. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983); see also Brett, 
Insuring Against and Innovative Liabilities and Remedies Created by Superfund, 6 J. ENVTL. 
L. 1, 52 (1986) CUlt is contrary to public policy to allow a responsible party to pass on the 
costs of cleanup, as well as other costs recoverable under Superfund, to its insurance carrier, 
and thereby retain the benefit of having another perform its public duty without ever having 
paid for it. "). 
447 Some courts have cited an emphasis on risk-spreading efficiency, that is, distributing the 
single loss of one insured among a large pool of insureds, to justify extending insurance 
coverage under the ambiguity doctrine. See Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for 
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (1988). That approach 
disrupts the efficiency of the insurance market, however, and causes all premium rates to 
rise. Id. at 1860-62. 
44' Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 22 (Callow, C.J., dissenting). The dissent in Boeing 
inferred the following reasoning for the congressional intent that polluters should pay for 
cleaning up the environment: 
Id. 
Congress clearly recognized that corporate polluters have reaped enormous benefits 
from their past inadequate waste disposal practices. These practices created signifi-
cant short-term savings for polluters, resulting in higher profits for them, but caused 
enormous long-term harm in the form of environmental degradation. CERCLA re-
sponse cost liability forces these polluters to disgorge these profits. 
449 See Fields, Superfund: The Court Search for Insurance Money, BRIEF, Fall 1984, at 7, 
9. The author remarks that New York's insurance code at one time mandated the pollution 
exclusion. The prohibition on pollution liability insurance was intended by the Legislature to 
buttress New York's environmental protection standards. The New York Legislature was 
concerned that the state's environmental protection effort would be undermined if businesses 
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lution losses, insureds may then underallocate resources for contam-
ination-related loss prevention efforts after purchasing insurance. 450 
The tendency of an insured to take less care to avoid losses than it 
otherwise would if it were not insured is referred to in insurance 
circles as the "moral hazard. "451 When an insured can "externalize" 
the costs of environmental losses by purchasing insurance, that in-
sured's incentive to engage in loss prevention efforts will be re-
duced.452 
An approach requiring polluters to pay for cleaning up the envi-
ronment, rather than their insurers, has received the support of 
could purchase insurance to protect themselves from liability for polluting the environment. 
Id. (citing N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 1971, at 353-54; 19 N.Y. Laws 2633). 
The legislative history of the statute explains: 
For example, a polluting corporation might continue to pollute the environment if it 
could buy protection from potential liability for only the small cost of an annual 
insurance premium, whereas, it might stop polluting if it had to risk bearing itself 
the full penalty for violating the law. 
Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 418, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (1981) 
(quoting N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 1971, at 353-54). In Niagara County, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated that the pollution exclusion in liability insurance policies was intended to 
"buttress New York's strict environmental protection standards. These standards could be 
undermined if commercial enterprises were able to purchase insurance to protect themselves 
from liability arising from their pollution of the environment." I d. A thorough reading of the 
history of the New York legislation mandating the inclusion of a pollution exclusion in liability 
policies in that state, however, directs that the bar to liability coverage for pollution losses 
was intended to be broadly applied, that is, to non-commercial as well as commercial entities. 
See Note, The Pollution Exclusion Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1270-71 
(1986). 
460 See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
14-15 (1986). 
451Id. at 14, 35; see also Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 645, 653 (1985) ("Individuals with insurance against certain types of losses are more 
likely to engage in risky conduct.") (citing Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 98 Q.J. 
ECON. 541 (1979)); Priest, The Current Insurance Crises in Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1547 (1987) (defining "ex ante moral hazard" as "the reduction in precautions taken by 
the insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance"). 
452 ABRAHAM, supra note 450, at 17. Abraham notes: "If a[n insured] firm's actual expected 
loss is high, but insurance premiums are only crudely rated, it may be economically irrational 
for the firm to conduct its activities more safely. It may be better off free riding on the loss 
prevention efforts of other members of its risk class." I d.; see also MEHR & CAMMACK, supra 
note 6, at 13, 14 (positing that insurance coverage "is also responsible in some cases for losses 
induced by carelessness because insurance may eliminate one's incentive to protect property 
or control losses once they occur"). Where coverage is priced below the insured's experience 
costs for prevention, insureds may not take safety precautions that would otherwise be 
worthwhile. In such circumstances, insureds may be able to obtain equivalent protection 
against risk by purchasing insurance at a lesser cost than the expenses for the precautions. 
ABRAHAM, supra note 450, at 78. Abraham also states that "inaccurate pricing or classification 
can allow insureds to externalize the risk of liability and to ignore the benefits ofloss prevention 
efforts." Id. at 44. 
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environmentalists because of its strong anti-pollution incentives. 453 
By declining to recognize either property or liability insurance cov-
erage for pollution losses, heightened incentives will be imposed on 
those responsible for environmental contamination and they will be 
motivated to take extra precautions to protect the environment.454 
The corresponding improvements in the manufacturing processes 
used by industrial concerns, the safer disposal of hazardous waste 
by those involved in such activity, and the enhanced care exercised 
by all who handle or use potential pollutants should ultimately lead 
to a cleaner and healthier environment. 455 
Environmental risks do not fit smoothly within the framework of 
losses that can be insured against. An insurer's most important 
method of mitigating the so-called "moral hazard," and thereby en-
couraging effective cost-internalization by insureds, is to create risk 
classifications and to vary the premium prices charged for coverage 
depending on the anticipated loss experience of each class of in-
sureds. 456 The deterrent effect of insurance is dependent on how 
accurately the premiums can be set and the risks classified. These 
principles, however, cannot be applied readily to risks of loss due to 
contamination. 457 
Property and liability insurers cannot calculate and assess insur-
ance premiums that bear any meaningful relationship to environ-
453 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1, 1989, at Bl, col. 2 (requiring polluters rather than their 
insurers to pay for the cost of cleaning up their pollution is "supported by environmentalists 
because of its inherent anti-pollution incentives" and because it "provides strong incentives 
against future pollution and holds past polluters accountable"). 
454 See Note, supra note 449, at 1253 (since the early 1970's, insurers have urged the view 
that industrial concerns will improve their manufacturing and disposal processes if insurance 
coverage is absent for pollution losses due to the exclusion contained in standard liability 
policies). 
455 See id. at 1253 n.82. 
456 ABRAHAM, supra note 450, at 15, 48. 
457 I d. at 46-47. In discussing the deterrent effect of liability insurance coverage for toxic 
torts, Abraham notes the highly speculative nature of predicting such liability and explains 
that: 
For many reasons, the amount of damage that current and past uses of toxic sub-
stances ultimately will cause cannot be predicted. Scientific uncertainty is one reason; 
knowledge of the hazardous properties of toxic chemicals is in its infancy. [footnote 
omitted] The synergistic effect of chemicals that have been mixed together during 
storage in waste dumps are even less clear. The ways in which hazardous waste 
migrates from storage facilities into contiguous property and water supplies are not 
completely predictable. And toxic tort disasters tend to be catastrophic in scope and 
sporadic in occurrence. All this makes it very difficult to predict the ultimate riskiness 
of activities involving toxic substances. 
Id. at 47. 
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mental risks.458 In the past, insurers have not calculated or charged 
insureds an accurately-priced insurance premium sufficient to pay 
for environmental clean-up coverage.459 Given the absence oj realistic 
data about the presence and nature of potential contaminants in our 
environment, it will not be possible for insurers accurately to classify 
insureds according to their probability of experiencing pollution 
losses or the magnitude of such losses if they occur.460 Because there 
is presently no way for insurers to accurately predict which subclas-
sifications of insureds may experience environmental losses, envi-
ronmental risks are fundamentally uninsurable as a practical mat-
ter.461 
Despite Congress's stated policy that polluters should pay to clean 
up the environment, and notwithstanding the unsuitability of insur-
458 Boeing v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 55700-4, slip op. at 23 (Wash. Jan. 4, 1990) (Callow, 
C.J., dissenting). The dissent explained that, in the context ofliability policies, 
An insurer who undertakes to insure response cost liability [under CERCLA] will 
therefore be liable for risks that are undiscovered and largely undiscoverable at the 
time the actions [that ultimately create the liability] are taken. "Because the mag-
nitude of such risks is inestimable-they're unknowable when insured against-it is 
impossible confidently to set a price for insurance against them." 
Id. at 26 (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits 
of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 958 (1988». The Boeing dissent concluded that an 
insured's potential liability for response costs under CERCLA cannot be assessed by insurers 
seeking to set premium levels. Id. at 28 (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF 
TREASURY, ADEQUACY OF PRIVATE INSURANCE PROTECTION UNDER SECTION 107 OF THE 
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980: 
A REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 301(B) OF P.L. 96-105, at 83-87, 94-95 (June 
1983». . 
459 Id. at 22 (Callow, C.J., dissenting); see also Note, CERCLA Cleanup Costs Under 
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: Property Damage or Economic Dam-
age?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1988) (when issuing older liability policies, insurers 
did not anticipate or plan for paying the costs of cleaning up the environment). 
460 Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 23 (Callow, C.J., dissenting). The dissent stated that: 
"[R]esponse costs [are] particularly difficult to insure ... [because of] CERCLA's imposition 
of liability for harms the party did not cause." I d. at 26; see also Abraham, supra note 458, 
at 959-60. Abraham commented that liability under CERCLA 
Id. 
[C]reates special uncertainty, because the probability of liability-and of consequent 
loss for the insurer-is affected by the behavior of non-policyholders whom the insurer 
cannot necessarily identify in advance. When the scope of that liability is potentially 
very large, that uncertainty is magnified. 
In order to insure against this threat, insurers would have to make nearly impos-
sible calculations based on both the potential behavior of the other parties whose 
activities might combine with the insured's to cause damage, and on the probability 
that these parties would prove to be judgment proof. 
461 Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 23 (Callow, C.J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that 
CERCLA liability is "fundamentally uninsurable" and noted that the novel components of 
CERCLA's liability scheme make it impossible for insurers to charge premiums bearing any 
genuine relationship to the risks involved. Id. 
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ance coverage for environmental losses, some courts have created 
insurance coverage for contamination claims when the express lan-
guage of the relevant policy should not provide it.462 When these 
courts invent coverage for environmental losses, contrary to insur-
ance policy terms, they do so to the ultimate detriment of insureds. 463 
In expanding coverage beyond the express terms and conditions of 
insurance policies, these courts most notably have relied upon the 
related doctrines of ambiguity of contract464 and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured. 465 Because polluters should pay the costs 
462 Abraham, supra note 458, at 960 (noting with displeasure that "judicial interpretations 
of policy language that insurers had regarded as fixed, clear, and limiting have expanded the 
scope of coverage against both the old and new forms of environmental liability"). 
463 Since the enactment of CERCLA, pollution insurance has become unavailable in any 
insurance market. Boeing, No. 55700-4, slip op. at 28 (Callow, C.J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 
Weishaar, Ledbetter & Light, Hurricane SARA: An Introduction to the 1986 Superfund 
Amendments, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1104, 1110 (1987)); see also Abraham, supra note 458, 
at 944 ("[F]or most businesses in the United States insurance against environmental liability 
is completely unavailable."). Many corporate insureds link the unavailability of environmental 
insurance to judicial decisions expanding coverage beyond that provided by the contractual 
terms. Insurers may be simply unwilling to issue insurance designed to cover pollution losses 
because the coverage will probably not be limited by the terms of the contract. In formal 
communications to the EPA, according to Hewlett-Packard, the "absence of viable markets" 
for environmental insurance coverage is caused by a "fear of our present judicial system and 
their insistence that all losses are recoverable-when only asked to discover the appropriate 
'deep pocket' and, in the absence of policy coverage, coverage will be created for you." 
Rulemaking Comment, Sept. 4, 1985, from Gerrold Keating, Risk Manager, Hewlett-Packard, 
to U.S.E.P.A. Revisions to 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265; see also Rulemaking Comment in the 
same proceeding from John Stallings, Senior Staff Environmental Engineer, Kerr-McGee 
Corporation at 2 (Sept. 18, 1985) ("[M]uch of the current insurance availability difficulty seems 
related to interpretations by some courts ... [that] have broadened what is included under 
coverage far beyond what insurers would reasonably expect under ... the conditions insurance 
was provided."); Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity 
Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1862 (1988) ("[B]y unpredictably extending policy cover-
age, courts render insurance companies unable to closely tailor premiums to particularized 
risks."). 
464 The ambiguity doctrine is a rule of construction generally directing that any ambiguity 
in an insurance contract must be construed strictly against the insurance company. See 13 J. 
ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7401 (rev. ed. 1976); 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE 
2D § 15:83 (1984). Other authors note that "there are literally thousands of judicial opinions 
resolving insurance coverage disputes in favor of claimants on the basis that a provision of 
the insurance policy at issue was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against the 
insurer." R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCI-
PLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(2), at 629 (practitioner's ed. 
1988). The ambiguity doctrine derived originally from the contract principle of contra profer-
entem. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932) ("Where words or other manifes-
tations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an interpretation is preferred 
which operates more strongly against the party from whom they proceed, unless their use by 
him is prescribed by law."). 
465 The reasonable expectations doctrine has been most widely applied as an interpretative 
tool in the construction of ambiguities in ins:lrance contracts. Note, A Common Law Alter-
native to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 
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of cleaning up environmental hazards directly, however, such doc-
trines should not compel a finding of insurance coverage for pollution 
losses. 
A number of justifications have been advanced for construing 
insurance policies against an insurance company466 that should have 
no application to a business insured that is a polluter. An unqualified 
bias for an insured should be inappropriate in instances where an 
insurance policy is the product of "arm's-length bargaining."467 Yet, 
some courts continue to rule in favor of insureds based on perceived 
ambiguities in policies when the insured is a sophisticated business 
or even another insurance company.468 That outcome may result 
57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A Common Law Alternative]. Some 
courts have expanded the doctrine to apply to the entire transaction of purchasing insurance, 
rather than limiting it to the interpretation of specific terms of the contract. Anderson, 
Reasonable Expectations and Insurance Contracts: What Should We Reasonably Expect 
From Judges?, FOR THE DEF., Apr. 1986, at 9, 11; see also Note, The Reconstruction of 
Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 155, 161 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The Reconstruction]. Under a broad application of 
the doctrine, the reasonable expectations of the insured determine the insurer's obligations, 
notwithstanding unambiguous policy provisions to the contrary. Note, A Common Law Al-
ternative, supra, at 1186-87. An exhaustive discussion of the evolution and specific applications 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. 
466 Under most circumstances, courts will act to protect insureds from contracts of adhe-
sion-contracts that are drafted by a party of superior bargaining strength and offered to the 
weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 900, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1963). In the insurance context, the use of adhesion 
contracts has been cited by some courts to justify bias against insurers. See, e.g., Hahn v. 
Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 145 & n.5 (Alaska 1976) (noting that "[u]sually, as in 
this case, the insured is presented with a form policy and has no choice as to its provisions"). 
Some courts will construe coverage in the insured's favor because most insurance policies are 
drafted on standard forms. Some courts do not interpret form contracts under traditional 
contract principles because these courts presume that mutual assent to all of the contract 
provisions has not taken place. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 133 Ariz. 139, 
144-45, 650 P.2d 441, 446-47 (1982) ("The only aspect of the contract over which the insured 
can 'bargain' is the monetary amount of coverage."); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 384 
N.E.2d 607, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("An insurance contract is prepared and drafted solely 
by the insurance company subject to no real bargaining and, thus, is a contract of adhesion. "), 
aff'd as modified on other grounds, 442 N.E.2d 349, 366 (Ind. 1982). For a survey of "modern 
rationales for the judicial bias against insurers," see Note, supra note 22, at 1854-57. The 
author identifies the following reasons cited by some courts as a basis for construing policies 
against insurance companies: (1) protecting individuals from adhesion; (2) the standard form 
nature of insurance policies; (3) detrimental reliance by insureds believing that they have 
purchased sufficient coverage; (4) the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry; (5) the 
efficacy of spreading the risk of a single loss among a pool of insureds; (6) simple "paternalism 
towards the insured"; and (7) traditional principles of equity. 
467 Insurance contracts for business insureds are often the product of arm's length bargain-
ing. See Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argumentfor Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1988). 
468 See, e.g., ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1985) 
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though the bargaining power of some business insureds may exceed 
that of the insurance company offering the policy. 469 
A judicial orientation by some courts unilaterally favoring insured 
commercial polluters also overlooks that there is often fierce com-
petition among insurance companies to acquire business entities as 
insureds. 470 Benefitting from the competition to issue commercial 
coverage, corporate insureds enjoy the option of choosing among 
policy forms and terms, have policies specifically written for them, 
and comparison shop for the lowest available insurance premiums. 471 
Under such circumstances, the notion that business insureds must 
be protected from overreaching by "monopolistic and abusive" in-
surers does not withstand scrutiny. 472 
(applying Pennsylvania law and strictly construing the language of the liability insurance 
policy against the insurance company even though the insured was a large commercial entity 
that bargained with the insurer); H.K.H. Co. v. American Mortgage Ins. Co., 685 F.2d 315, 
319 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying Nevada law and observing that under Nevada law any ambiguity 
in an insurance contract is construed against the insurer, even when the insured is a commercial 
party); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. General Trucking Co., 423 So. 2d 168, 171 (Ala. 
1982) (rejecting the argument that the ambiguity rule should be ignored in a dispute between 
two insurance carriers); Abraham, supra note 458, at 960 ("[Expansive] judicial interpretations 
of policy language that insurers had regarded as fixed, clear, and limiting have expanded the 
scope of coverage" even "where the policyholder was a business entity with access to coun-
sel."). 
469 Note, supra note 467, at 1857-58. In highlighting the bargaining power of some corporate 
insureds, the author observes that it is not unusual for large companies to hire "corporate 
risk managers" and to employ risk management staff to review company insurance needs and 
negotiate and purchase insurance coverage. The author notes that, in some instances, an 
insured's bargaining power may actually exceed that of the insurer. 'Under such facts, an 
unqualified bias for the insured is inappropriate. I d. 
470 See id, at 1859. 
471 See id.; Anderson, supra note 24, at 14 (characterizing today's insurance market as 
intensely competitive among insurers "all to the benefit of policyholders"). 
472 Some courts have recognized an exception to the ambiguity rule in the commercial 
context. See, e.g., MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Central Bank of Monroe, 838 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (applying Louisiana law and enforcing a liability provision requiring the insured to 
give notice of a claim against it, without requiring the insurer to demonstrate prejudice, in 
part because the insured was a sophisticated business presumably conversant with the terms 
of its insurance contract); Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 
1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law and stating that the rule "that ambiguities 
in policies should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the situation where 
large corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to 
a negotiated policy"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States, 
543 F.2d 71, 74-75 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying Oregon law and stating that "the rule [of strict 
construction against insurance companies] has no applicability when the language is supplied 
by the insured, his agent or his broker"); American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[R]elying on social policy to justify 
imputing an expectation of complete coverage to an insured" is unsupportable under New 
York law where the insured's expectations were consistent with the policy language and the 
contract at issue was a manuscript policy written specifically for the insured, a large manu-
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A reliance by some courts on perceived contractual ambiguities to 
favor consumer insureds unilaterally works against the efficient use 
of standard form policies.473 Standard form policies are indispensible 
instruments of the insurance industry that render risk distribution 
feasible and economical. 474 Their use should be continued although it 
is essentially an impossible task for insurers to redraft the language 
of standard form policies to eliminate every potential ambiguity. 475 
In the final analysis, intervention by some courts on behalf of even 
individual consumer insureds does not always operate as a principled 
decisional mechanism. 476 Because all language conceivably can be 
characterized as ambiguous, sometimes courts are left with virtually 
unbridled discretion.477 Such broad discretion may be used by some 
courts to reach result-oriented decisions and to find coverage for 
pollution claims where otherwise there should be none. The inter-
ventionist approach is improper because it permits judges on those 
courts to reach an essentially legislative decision-that a mechanical 
bias against insurers is justified.478 This view, when applied uni-
facturer of goods), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 748 F.2d 760, 766 (2d Cir. 1984); J. 
Ray McDermott & Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 466 F. Supp. 353, 361 (E.D. La. 1979) ("[Wlhere 
the contract of insurance is prepared by the insured and its broker, and only presented to the 
underwriter for its acceptance, the reasons behind the rule of construction favoring the insured 
completely disappear."). Commentators have similarly argued against the application of the 
ambiguity rule in favor of a sophisticated insured. See Ostrager & lchel, The Role of Bar-
gaining Power Evidenced in the Construction of the Business Insurance Policy: An Update, 
18 FORUM 577 (1983). The authors surveyed selected case decisions and identified the following 
indicia of the insured's equal or greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the insurer that some 
courts have relied upon in declining to apply a "contra-insurer" rule of policy construction: (1) 
the insured was represented by an independent insurance broker or agent in the negotiation 
and drafting of the policy; (2) the insured was a large company sophisticated in insurance 
practices; and (3) the insured extensively participated in the placement and administration of 
the policy. See also Note, supra note 18, at 1185 ("When dealing with a sophisticated insured, 
the public policy rationale for construing the document against the insurer disappears. "). 
473 A factor often overlooked by critics of standard form insurance contracts is that the use 
of form contracts economically benefits both the insurers and consumers by allowing insurance 
services to be provided more cheaply. See Note, The Reconstruction, supra note 465, at 170 
n.91. The author characterizes standardized contracts as an "economic necessity" and sum-
marizes some of these benefits. I d. 
474 See Note, supra note 467, at 1861. 
475 Id. at 1861-62; see also Abraham, supra note 458, at 961 ("[Tlhere is no completely 
reliable way for insurers to draft around the threat of judge-made insurance, because by 
definition this is coverage that ignores the apparent meaning of the policy language itself."). 
476 See Note, supra note 22, at 1862. 
477 Id. See, e.g., American Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 
1485, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 748 F.2d 760, 766 (2d Cir. 
1984). Absent adherence to the plain meaning of policy language, problems inherent to judicial 
exercise of an essentially legislative function are created. 565 F. Supp. at 1512. 
478 Note, supra note 467, at 1864; see also Note, supra note 18, at 1178 ("Congress, with 
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formly, erroneously assumes that employing an anti-insurer bias 
ultimately benefits all insureds, which it does not. 479 
A penchant by some courts for finding coverage in contravention 
of the express language of the insurance policy should have no place 
in resolving questions of coverage for contamination claims. The 
judicial doctrines of ambiguity of contract480 and the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured481 have recently come under sharp criticism. 
In light of the public policy objective that the parties who pollute 
the environment should be responsible for cleaning it up, and con-
sidering that pollution claims do not constitute a risk that is readily 
insurable, the contra-insurer rule of construction must be superseded 
by a policy that seeks to hold polluters, not their insurers, liable for 
the remediation of pollution. Insurers are entitled to hold their in-
sureds to the language of the policies purchased, and should not be 
required to cover pollution losses unless they have agreed in advance 
to do so and have received from the insured an appropriate insurance 
premium reflecting the uncertainties of the risk. 
VII. ACCELERATED SUBROGATION THROUGH THIRD-PARTY 
PRACTICE 
No matter how compelling the arguments may be against imposing 
liability on property insurers for contamination losses, when an in-
surer advances a legitimate basis to disclaim coverage, litigation by 
an insured against the insurance company may follow. In pollution 
its superior fact-finding resources, occupies a much better position than the judiciary to 
formulate productive solutions to the problem" of cleaning up pollution). 
479 See Note, Sl<pra note 467, at 1860 (arguing that a judicial bias against insurance companies 
interferes with the efficiency of the insurance market and raises the premium rates of all 
insureds). 
480 For a discussion of the ambiguity doctrine and its flaws, see Note, supra note 467. The 
author argues that the ambiguity doctrine is an unprincipled and inefficient means by which 
to construe insurance contracts, and recommends that traditional contract law principles 
prevail in the matter of insurance construction. See id. at 1872. 
481 For a criticism of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, see Note, The Reconstruction, 
supra note 465 (concluding that the reasonable expectations doctrine is an unnecessary and 
unmanageable tool in the construction of insurance contracts). See id. at 175-76; Anderson, 
supra note 24, at 13-14 (criticizing the doctrine of reasonable expectations and articulating a 
series of rhetorical questions examining the tendency of the courts to assume a legislative 
function when interpreting insurance contracts). One author has noted that a growing number 
of courts are retreating from the doctrine of reasonable expectations by narrowing its appli-
cation. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 324 (1986); 
see also, e.g., Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) (applying contract 
law principles instead of the doctrine of reasonable expectations in order to avoid "the danger 
that the court might create liability when none was otherwise provided by construction of the 
contract terms or creation of a new contract for the parties") (emphasis added). 
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claims under property policies, it will often be the case that a third 
party is legally responsible for an insured's 10ss.482 In that event, if 
the insured also has not sued the party who apparently caused the 
contamination in the same suit, the insurer should give serious 
thought to filing a third-party action against the party potentially 
responsible for the loss. 
Upon payment of an insured's claim when a third party may 
be liable, a property insurer483 is entitled to recover the amount 
of the insurance payment through a subrogation484 claim against 
the responsible party. 485 Under traditional SUbrogation princi-
482 See, e.g., Auten v. Employers Nat'l Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), writ 
denied, 749 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1988). A professional exterminator misapplied pesticides and 
rendered the insureds' home uninhabitable. The insureds sued both the exterminator and 
their homeowners insurer. In the suit for policy proceeds, the jury found that the exterminator 
was negligent, that the misapplication of pesticides caused a physical loss to the insureds' 
home, and that the loss was not caused by contamination. [d. Accordingly, the trial court 
ruled that the insurer was liable under the policy. The trial court allowed the insurer to offset 
its damages, however, and awarded the insureds only their attorney fees because they had 
already settled with the exterminator. [d. On review, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's ruling and held as a matter of law that the insureds' loss was caused by 
contamination, for which there was no coverage under the policy. [d. at 47l. 
483 Principles of subrogation usually come into play in the recovery of payments made by 
insurers under property insurance policies. The application of subrogation to payments under 
liability policies is much less frequent. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 134; RODDA, 
supra note 7, at 8. 
484 Subrogation may arise through principles of equity and may also be provided under the 
express terms of an insurance contract. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 132; RODDA, 
supra note 7, at 8. Subrogation has been defined as the "substitution of one creditor for 
another, the new creditor succeeding to the former's rights." THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, 
at 127; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979) ("Insurance companies ... 
generally have the right to step into the shoes of the party whom they compensate and sue 
any party who the compensated party could have sued."); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1229--30 (3d ed. 1969) ("The principle of subrogation is broad enough to cover every instance 
in which one person is required to pay a debt for which another is primarily answerable, and 
which in equity and good conscience ought to be discharged by the latter."); MAGEE & 
SERBEIN, supra note 190, at 91 ("Subrogation, as it applies in the field of insurance, is the 
substituting of the insurer who paid the loss for the claimant so that, if there is any respon-
sibility on the party primarily liable for the loss, the insurer may reimburse itself."). 
485 From a public policy standpoint, it is reasonable to allow the insurer to collect from the 
wrongdoer under the right of subrogation because otherwise: (1) the insured could collect 
twice-from its insurer and against a third-party tortfeasor for the same loss; and (2) the 
responsible party might escape liability altogether, even though it was responsible for the 
loss. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 131--32; RODDA, supra note 7, at 8; THOMAS & 
REED, supra note 9, at 127; MAGEE & SERBEIN, supra note 190, at 9l. 
In instances where the insured's loss is not sufficiently covered by the policy and the insurer 
pays the policy limits, the insurer may pursue subrogation for the full amount of its payment. 
In many jurisdictions, however, the insured is entitled to first-dollar recovery of any proceeds 
of the subrogation claim by the insurer. The insured must be made whole before any subro-
gation recovery can be realized by the insurer. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 133. 
Under such circumstances, it is not uncommon for an insurer and an insured to enter into 
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pIes,486 however, an insurer is not entitled to pursue a subrogation 
action to recover amounts that it may in the future be compelled to 
pay, but has not yet paid,487 as indemnification to an insured. 488 
a loan receipt agreement that authorizes the insurer to pursue the insured's uncovered loss 
as well as the amount paid under the insurance policy. The insured and the insurer ordinarily 
agree to bear a proportionate share of the litigation expenses and attorney fees in relation to 
the percentage each party's loss bears to the total recovery. The insured usually agrees that 
the insurer may control the litigation and may prosecute the claim in the insured's name alone. 
Under such an arrangement, the insurance payment is treated as a loan to the insured to be 
repaid to the insurer in the event of a sufficient recovery. See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE 
2D §§ 61:185, 61:84, 74:423-74:429 (1983 & Supp. 1989). See also HUEBNER, BLACK & CLINE, 
supra note 5, at 69-70; THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 130. 
486 Under a common-law right of subrogation, the insured is not required to take any 
affirmative action to support the insurer's subrogation lawsuit. The insurer merely has the 
right to file suit and substitute itself for the insured as plaintiff. One of the advantages of the 
standard subrogation clause in an insurance policy is that the insured is contractually obligated 
to cooperate with the insurer in subrogation proceedings. RODDA, supra note 7, at 8-9; MP 
00 90 para. 6(a) (Ed. 07 77). The standard subrogation clause assigns to the insurer only those 
rights of action held by the insured. MEHR & CAMMACK, supra note 6, at 133. 
The insurance company is relieved of any obligation to indemnify the insured under the 
policy and the insurer is entitled to recover from the insured any payment it has made, in the 
event the insured waives its right of recovery from another party after the loss has taken 
place. RODDA, supra note 7, at 9; THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 127-28; MP 00 90 para. 
6(b) (Ed. 07 77). Prior to a loss, pursuant to the subrogation clause, the insured may have 
released from liability the party against whom a subrogation recovery might otherwise have 
been sought. In many such cases, however, the insured will not have jeopardized its right of 
recovery under the policy. Under the "waiver of subrogation" clause in the standard property 
insurance policy, the insurer voluntarily waives its subrogation rights where the insured has 
waived such rights in writing prior to the loss, for example, in the case of a lease of property 
to a tenant or for property belonging to others while on the premises of the insured. THOMAS 
& REED, supra note 9, at 127; MAGEE & SERBEIN, supra note 190, at 92; MP 00 90 para. 
6(b)(I) (Ed 07 77). 
487 A typical subrogation clause in a commercial property policy provides: 
6. Subrogation. 
(a) In the event of any payment under this policy, the Company shall be subrogated 
to all the insured's rights of recovery against any person or organization and the 
insured shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever else is 
necessary to secure such rights. The insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice 
such rights. 
(b) The Company shall not be bound to pay any loss if the insured has impaired 
any right of recovery for loss; however, it is agreed that the insured may: 
(1) as respects property while on the premises of the insured, release others in 
writing from liability for loss prior to loss, and such release shall not affect the right 
of the insured to recover hereunder, and 
(2) as respects property in transit, accept such bills of lading, receipts or contracts 
of transportation as are ordinarily issued by carriers containing a limitation as to the 
value of such goods or merchandise. 
MP 00 90 (Ed. 07 77) (special mUlti-peril policy conditions and definitions). 
488 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 61:39 (1983 & Supp. 1989); see also MEHR & CAMMACK, 
supra note 6, at 132 ("[T]he claim must first be paid before the insurer can exercise the 
subrogation right. "). 
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A property insurer considering its response to a contamination 
claim may be faced with a "Hobson's choice"-an election without 
an alternative.489 In the event an insurer determines that there is a 
valid basis to disclaim coverage for an insured's contamination claim, 
it will not be uncommon for the insured to disagree and threaten 
litigation unless the claim is paid. If an insurer pays a claim for which 
the policy provided no coverage, however, the insurer is merely a 
volunteer payee that has no right of subrogation. 490 On the other 
hand, if an insurer denies the claim and an insured Ultimately pre-
vails in its lawsuit for coverage, the insurer's potential subrogation 
action may be jeopardized because of an inability to preserve vital 
evidence or the expiration of an applicable limitations period. 491 
In practice, one solution to this dilemma used by insurers is resort 
to third-party actions in claims disputes where an insured has sued 
an insurance company.492 In the context of environmental claims, an 
insurer's decision to pursue a subrogated claim against a third party 
who is responsible for the loss embodies the public policy objectives 
expressed by Congress that those responsible for pollution damage 
should pay for cleaning it up. A third-party action by an insurer also 
should function as a deterrent against future pollution activity by 
the responsible tortfeasor.493 
489 Pictorial Review Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 766,769 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (defining a "Hobson's 
choice" as an election by compulsion or without freedom of choice). See, e.g., Louisville and 
Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 F.2d 533, 538-40 (6th Cir. 
1985). The insured was a municipality that operated a wastewater treatment plant that was 
damaged when a third party illegally dumped toxic waste into the sewer system. [d. at 534. 
After the property insurer denied coverage for the loss, the insured sued both its property 
insurer and the potentially liable tortfeasors. [d. at 535. Before the suit against the insurer 
was resolved, the insured recovered 97.7% of its losses (totalling $299,669) from the manu-
facturer and handlers of the toxic material. Although the court reduced the insurer's liability 
under the policy accordingly (leaving $6,892 of the loss outstanding), it ordered the insurer to 
pay its proportionate share of the insured's litigation expenses incurred in the suit against 
the responsible third parties (the insurer's share totalled $104,628). [d. 
490 THOMAS & REED, supra note 9, at 127. 
491 Krause v. American Guar. & Liability Ins. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 147, 239 N.E.2d 175 (1968) 
(noting the "extreme injustice" to the insurers if they were required to resolve the main claim 
by the insured before initiating a claim against the third-party tortfeasor). But see Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 41 A.D.2d 37,40,340 N. Y.S.2d 991,995 (1973) (dissent 
argued vigorously that the insurer should be required to pay the insured's claim prior to 
initiating a third-party action against the party responsible for the loss). 
492 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 41 A.D.2d at 40,340 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court's decision to deny the third-party defendant's motion to dismiss the 
third-party complaint where otherwise the potential subrogation claim might have become 
time-barred). 
493 ABRAHAM, supra note 450, at 51-57 (by exercising subrogation rights, a subrogated 
compensation fund may playa potentially significant role in deterring risky activities giving 
rise to toxic tort liability by third parties). 
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Some courts have allowed insurers to initiate "accelerated" sub-
rogation actions against tortfeasors responsible for an insured's prop-
erty damage before finally resolving and making payment on an 
insured's claim. 494 This practice has been allowed under federa1495 
and state496 civil procedure statutes permitting a defendant to im-
plead a third party "who is or may be liable" to the defendant for 
the damages sought in the plaintiff's original suit. 497 Under such an 
approach, insurers, as defendants in suits brought by their insureds, 
are permitted to expedite subrogation by impleading a negligent 
third party ultimately responsible for an insured's loss. 
494 See, e.g., J&B Schoenfeld v. Albany Ins. Co., 109 A.D.2d 370,374,492 N.Y.S.2d 38,41-
42 (1985) (the insurer's act of impleading the alleged tortfeasor as a third-party defendant is 
the extent of the subrogation right that an insurer may exercise prior to making a payment 
to the insured on a claim). 
495 Federal courts construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), governing third-party 
actions, have regularly permitted insurance companies to implead third-party defendants 
based on a contingent subrogation theory. See, e.g., Concordia College Corp. v. Great Am. 
Ins. Co., 14 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D. Minn. 1953) (permitting an insurer to implead an architect 
and subcontractor on theories of negligence and breach of warranty on an inchoate claim for 
subrogation under the terms of an insurance policy). Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. 
Corp., 199 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1952) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the defendant 
insurer's third-party complaint, stating that: "Rule 14 was desigued to prevent this circuity 
of action and to enable the rights of an indemnitee against an indemnitor and the rights of 
the latter against a wrongdoer to be finally settled in one and the same suit"); St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258 F.2d 374,375-76 (2d Cir. 1958) (held that 
the insured's filing of the third-party complaint had tolled the running of the pertinent statute 
of limitations, even though the subrogation rights on which the complaint was based would 
not accrue until some time later, after the insured had paid the underlying judgment), cert. 
denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959); International Harvester Co. v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 45 
F.R.D. 4, 8 (E.D. Wis. 1968) ("The fact that ... [an insurer] has not as yet paid or may not 
have to pay the claim is immaterial" in an impleader action against a third party pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)); Monarch Indus. Corp. v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 
276 F. Supp. 972, 980 (S.D.N. Y. 1967) (although the insurer was not authorized to bring a 
separate suit as a subrogee until the insured had been paid, the insurer could sue the third-
party tortfeasor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)); Lee's Inc. v. Transcontinental 
Underwriters, 9 F.R.D. 470, 471 (D. Md. 1949) (the potential prejudice to the insureds did 
not outweigh the possible benefits to be derived from the use of third-party procedure to 
implead the potentially liable third party). 
496 See e.g., Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 105 Mich. App. 487, 307 
N.W.2d 78 (1981) (insurer was entitled to implead third-party defendants based on their 
potential liability, despite the fact that insurer had not paid insured's claim); Foley Mach. Co. 
v. Amland Contractors, Inc., 209 N.J. Super. 70, 77, 506 A.2d 1263, 1267 (1986) (citing New 
Jersey Civil Practice Rule 4:27-l(b) and relying on the court's policy of resolving all aspects 
of a controversy in a single action, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court ruled that an 
insurer had standing to assert a third-party claim as subrogee even though it had not yet paid 
its insured's claim). 
497 In Glens Falls, the appellate court reversed the trial court, concluding that the impleader 
action could not have been dismissed in the exercise of the court's discretion, because to do 
so would "clearly frustrate the purpose" of the third-party practice rule. 199 F.2d 60, 64 (4th 
Cir.1952). 
--------------
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A recent decision by the Illinois Appellate Court, however, has 
established a judicial precedent tending to discredit this short-cut 
route to subrogation. In Johnson v. State Farm Insurance CO.,498 
the court ruled against the use of accelerated subrogation through 
third-party practice. The court held that third-party civil suits could 
not be utilized to circumvent the common-law rule requiring an 
insurer to pay its insured prior to pursuing any subrogation rights. 499 
Under the Illinois court's ruling, the standard subrogation clause in 
the property policy at issue precluded the insurer from impleading 
a third party into the underlying action initiated by the insureds. 500 
That was the outcome, even though the third party allegedly was 
responsible for the damage to the insured's property. 501 
Under the Illinois statute governing third-party proceedings,502 
the defendant insurer was authorized, with court approval, to im-
plead a non-party "who is or may be liable" for "all or part of the 
plaintiff's claim. "503 The insurer argued that, in the interest of fair-
ness, the third-party claim should have been allowed. 504 The court 
disagreed, relying on the insureds' allegations of undue delay by the 
insurance company in settling their claim.505 In addition to the com-
mon-law SUbrogation doctrine that the debt must have been paid in 
full, the court also was persuaded by policy considerations favoring 
speedy payment to insureds. 506 
498 151 Ill. App. 3d 672, 503 N.E.2d 602 (1987). 
499Id. at 673-74, 503 N.E.2d at 604. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal 
of the insurer's third-party complaint. Id. at 676, 503 N.E.2d at 605. The court rejected the 
insurer's contention that the trial court mistakenly relied on '''anachronistic common law 
doctrines of subrogation'" in requiring actual payment as a prerequisite to bringing a third-
party action. Id. at 674,503 N.E.2d at 604. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the express 
terms of the subrogation clause required the insurance company to pay its insureds before it 
could maintain a third-party suit against the alleged tortfeasor. Id. 
500 Id. 
501Id. at 673, 503 N.E.2d at 603. 
502 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, ~ 2-406 (1985). 
503Id. 
504 151 Ill. App. 3d at 673-74, 503 N.E.2d at 604. 
505Id. at 673, 674, 503 N.E.2d at 603, 604. 
506Id. at 675, 503 N.E.2d at 605. The court explained: 
[W]ere we to permit the insurer to proceed without having discharged its obligation 
to its insured, we would be defeating one of the primary functions of insurance-that 
is, recovering for one's losses quickly and simply by filing a claim with the insurer 
and avoiding the trouble, time, expense and uncertainty of lawsuits-while doing 
nothing to discourage the insurer from delaying the settlement of claims, such as has 
been alleged in the main complaint in this case. 
Id. But see Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 105 Mich. App. 487, 490, 307 
N.W.2d 78, 82 (1981) (discussing the factors to be taken into account by the trial court in 
ruling on an insurer's attempt to use third-party practice to expedite subrogation). 
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New York courts have reached the opposite result from the Illinois 
decision. In Cassel Vacation Homes, Inc. v. Commercial Union 
Insurance,507 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court and ruled that the insurer's impleader 
action against an allegedly negligent third party was proper. 508 The 
court ruled that the New York statute authorizing a third-party 
claim against any person "who is or may be liable" for all or part of 
the underlying claim permitted contingent claims based on subro-
gation. 509 The court disagreed with the third-party defendant's po-
sition that the applicable insurance policies provided for a subroga-
tion action only after the insurers actually paid the insured's 
claims. 510 The N ew York Court of Appeals articulated valid public 
policy reasons for allowing an accelerated sUbrogation action through 
the use of third-party practice in Krause v. American Guaranty & 
Liability Insurance CO.511 
An immediate subrogation claim via third-party practice should 
be considered by insurers, where appropriate, to protect their con-
tingent subrogation rights in pollution claims. By doing so, an insurer 
should be able to preserve important evidence of the third party's 
liability, and can avoid the risk that a later subrogation action may 
be time-barred. The recent Illinois appellate decision in Johnson v. 
State Farm, however, may undermine this approach. Nevertheless, 
the great weight of reported authority addressing the issue and the 
express wording of civil practice statutes in most jurisdictions sup-
port the use of impleader actions as a basis to accelerate subrogation. 
An insurer confronted with an insurance action by its insured to 
collect for contamination damage to property caused by a negligent 
third party should not overlook this option. Insurers and their legal 
counsel should consult the third-party practice rules of the local 
jurisdiction and consider filing a claim against the responsible tort-
feasor at the first opportunity. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The environmental crisis should not be resolved by saddling prop-
erty insurers with responsibility for cleaning up and repairing pol-
lution damage unless they have expressly agreed to provide such 
507 121 A.D.2d 674, 504 N. Y.S.2d 443 (1986). 
508 [d. at 675, 503 N. Y. S.2d at 443. 
509 [d. at 676, 503 N.E.2d at 444. 
5\0 [d. 
511 22 N.Y.2d 147, 155-56,239 N.E.2d 175,179-80 (1968). 
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coverage and have been fairly compensated for assuming such risks. 
This Article has surveyed many available defenses that should ex-
clude coverage for contamination losses under first-party property 
insurance. A thorough analysis of the terms and conditions of stan-
dard property insurance policies reveals that pollution losses usually 
should fall outside the intended scope of coverage. Environmental 
claims under property insurance also should be excluded by express 
policy provisions that bar coverage for certain specified risks. 
There are potential arguments, however, that contamination 
losses should be covered under traditional forms of property insur-
ance. To counter such arguments, revised policy language has been 
adopted by many property insurers to clarify the policy intent that 
environmental losses are not covered absent a special endorsement 
expressly providing such coverage. 
Additionally, in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, Congress determined that pollu-
ters should pay for the environmental damage they inflict. Allowing 
polluters to externalize pollution clean-up costs through property 
insurance coverage, however, will defeat the public policy objectives 
behind CERCLA. Requiring those who pollute to be directly re-
sponsible for the environmental consequences of their activities will 
encourage safety measures to prevent future pollution losses. The 
latter approach will encourage enhanced efforts to protect the en-
vironment. 
Whether there is coverage for contamination claims under stan-
dard forms of property insurance policies is a question that must be 
left to the courts to decide on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. 
Insurers should continue to insist, however, that the property in-
surance policies they issue should be enforced to exclude environ-
mental coverage where none was intended. 
